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ABSTRACT
Latin America is assuming greater importance for the 
United States as a result of increasing American dependence 
on foreign markets and external sources of raw materials and 
because of the current world ideological conflict. The two 
most important South American nations from a viewpoint of 
land area, population, natural resources and economic poten­
tial are Brazil and Argentina. Developments in these two 
nations will to a great degree determine the future course 
of evolution of the whole of Latin America and are of vital 
importance to the well-being of the United States.
The purpose of this study is to examine United States 
economic relations with Brazil and Argentina from 1947 
through I960. Specific objectives are to identify, describe, 
analyze and contrast the economic factors underlying these 
relationships. It is hoped that this investigation will 
provide the basis for improved understanding of economic 
relations between the United States and Argentina and Brazil. 
Expectations are that improved understanding will lead to a 
formulation of United States policy which will help fulfill 
American ambitions for eoonomlc growth of these two countries 
within the framework of democratic institutions.
xi
xii
Methodologically* the procedure utilized has been to 
describe Argentina and Brazil in reference to: (1) their
economic development prior to 1947; (2) trade with the 
United States since 1947; (3) the amounts and significance 
of United States direct investment in the postwar period;
(4) the role of the balance of payments in economic develop­
ment and in relations with the United States, and (5) United 
States economic policy. The information presented for 
Argentina and Brazil is compared and analyzed at the con­
clusion of each chapter. Data utilized have been obtained 
primarily from reliable secondary sources suoh as United 
Nations and United States Government publications.
Several conclusions are reached, (l) Brazil has a 
greater economic potential than Argentina. (2) The economic 
development of both countries has been greatly influenced by 
external economic factors. Both nations have balance of 
payments disequilibrium, but Brazil's problems are more 
serious as a result of a large deficit in the Investment 
Income account and weakness in the transportation and service 
sector. (3) Argentine and Brazilian relations with the 
United States have been greatly governed by economic factors, 
while United States relations have been motivated by politi­
cal aspects. (4) Eoonomlc exchange with the United States 
has been more important for Brazil than for Argentina.
(5) The policy change by the United States in 1939 placing 
emphasis on Argentina instead of Brazil was not in the
xiii
national interest of the United States. (6) Brazil should 
he the cornerstone of United States economic policy in Latin 
America. (7) Argentina is primarily a decapitalized nation, 
while Brazil is more an underdeveloped one. (8) United 
States capital can help ease the period of economic tran­
sition through the industrial revolution in these two 
countries. (9) The degree of excessive inflation has been 
a detriment to economic development in Argentina and probably 
also in Brazil. (10) A program of United States economic 
assistance to these nations should: (a) be based on en­
lightened self-interest; (b) be in the form of low interest, 
long term loans; (c) obtain economic reforms as a prerequisite 
for assistance; (d) stress education as the focal point.
The excellent resource potentials of Argentina and 
Brazil give hope that the economic expectations of these two 
countries will be realized with time and United States 
economic assistance.
INTRODUCTION
Latin America is assuming increasing importance for 
the United States as a result of increasing American depend­
ence on foreign markets and on external sources of raw ma­
terials, and because of the current world ideological con­
flict. The two most important South American nations from a 
viewpoint of land area, population, natural resources and 
future promise are Brazil and Argentina. These two coun­
tries occupy 49 and 16 per cent of the land mass of South 
America respectively.^ A world-wide comparison places 
Brazil fifth^ and Argentina eighth in territorial dimensions 
among the family of sovereign states.^ Demographic esti­
mates for I960 indicate that 67 million persons astro living 
in Brazil and 21 million in Argentina.* The combined
^P. Benham and H. A. Holley, A Short Introduction to 
the Economy of Latin America (New York: Oxford University 
T?ess, 19 28) “ p T T T T .-------
p
U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Brazil. World Trade Information Service, Part I,
JTT. pTTT"
^"Argentina," Collier's Encyclopedia (i960 ed.),
II. 135.
*Benham and Holley, 0£. oit., p. 13*
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2populations of these two nations represent 44 per cent of 
the inhabitants of Latin America and 63 per cent of the 
people living in South America. Brazil has rich and diverse 
resources, including iron ore, zirconium, hydroelectric 
power, cobalt, manganese and nickel, which give it the pos­
sibility of becoming a powerful induetried, nation. Argen­
tina's resources, although not as extensive as Brazil's, 
consist of the Pampa, the largest, most fertile plain of 
Latin America; petroleum; and the most educated and skilled 
population of the South American countries.
Developments in these two nations will to a great 
degree determine the future course of evolution of the whole 
of Latin America and are of vital Importance to the well­
being of the United States. Past relations between the 
United States and Argentina and Brazil have not always been 
harmonious. Economic exchanges between nations are key 
factors which influence all relations between them. It is 
partly out of these relationships that arise friendships, 
dependence of one nation upon another, and mutual benefits 
for the parties involved. Out of economic relationships, 
however, may also arise conflicts, claims of exploitation, 
distrust and adverse political as well as economic relations. 
Argentina and Brazil present a particularly Intriguing 
study along these lines. Brazil typifies a situation where 
trade with the United States tends to be complementary, 
while Argentine-United States trade is competitive in many
3areas.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHOD
The purpose of this study is to examine United States 
economic relations with these two Western Hemisphere neigh­
bors. A description and comparison of the role of the 
United States in the economic development of these two Latin 
countries is presented. Specific objectives are to identify, 
describe, analyze and contrast the economic factors under­
lying these relations. Developments causing changes in the 
climate of relations and quantitative breakdowns of trade 
and investments are presented for the period 1947 to I960.
It is hoped that this investigation will provide the basis 
for improved understanding of economic relations between the 
United States and Argentina and Brazil. Possible future 
avenues whereby the United States may be able to fulfill 
better its ambitions of economic growth in Argentina and 
Brazil within the framework of democratic institutions are 
enumerated.
This study is confined to the post-World War II 
period during which many important developments such as the 
"cold war," "revolution of rising expectations," and post­
war international trade adversities for Argentina and Brazil 
have taken place. Extension of the time period under analy­
sis would present too great a burden for research of this 
nature. Since one of the objectives of this study is to
4present and analyze factors which may be of assistance In 
comprehending and solving current problems, the time period 
chosen provides coverage of the origin of many of today's 
difficulties. At the same time an opportunity is afforded 
to scrutinize changes in policy and the role played by eco­
nomic factors in these changes; furthermore, the period 
chosen is not so lengthy as to defy adequate coverage. Em­
phasis is placed on the external relations of the nations 
involved; this does not, however, exclude an appraisal of 
internal problems, such as economic development and fiscal 
and monetary policy, which play a significant role in ex­
ternal economic relations.
PLAN OP ORGANIZATION
This study is divided into six parts. Part I deals 
with the economic development of Argentina and Brazil 
through 1946. Areas discussed are natural resources, forms 
of government, extent of economic development, foreign in­
vestment, the role of international trade and economic rela­
tions with the United States. A comparison between Argen­
tina and Brazil in these areas is undertaken. This part is 
not intended to be exhaustive in its coverage, but to serve 
as a foundation for the more detailed presentation of the 
post-World War II period.
In Part II, a study of the trade of the two Latin
5American nations with the United States is presented. Spe­
cific areas covered are composition of trade, magnitudes, 
problems and trade restrictions. A comparison between Argen­
tina and Brazil is made concerning the importance of this 
trade, degree of diversification, sources of trade conflicts 
and trends in the post-World War II period.
United States private direct investments in Brazil 
and Argentina are treated in Fart III. Types, volumes, 
problems encountered, and the role of these external re­
sources in economic development are enumerated. Investments 
by the United States in these two nations are contrasted in 
relation to magnitudes, areas of investment, contribution to 
economic development and investment climate. Trends and 
changes in investment Buch as the apparent shift from Brazil 
to Argentina are analyzed.
The balances of payments of Argentina and Brazil are 
brought under scrutiny in Part IV. Magnitudes, areas of 
difficulty, restrictions, importance to economic develop­
ment and the role of the United States are examined. Devel­
opments in the balances of payments of Argentina and Brazil 
are compared. Specific comparisons include the degree of 
problems presented by balance of payments difficulties, 
restrictions Imposed, importance to economic development and 
the influence of the United States in this area.
Fart V deals with United States economic policy 
toward Argentina and Brazil. Although economic factors are
6stressed, a brief excursion is made into political and other 
institutional determinants. A comparison of United States 
policy toward the two South American states is undertaken; 
factors motivating economic policy are examined and con­
trasted. Trenda in American policy are described and the 
impact of United States actions on Argentina and Brazil 
evaluated.
A summary of major findings and conclusions is at­
tempted in Part VI. Some specific proposals which may serve 
as guides to future United States economic policy toward 
Argentina and Brazil are presented. These proposals are 
substantiated by this research.
The data utilized was obtained primarily from re­
liable secondary sources such as United Hatlons, United 
States Government, and Brazilian Embassy publications.
CHAPTER I
RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OP 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL TO 1947
It ia virtually impossible to comprehend fully the 
current economic problems of a nation without some appreci­
ation of its resource base and institutional evolution. As 
a background to the study of the post-World War II economic 
relations of the United States with Argentina and Brazil, 
an examination of the resources and historical development 
of these nations becomes imperative. The procedure used 
will be first to consider Argentina in reference to:
(1) resources; (2) forms of government; (3) economic develop­
ment; (4) receipts of foreign investments; (5) the role 
played by international trade, and (6) economic relations 
with the United States. The same procedure will then be 
applied to Brazil followed by a comparison of the two coun­
tries in the enumerated areas. At times the analysis is 
extended to several years past 1947; this is done when the 
nature of the data available necessitates such an under­
taking in behalf of clarity and comparability.
8ARGENTINA
Resources
Argentina covers an area of 1,079»965 square miles; 
its greatest length, north to south, is 2,100 miles and its 
maximum width from the Andes to the Atlantic Ocean is about 
900 miles.^ These dimensions make the country the second
largest of South America and the eighth largest in the world.
2
It is approximately one-third the size of the United States, 
and five times larger than France.^ For the most part 
Argentina is situated in the temperate zone and is the pos­
sessor of large, fertile plains, long seacoasts, and good 
inland waterways. The Pampa, a great central plain, covers
250,000 square miles and in this grassy, treeless area is 
contained much of the best agricultural land in South 
America. About one-third of the territory of Argentina is 
cultivable and traditionally agriculture has been the back­
bone of the nation's economy.
The population in I960 was estimated at 21,000,000 
persons, and since 1937 the average rate of growth has been
^"Argentina," Encyclopedia Americana (1961 ed.)t II,
196.
^"Argentina," Collier1s Encyclopedia (I960 ed.), II,
135.
^Michael Scully, "What Peron Cost Argentina,"
Reader1 a Digest, LXVII (January, 1956), 88.
9approximately 2.4 per cent annually.^ In 1954» about
5,900,000 of the inhabitants were located in the greater
«5
Buenos Aires area, with 3,799,000 in the city proper. 
Approximately 81 per cent are native born of European de­
scent; 16 per cent are European by birth, and 3 per cent are 
Indian and non-Caucasian. Since 1875, about 80 per cent of 
all immigrants have been Italians and Spaniards. Of the 
total labor force in 1954, 2 3 . 3 per cent were in agriculture, 
stock raising, and forestry; 22.4 per cent in manufacturing, 
construction, and mining; 16.2 per cent in trade and finance, 
and 38.1 per cent in domestic and related services.^
Minerals have posed a serious problem in Argentina. 
Although the production of petroleum, coal, iron ore, salt, 
bismuth, lime, lead, zinc, gold, silver, copper, and tung­
sten is carried on, it has not been in significant amounts. 
This fact has presented a serious obstacle to the nation's 
industrialization hopes; for example, in 1959, only approxi­
mately 50 per cent of the fuel needs were obtained domesti­
cally. The necessity to import such large quantities of
^F. Benham and H. A. Holley, A Short Introduction to 
the Economy of Latin America (New York: Oxford University 
Press^ i960), p . l l •
^Pan American Union, Argentina (Washington: American 
Republics Series, No. 1, 1961)7 P- 4€>.
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Argentina, World Trade InformaTion Service, Part
1, Bo. 5B=7j; p“ T.
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fuels has been a contributing factor to balance of payments
difficulties. Since the Frondizi government came into power
in 1958| the picture in petroleum haB improved markedly.
Private development of oil fields has been permitted since
1958 with the results that Argentina nearly became self-
sufficient in 1961 and became a small-Bcale exporter of
petroleum by 1962. Argentina, however, still imported about
$50 million worth of specialty oils and other petroleum
products during 1962. Oil production in I960 was 37 per
cent greater than the 1959 output and the 1961 output ex-
7
ceeded the I960 volume by 32 per cent. This development 
will have great beneficial significance to the Argentine 
economy and means a savings of about $200 million per year 
in imports. Attempts are now being made to develop the 
nation's iron ore and coal deposits, but the outlook is not 
very optimistic because these resources appear to be of in­
ferior quality and insufficient in quantity. Water power 
appears to be a great natural resource that has not been 
sufficiently developed, from all indications. Argentina's 
Iguazu Falls have tremendous potential along these lines. 
Unfortunately, the task of transmitting the power from this 
area 800 miles to Buenos Aires, the only large market for 
electricity, remains largely unsolved. Under Frondizi's
7
U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development 
in Argentina, 1961. World Trade Information IJervice, Fart 
IT tfoT 6i?-36» p. 5.
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regime new attempts were made to harness this potential 
power and high hopes are now held for success. Table I 
gives mineral production in Argentina during the 1951 to 
1959 period. The data reveal that Argentina has not been 
an important mineral producing country.
TABLE I
MINING PRODUCTION IN ARGENTINA, 1951-1959 
(In thousands of tons)^
Mineral 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 19593
Coal AO 112 82 93 133 152 206 264 301
Petroleum2 3.4 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.9 5.1 6.4
Lead Ore 24 20 16 19 23 24 31 30 30
Zinc Ore 17 17 17 20 23 25 30 33 40
Tin Ore 241 265 156 97 86 85 185 182 210
Silver 240 340 223 155 100 52 42 48 n.a.
Sulphur 8 19 19 21 19 19 17 26 17
Source: "Statistical Supplement," Economic Bulletin
for Latin America. October 1959» pp. 78, 81^
^Thousands of tons of metal content for lead, zinc, 
and tin.
2
Millions of crude.
3Data for 1959 from "Supplemento Estadistico," Bole- 
tin Economico de America Latina. V (Noviembre I960), 34-— 35-
Forests cover about one-third of Argentina and from 
them comes quebracho, which is used primarily for extract, 
but also for timbers, railroad ties, and posts. Other im­
portant products of the forests are woods that are used for
12
fuel, boxes, flooring, furniture, and charcoal. Approxi­
mately 350 sawmills process these forest products with aver­
age annual production being approximately 2,000,000 railroad 
ties, 1,000,000 posts, 500,000 fine rails, 1,000,000 tons of
Q
charcoal and 300,000 tons of construction wood. Yerba mate 
is produced in quantities and is very extensively used in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Over-all, the nation is not
self-sufficient in these items and imports such materials as
g
paper, cardboard, and newsprint.
Government
Argentina was discovered by the Spanish navigator 
Juan Diaz Sails in 1515, and remained under Spanish control 
until 1816 when independence was declared. There followed 
a period of four decades of anarchy, civil war, and seces­
sion which prevented the unification of the nation until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Buenos Aires, the most 
important and powerful province, sought to institute a Uni­
tarian form of government, but the interior provinces de­
sired a federalist type. After much warfare among the 
chieftains of the provinces and the harsh rule of Juan 
Manuel de Rosas, Governor of Buenos Aires for twenty-three
Q
"Argentina," Encyclopedia Americana, op. bit., p.
205.
q
■'U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Argentina, op. oit.. p. 9-
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years, the federalists triumphed with the adoption of a 
constitution in 1853* This new constitution provided for a 
federal, republican, representative form of government.
The plague of political instability, which has been 
so common in Latin America, was not escaped by Argentina.
By 1890 political unrest reached a peak as a result of wide­
spread corruption, the non-existence of political liberty 
and the chaotic financial status of the country. A politi­
cal revolt occurred in 1890 under the Union Civica Radical 
which overthrew the old regime and espoused a drive toward 
more responsible government. In 1910, with Dr. Roque Sdenz 
Pella's election to the office of President, widespread re­
forms were introduced. He worked forcefully for free suf­
frage, honest elections and the political representation of 
minorities. The Sdenz Pena Law was passed in 1912 which 
made suffrage "free, secret, and obligatory. Democratic 
ways prevailed until 1932, when a coup d'etat brought by 
financial and political problems was executed.
The new provisional government was headed by Jose F. 
Uriburu, who resorted to dictatorial governmental action. 
Uriburu suppressed labor unions, nullified elections won by 
the opposition party in the provinces, imposed censorship 
on the press and attempted to change the existing constitu­
tion and the S£enz Pena Law. In 1933 the nation returned
^ P a n  American Union, Argentina, op. cit., p. 24.
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to democratic waya by electing Aguetin P. Justo, who appar­
ently proved to be an able leader. Roberto M. Ortiz became 
President in 1937 and when he became ill in 1940 his Vice- 
President Ramon S. Castillo took over. Castillo’s suppres­
sion of democratic elements set the basis for a popular 
revolt.
On June 4, 1943* the armed services forced Castillo's 
resignation and instituted a provisional government. Juan 
Peron began a rapid rise within the provisional government, 
which culminated with his election to the Presidency in 
1946 with the support of the Partido Laborista. Once in 
power he ^ranted labor most of its requests, and wages, 
pension benefits, paid holidays and vacations increased 
rapidly. These increases, which were made without consid­
eration of productivity increases, led to a period of in­
flation, but convinced labor that Peron was truly interested 
in their well-being. Peron and hie wife, Eva, were believed 
by the working class to be moved with compassion for the 
cause of "los descamisados," or "shirtless ones."
Under Peron, the hand of the state reached every­
where. Newspapers were bought and controlled, 2,000 univer­
sity faculty members who opposed his election were removed 
from their jobs and replaced with persons whose chief quali­
fications consisted of allegiance to Peron. Colonels were 
made Generals, army pay for officers became the highest in 
the world, and the rolls of government workers were swelled.
15
These moves kept possible opposition either happy or silent. 
Judges were replaced with pro-Peron followers; it was now 
the will of Peron and not the law of the Constitution. The 
state rigidly controlled trade as well as many internal 
areas of production such as public utilities, petroleum, 
shipping and industrial plants.^
Peron finally overstepped his bounds. He set him­
self up as a god, being compared in public speeches with 
Christ, Mohammed and Buddha. A movement was started to 
canonize his wife, Evita, before her death and this move­
ment continued until Peron lost power. She had been pre­
sented in 1951 as "Our lady of Hope" and Peron at this 
meeting proclaimed a new holiday, "Saint Evita Day." He 
attempted to eliminate religious processions, legalize 
divorce and separate the church and state. This gave dif­
ferent movements which were against him a common cause on 
which to unite. Also, at this time in 1955* Argentina was 
feeling the impact of Peron's suicidal economic policies.
The economic downfall was to a great degree the result of 
the recovery of Europe to a point where the demand for Argen­
tina's commodities had been greatly reduced. These factors, 
plus the tiring on the part of the military of the corrup­
tion and fraud in the Peron government led to his overthrow 
in September, 1955.^
^Scully, 0£. cit., p. 88. ^ Ibld.. p. 89.
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After the fall of Peron a Provisional Government 
took office until May, 1958. In 19f6 this government an­
nulled the constitution which the Peron government had 
adopted in 1949 and reinstated the Constitution of 1853» 
which greatly resembles that of the United States. A Con­
stitutional assembly met in 1957 and modified parts of the 
1853 Constitution. The present Constitution provides for a 
federal union of provinces which retain all powers not spe­
cifically delegated to the federal government by the Consti­
tution. There is a separation of powers between the execu­
tive, legislative and judicial branches. The executive 
branch consists of the President, eight Ministers and twelve 
Secretariats. Secretaries of state have the same rank as 
the Ministers except that they cannot countersign executive 
documents nor represent the Executive before Congress.
Legislative power is vested in a bicameral congress 
made up of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Laws 
may originate in either chamber or through the President, 
and members of both of these houses are publicly elected.
The Judicial Branch consists of the Supreme Court, the 
national tribunals in the Federal Capital and the national 
tribunals with seats in the provinces; judges are appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Each of the 
provinces has its own constitution in accordance with the 
principles, rights and guaranties of the National
17
Constitution.1^
Economic Development
Forces of the world economy in the period of rapid 
world expansion prior to the depression of the 1930's pro­
duced a vast experiment in Argentina's agriculture. All 
the factors needed for large scale production were brought 
together. There was an abundance of well-situated, fertile 
land and there was no old established agrarian population 
that had been cultivating it with traditional methods merely 
for its own subsistence.1* These conditions, when combined 
with a favorable climate, led to migration from Europe and 
opened an attractive area for foreign investment. Thus a 
capitalistic agricultural system grew without restrictions 
of any type. It was capitalistic because it demonstrated 
ability to adapt to the best methods of cultivation and 
livestock raising, adjusted itself to the changing circum­
stances of the market and had great mobility of the factors 
of production. Farmers motivated by profits changed from 
the raising of cattle, to crops, to livestock and back again 
depending on the economic returns. The mobility of Argen­
tina's agriculture was demonstrated by international as well
1%.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Argentina, op. pit., p. 4.
^United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America, "Economic Development of Argentina," Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1949 (New York, 1951)* p. li7.
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a8 domestic aspects. Before World War I, large numbers of 
workers came every year from southern Europe to help harvest 
the crops and then returned to Europe with sizeable savings. 
These favorable conditions in agriculture led to a rapid 
development of Argentina's economy up to the 1930 economic 
crisis. This period not only ended expansion, but indi­
cated to Argentina that its agricultural productive capac­
ity was greater than world demand.
During the 1930's a better balance between agricul­
ture and manufacturing was achieved in Argentina. The agri­
culture sector no longer needed to increase its labor force 
because of the lack of need to expand production and the 
mechanization of the farms. Argentine workers could now 
enter manufacturing outlets without putting pressure on the 
agriculture labor supply. Thus, as manufacturing expanded, 
it did not hinder agriculture. During World War II, how­
ever, the mechanization of agriculture in Argentina was 
greatly hindered. In the immediate postwar period there 
was not sufficient incentive to make up for the lack of 
farm capital replacement during the war period. This was 
the result of exchange control and state trading systems 
which discriminated against agriculture. The balance worked 
out after the war between industry and agriculture was one 
which wsb unfavorable to the farm sector. Available foreign 
exchange was allocated to purchase industrial capital goods. 
Also the state trading system purchased agriculture products
19
at low prices and sold them in world markets at high levels. 
It may be noted that Industrialization which had tended to 
alleviate the disequilibrium in the balance of payments 
during the 1930'b now created the opposite effect. This 
development occurred as a result of the decline in agricul­
tural exports because of lack of farm equipment and incen­
tive to stimulate output.
The above is not to say that there was over-industri­
alization in Argentina. It appears that the only way a 
nation such as this could have moved forward economically 
was in the direction it did. Argentina wished to reduce 
its vulnerability to external influences; however, problems 
presented themselves to render the successful conclusion of 
this objective extremely difficult. To accomplish these 
purposes, capital goods had to be Imported for industrial 
development and improvements were needed in transportation 
and production of power. Unfortunately, these enumerated 
needs were accompanied by a necessity to re-equip the agri­
culture sector.
‘An insight into the value of Argentina's agricultural 
production and its stagnation over the twenty-year period 
from the late 1920's to the late 194-0' s is presented in 
Table II. This table reveals several facts: in 1925-29
the leading items by value were wheat, meat, maize, linseed 
and wool; by 1945-43 the rank was meat, wheat, wool, maize 
and sunflower. Over a span of approximately twenty years
20
the total value of Argentina’s agricultural production in­
creased only approximately five per cent and within this 
over-all picture there was a decline of 17 per cent in grain 
values. This decline was offset primarily by an increase 
in meat and wool values of 22 and 56 per cent respectively. 
In addition there occurred a sharp rise in the less signifi­
cant group of industrial agricultural crops. The industrial 
group was led by yerba mate and cotton with increases of 
487 and 231 per cent respectively.
Industrial development in Argentina gained its im­
portance to a great degree from an attempt to reduce the 
vulnerability of the nation to external factors. Data 1b 
very scant on industrial development prior to 1935; however, 
it is apparent that growth in industry up to the 1930's was 
very slow. For example, the 1914 census revealed 362,300 
persons engaged in manufacturing and this number by 1935 
had increased to only 463*000, a rise of barely 28 per cent 
or 1.3 per cent per year. In comparison, between 1935 and
1940, the number employed in manufacturing rose to 710,000,
15a 35 per cent increase. ' Nevertheless, this start, though 
slow, was of considerable help at a time when the serious 
decline in exports and the terms of trade reduced the level 
of imports which Argentina could maintain.
15Ibid., p. 10.
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TABLE II
VALUE OF ARGENTINA'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1925-29 AND 1945-48 AVERAGES 
(In thousands of 1925-29 pesos)
Yearly Averages In 
Thousands of Pesos
Per Cent of Change
riuuuubo
1925-29 1945-48 1945-48
Grains A Meats 2,605,889 2,488,325 -5
Grains 1,758,583 1,457,563 -17
Wheat 894,274 669,426 -25
Maize 480,440 309,868 -36
Linseed 285,075 114,421 -49
Sunflower 183 148,037 —
Oats 57,169 52,387 -8
Barley 24,286 64,521 166
Rye 15,300 40,096 162
Rice 1,852 28,807 1,455
Meat 847,306 1,030,762 22
Wool 231,008 361,038 56
Industrial Crops 138,060 265,801 92
Sugar Cane 63,060 90,464 43
Wine 33,347 42,350 27
Peanuts 11,123 25,559 129
Tobacco 3,993 12,540 214
Yerba Mate 3,065 17,982 487
Cotton 23,204 76,906 231
TOTALS* 3,022,277 3,179,518 5
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America, "Economic Development of Argentina, op. cit.. 
p. 127-
♦Includes potato production.
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Curtailment of the availability of foreign goods 
during World War II had favorable effects on industrializa­
tion. The weakness of the industrial development of Argen­
tina became evident as shortages developed in respect to 
fuel, transportation, iron, machinery spare parts, and all 
chemical products. A considerable amount of decapitaliza­
tion was experienced as a result of the reduction in the 
imports of foreign capital goods. In the years after the 
war, however, conditions were favorable for Industrial ex­
pansion. Argentina's monetary reserves were large, and the 
government encouraged their use for industrial expansion in 
hopes of utilizing the potential of the nation and raising 
the standard of living. To these ends every possible ap­
proach was pursued, particularly easy credit, development 
of transportation by the state and provision of foreign ex­
change for key imports of capital goods.^
Textile production was at this time, and still is, 
the most advanced industry of Argentina. Concentrating on 
cotton, wool, and rayon, the nation became fairly self- 
sufficient in textiles with the exception of high grade 
items which were not economical to produce because of 
limited markets. Argentina's rapid increase in cotton tex­
tile production is revealed by Table III, which shows the 
replacement of imports with domestic production.
16Ibid., p. 193.
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TABLE III
COTTON TEXTILE CONSUMPTION IN ARGENTINA,
1930-1945
19.35 1940 1945
Percentage of total
Domestic production 9 26 56 86
Imports 91 74 44 14
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America, "Economic Development of Argentina," op. 
c i t., p * 17 6•
The composition of the textile industry in 1945 is 
significant. Small spinning establishments of less than 
10,000 spindles, which represented less than 50 per cent of 
the spinning mills, contributed 18 per cent of the produc­
tion. In weaving 98 per cent of the weaving mills con­
tributed one-third of production, with the other two-thirds 
of output coming from the remaining 2 per cent of the 
mills.17
The iron and steel industry presents one of the key 
factors in understanding Argentina's industrial develop­
ment. Lack of iron ore and coal were at this time, and 
still are, serious handicaps to industrial development in 
the country. During the World War II period, Argentina's
17Ibid., p. 177.
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imports of iron ore and finished steel products declined 
sharply. Fortunately for Argentina, she had acquired some 
technical know-how in the past and had also stockpiled scrap 
metal prior to the war. During the period under considera­
tion Argentina depended on foreign sources for Intermediate 
materials for her iron and steel industry and for a consid­
erable percentage of her semi-finished and steel goods.
Cement production is an area in which Argentina has 
been active since the 1920's. In the 1939-46 period her 
domestic production took care of her needs, but since then 
some Imports have been necessary to fill the total demand. 
Table IV, which presents cement production for selected 
years up to 1949, reveals a decline in production between 
19 38 and 1945. Starting with 1945, production rose up to 
1947, declined in 1948, then increased in 1949. Consump­
tion at the same time increased so that in the years 1930, 
1938, and 1947-49 imports were needed to fill total demand.
The development of heavy industry was hindered by 
the scarcity and improper use of mineral resources. Spe­
cifically, the lack of coal deposits, unsound government 
management, and setbacks in agrioulture presented obstacles. 
The main areas of development ir addition to textiles and 
cement were meat packing, flour milling, sugar refining, 
wine making, and quebracho extraction.
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TABLE IV
ARGENTINA'S CEMENT PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION,
1930-1949 
(In thousands of tons)
Ysar Production Consumption
1930 412 755
1938 1,179 1,254
1945 1,096 1,084
1946 1,150 1,120
1947 1,353 1,481
1948 1,251 1,594
1949 1,446 1,538
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America, "Economic Development of Argentina," op. 
cit., p. 186.
Foreign Investments
Foreign capital has played a significant part in the 
economic life of Argentina. This country was one of the 
first nations of South America to attract the external in­
vestor. External government loans were floated as early as 
1825 and after 1852 British investments rapidly became 1m-
1 Q
portant. "Before the outbreak of World War II British 
Investments in Argentina were, with the exception of their 
investments in the United States, the largest group of 
British investments outside the British Empire and
T O
Clarence H. Haring, Argentina and the United States 
(Boston: World Peace Foundation7 1941J, p. 5o.
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Commonwealth."1^ United States investments in Argentina 
did not become important prior to World War I.
In appraising the magnitude of foreign investments 
in Argentina the approximate nature of the data should be 
kept in mind. What P. J. Weil wrote oonceming United States 
investments in Latin America in general is applicable to 
Argentina in particular. "It is impossible to determine 
more than their approximate value at any one time. . . Not 
only does the true value of such investments fluctuate with 
the return on operations, but the valuations which the com­
panies place on their properties are subject to a number of 
factors which may bear little relation to the original in-
O A
vestment or to the current market value of their holdings."
Railroads were the major area of direct foreign in­
vestment. As of 194 3, approximately 75 per cent of Argen­
tine railroads were owned by the British. These firms exer­
cised considerable political Influence and up until 1932 
they successfully blocked the development of a road system 
which would make motor vehicle competition possible. Other 
areas of the economy, however, also attracted considerable 
foreign investments. The major meat packing plants were 
owned by British and American interests such as Anglo,
^ H .  S. Perns, "The Establishment of British Invest­
ments in Argentina," Inter-American Economic Affairs. V 
(Autumn 1951), 67.
^°Pelix J. Weil. Argentine Riddle (New York: The 
John Lay Company, 1944), pT 129.
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Smithfleld, Swift, Armour and Wilson. Tire, chemical and 
electric power production were dominated by foreign inter­
ests. Ford and General Motors owned the automobile assembly 
plants while the trolley and subway companies were English. 
Nearly all the plants producing quebracho extract were under 
the domination of the British. Argentine capital was domi­
nant in oil, flour mills, textiles, sugar, shoes, glass,
21and beer production.
Foreign investors were highly favored prior to World 
War II. Railroad companies received tax exemptions and 
were permitted to Import goods for their own needs duty 
free. Although the "Mitre" law stated that net earnings on 
a three-year moving average were not to exceed 6.8 per cent 
of invested amounts, it did not define "investments." As a 
result many loopholes were utilized to send profits in con­
siderable excess of the stated maximum to England. Exces­
sive salaries were often paid to the board of direotors, 
executives, legal advisors, and "consultants" which were 
charged to operating expenses. The "inside” construction 
company was used widely to exaggerate costs of building and 
reduce profits. In meat packing American and British inter­
ests operated monopsonies which discriminated among the
sellers of cattle. The Argentine anti-trust law was too
22ambiguous to be effective.
21Ibid., p. 114. 22Ibid.. p. 116.
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Clarence H. Haring estimates that In 194-0, British 
investment holdings amounted to over two billion dollars 
and French, German, Dutch, and Belgian capital together
about a billion dollars. His estimates of United States
2 3investments during the same year were 1600 million.
Felix J. Weil states that United States Investments in 
Argentina in 1940 were about $578 million.2* Paul V. Horn 
and Hubert E. Bice reach the same numerical conclusion per­
taining to United States investments as Well. Of the $578
million, they state $388 million to have been of a direct
2 5nature and $190 million in portfolio forms. Estimates in
1940 were that United States direct Investments represented
2614 per cen of the total foreign Investments in Argentina. 
John W. White states that aggregate British capital in 
Argentina was 435,128,482 pounds sterling in 1930 and 
417,327«d54 pounds sterling at the end of 1940; his estimate 
of United States investments in 1941 was between $580 and 
$610 million.2^ Weil indicates that by the early 1940's 
Britain held about 60 per cent of all foreign investments
2 3JHaring, 0£. cit., p. 50.
2*Weil, o£. cit., p. 230.
2 5 Paul V. Horn and Hubert £. Bice, Latin American 
Trade and Economics (New York: Prentice-Hal!, Inc., l949),
pT‘35‘3.
26Ibid., p. 360.
2^John W. White, Argentina, The Life Story of a 
Nation (New York: The Viking IPress, 1942J, pp. $33» 251.
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In Argentina. The British attitude toward Argentina is 
best illustrated by the story of a hypothetical Englishman
saying to a hypothetical American: "You may take Canada
28away from us but you will never take Argentina."
Juan Peron came into power in 1946 and his economic 
program revolved around the idea of Argentina for the Argen­
tines. As part of this program the nationalization of some 
foreign investments was accomplished. In September of 1946t 
Argentina purchased the United River Plate. Telephone Com­
pany, a subsidiary of the American and International Tele­
phone and Telegraph Company for $ 9 4 , 9 9 1 * 3 6 4 . The nation­
alization of the railroads was realized early in 1947 by 
the purchase of British interests for 150 million pounds 
sterling. As part of this movement Peron purchased Argen­
tina's foreign-held debt of approximately 12.5 billion 
pesos in August of 1947. Juan Peron proudly stated in 
August of 1947: "Argentina . . . has no foreign debt, since 
it has all been cancelled, making us one of the world's 
three creditor countries. "3^
This reaction against foreign sources of funds, which 
resulted in Argentina using the foreign exchange she had
28Ibid., p. 129.
2^Robert J. Alexander, The Peron Era (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1951) * p. 157.
3°Ibid., p. 159.
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accumulated during the wary was detrimental to the nation's 
hopes of industrialization. She did not have the foreign 
exchange left to import capital goods. The fallacy of this 
approach was to he realized hy Peron in the early 1950's 
and hy Arturo Frondizi when he took office in 1958.
International Trade
In the latter half of the 1800's Argentina was ex­
ternally oriented. This fact is revealed hy the use of 
foreign capital in the railroads, the dependence on exports, 
and the increased population resulting from immigration.
The late 1880's commenced a period of accelerated develop­
ment which continued until the depression of the 1930's. 
During the first thirty years of the twentieth century 
Argentina's gross national product expanded at an annual 
rate of 4.5 per cent.^ Although a good part of this in­
crease on a per capita hasis was minimized hy a rapid popu­
lation growth of 3.3 per cent, the accomplishments were con­
siderable. The significant fact is that Argentina was able 
to expand because it obtained capital goods as a result of 
exports, foreign investment and loans. The growth was thus 
externally oriented, producing an imbalance in Argentina's 
economic development. In 1929* Argentina's agricultural
^"The Problem of the Economic Development of Argen­
tina, " Economic Bulletin for Latin Amerloa, IV (March 1959)* 
14.
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production exceeded the nation's domestic consumption needs. 
However, her needs for capital goods, manufactures in gen­
eral and fuel exceeded her internal capacity to produce 
them. Thus the great significance of commerce to Argentina 
was that foreign trade made it possible to reduce the im­
balance between agricultural and industrial production.
The depression of the 1930's hit at the heart of the 
Argentine economy through its direct impact on exports and 
foreign investment. Capacity to import, representing Argen­
tina's exports of goods and services multiplied by her 
terms of trade, averaged $1,600 million during the 1925-29 
period but dropped to an annual average of $74-4 million
during the 1930-35 period. The purchasing power of exports
fell from $1,982 million to $1,214 million.^2 These adverse 
effects were further influenced by a reduction in net annual 
inflow of foreign investment from $199 million to $120 
million.^ Table V gives an indication of how severely 
Argentina was affected by the depression and the war years. 
The data reveal a sharp decrease from 1925-29 to 1940-44 in 
all the components considered. Declines in percentages 
were: quantity of exports, 32; terms of trade, 19; capac­
ity to import, 45; and quantity of imports, 58. If the
1945-48 period is considered, a recovery over the 1940-44
J In terms of 1950 purchasing power.
33-’-’"The Problem of the Economic Development of Argen­
tina,M 0£. cit.. p. 14.
years In all four measures Is noted
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TABLE V
ARGENTINA'S EXPORTS, IMPORTS, TERMS OP TRADE 
AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1925 TO 1948 
(Index numbers: 1925-29 = 100)
Quantity Terms of Capacity Quantity 
of Exports Trade to Import of Imports
1925-29 100 100 100 100
1930-34 92 80 73 68
1935-39 89 100 90 77
194.0-44 68 81 55 42
1945-48 76 116 89 82
Source: "Economio Development of Argentina," Eco­
nomic Survey of Latin America. 1949. o p. cit., p. 112.
The relationship between the volume of Imports and 
population is important, for while imports were reduced the 
number of persons was increasing. Table VI reveals numeri­
cally this relationship. Between 1925-29 and 1940-44 the 
quantity of imports per person experienced a very sharp de­
cline of 70 per oent. A recovery is noted in all components 
during the 1945-48 period. Tables V and VI clearly point 
out the dilemma faced by Argentina. There was a reduction 
in exports, a deterioration in the terms of trade and capac­
ity to import plus shortages imposed by World War II.
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TABLE VI
ARGENTINA'S IMPORTS PER CAPITA FOR SELECTED PERIODS,
1925 TO 1948 
(Index number: 1925-29 * 100)
Years Quantity of Imports
Population
Increases
Quantity of Imports 
Per Capita
1925-29 100 100 100
1930-34 68 113 60
1935-39 77 1 2 8 60
1940-44 42 138 30
1945-48 82 147 56
Source: "Economic Development of Argentina," Eco
nomic Survey of Latin America, 1949, op. cit., p. 111.
The impact of these enumerated developments resulted 
in a reduction in Argentina's aggregate demand. The Argen­
tine government was now faced with the difficult decision 
of what action to take. Two alternatives were present. One 
Involved the free trade approach of letting the market 
forces work themBelves out; the other was a resort to selec­
tive controls. If the free trade alternative were chosen, 
the domestic income level would probably fall further in 
the short run. Such a development would contract demand 
for Imports until demand for foreign items and the availa­
bility of foreign exchange came into balance. This approach, 
the government felt, would impose severe hardships on its 
citizens who were extremely dependent on foreign sources for
34
capital goods and manufactured items. A free trade solution 
would cure the balance of payments problems, but would widen 
the gap between internal needs said supply of these items.
The consequences of this action might have been stagnation, 
unemployment and a reduction in the standard of living. 
Argentina chose, instead, a policy of controls. She at­
tempted to keep domestic demand as high as possible by re­
sorting to import substitution and a multiple exchange rate 
system, which was used along with tariffs. Thus the Argen­
tine government chose not to solve the balance of payments 
problem, but merely to control it in the short-run.
Argentina's attempt at controlling commerce to re­
lieve the economic dilemma she found herself in was aided 
by several factors: (1) A part of the foreign exchange had
been used to import items which Argentina could produce 
fairly economically. In the 1929-35 period imports of this 
kind represented approximately 9.3 per cent of the total;
•>4,
by the 1940-44 period this percentage was reduced to 2.4.
(2) Much capital investment had gone into basic areas such 
as transportation, and new expansion of investment could go 
along different lines without an immediate serious impact 
in the former capital investment areas. (3) Domestic 
sources of investment funds were fairly high. Thus, de­
spite a decline experienced during the 1930's, savings were
34Ibid., p. 15.
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high; this, coupled with a reduction of investment in agri­
culture and transportation, left a considerable amount of 
investment funds for manufacturing development.
Argentine policy held gross national product at 
fairly high levels during the depression and increased it 
during World War II. However, growth failed to match popu­
lation increases, so that only by 1 9 4 5 did per capita income 
regain its 1929 level. The main factor behind all this was 
the decline in agriculture demand. Between 1925-29 and 
1940-44 domestic consumption of agricultural products in­
creased approximately 24 per cent, but foreign demand de­
clined 34 per cent. During this period agricultural produc­
tion rose 34 per cent; this meant an increase in farm pro-
3 5duction over demand of about 10 per cent.  ^ Thus foreign 
commerce, specifically as measured by the severe foreign 
decline in demand for agricultural exports, made it ex­
tremely difficult for Argentina's gross national product to 
grow. Agriculture, which contributed one-third of gross 
national product, suffered depression conditions. To offset 
this decline and to raise gross national product 2 per cent 
annually would have necessitated an increase in non-agricul­
ture production of 2.3 per cent per year from 1925 to 1944.3 *^ 
It may also be noted that four of these years occurred 
during a period of war when capital goods imports were
35Ibid., p. 16. 36Ibid., p. 17.
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greatly curtailed.
Argentine-United States Economic Relations
Relations between the United States and Argentina
have not generally been harmonious. "Argentina's foreign
policy, including her divergent attitude toward Great
Britain and the United States and her efforts during 1940-
41 not to offend Germany, is dictated and controlled by the
cold, inescapable economic fact that practically 100 per
cent of the country's exports consist of raw materials of
which 60 per cent are agricultural and 34 per cent live-
X7stock products."J This fact has been the fundamental cause 
of adverse United States-Argentine relations. The United 
States, because it produces large quantities of the items 
which Argentina exports, has used various devices to keep 
Argentine products off the American market. Argentinians 
have been angered and the emotions aroused by these restric­
tions have made understanding between the two nations diffi­
cult .
Argentine resentment dates back to 1867 when a very 
high duty was placed on wool for the specific purpose of 
keeping Argentine wool out of the United States markets.
With the passage of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff in 1930, which 
the Argentinians felt was aimed directly at them, Argentine 
exports to the United States dropped 86 per cent, from $117
^White, o£. cit., p. 198.
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million in 1929 to $16 million in 1932.38 During the
1936-40 period average yearly exports were $78 million as 
compared with $95 million during 1926-30.
As a retaliatory measure against American restric­
tions Argentina established an exchange control system spe­
cifically aimed to keep United States imports out. However, 
because the manufactured items of America were highly de­
sired, they continued to flow to Argentina despite the pen­
alty rates. Permission was finally refused for the importa­
tion of many American articles through the issuing of 
embargo lists.
Attempts at a United States-Argentine commercial 
treaty in November 1939 ended in failure. Argentina's 
demand for concessions, while being willing to give almost 
none, the animosity toward the United States and the clash 
of bilateral versus multilateral trade ideals were insur­
mountable obstacles. At this time Argentina had 17 bilat­
eral trade agreements with European nations and was not 
willing to grant the United States its most favored nation 
clause provision. Also, the few concessions Argentina 
offered the United States were such that they could be nul­
lified by quotas.
A treaty was successfully negotiated between the two 
nations in 1941. Circumstances had changed, the European
38Ibid., p. 216.
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market was to a great degree shut off from Argentina and 
the United States was the only major source of the capital 
goods which Argentina needed desperately. The signing of 
this treaty was a major success for the State Department. 
Argentina accepted the unconditional most favored nation 
clause and repudiated the bilateral system of trade set up 
by the Roca-Runoiman Treaty of 1933; a victory had been won 
for multilateralism. Although the United States granted 
concessions on 8 4 items making up 92 per cent of Argentine 
exports to America in 1940, no concessions were made to 
grains except linseed. Chilled and frozen beef were still 
excluded, thus to many Argentinians the task was still 
incomplete.
During World War IX Argentina was the least cooper­
ative of the Latin American nations. It was not until early 
1944, when the outcome of the war was apparent, that she 
severed relations with the Axis. Because Axis spies were 
freed from jail and given freedom of movement under the 
Farrell Administration, the United States broke diplomatic 
relations with Argentina in June 1944 and urged other Latin 
nations to do likewise. At the Chapultepee Conference in 
February 1948 the atmosphere improved somewhat. Argentina 
agreed to declare war on the Axis and the United States 
promised to use its influence to get Argentina admitted to
39Ibid., p. 224.
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the United Nations.
Under Peron relatione were not cordial. Some Ameri­
can business interests espoused closer United States-Argen- 
tine ties in hopes of obtaining markets for United States 
exports. A part of the United States military desired im­
proved United States-Argentine relations because they wanted 
an ally in case of World War III against Russia. Generally, 
it appears that American policy toward Peron was one of 
hesitant toleration rather them any genuine attempt to ac­
cept what Peron stood for. Economic factors, political and 
ideological conflicts, and the fact that Argentina felt she 
should be the leading force in Latin Amerloa rather than the 
United States, explain past strained relations between the 
two nations.
Table VII presents a partial picture of the import­
ance of United States trade to Argentina, comparing the role 
of Great Britain and the United States in trade with Argen­
tina.
Before World War II, Great Britain was the leading 
trading partner of Argentina. England normally took from a 
quarter to a third of her exports and supplied approximately 
one-fifth of Argentina's imports. During these years Argen­
tina imported from 14 to 29 per cent of her foreign merchan­
dise from the United States. Exports to America by Argen­
tina approximated 12 per cent except during war years when 
they increased. Generally, Argentina had deficits in its
40
trade with the United States and surpluses in its dealings 
with England.
TABLE VII
ARGENTINE TRADE WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES,
1935 TO 1941 
(In percentages*)
Imports from Exports to
Year Great United Great United
Britain States Britain States
1935 21 14 34 12
1936 21 15 25 12
1937 21 16 29 13
1938 18 18 33 8
1939 20 17 36 12
1940 20 29 36 18
1941 17 29 38 37
*Percentages are hased on tariff values.
Source: Weil, o£. cit.. p. 130.
In summary, Argentina's greatest resource asset is 
her fertile soil. She encountered difficulties in develop­
ing manufacturing as a result of inadequate mineral and fuel 
resources. The balance of payments has played a very sig­
nificant role in the country's development because foreign 
exchange had to be earned from agriculture exports to fi­
nance purchases of industrial, power and agricultural equip­
ment. Argentina's constitution is a democratic one but con­
siderable political instability has at times led to the
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abandonment of democratic government. Foreign Investments 
have been important to Argentina and have helped to develop 
her transportation, power and manufacturing industries. 
Argentina has been economically more olosely associated with 
Europe than with the United States. This is the result of 
the competitive nature of Argentine and United States agri­
culture exports and the complementary trade with Europe. A 
major change in Argentine development occurred in the 1930's 
as a result of Argentina's disillusionment with dependence 
on external factors for economic growth. The new trend was 
to emphasize industrial development and to reduce dependence 
on export markets. A brief examination of the development 
of Brazil until 1947 will now be undertaken.
BRAZIL
Resources
The United States of Brazil is an area of 3»287,195 
square miles. It occupies 47 per cent of the South American 
continent and its land area is only 7 per cent less than the 
continental United States of America including Alaska.^ 
Brazil 1b the fifth largest country in the world and borders 
on all nations of South America except Chile and Ecuador. 
Altogether Brazil has eight river systems of which the
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data, on the 
Economy of Brazil. World Trade Information Service. Part I.
No. 5n-577 P7TT
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Amazon and Its tributaries in the northern part represent 
56 per cent of the total inland waterways. Unfortunately, 
some of these great rivers flow toward the interior Instead 
of to the sea and are interrupted by large waterfalls.
About 57 per cent of the land is made up of plateaus with a
range of from 650 to 3,000 feet in altitude. Approximately
40 per cent of Brazil consists of lowlands of under 650 feet 
in elevation and the other 3 per cent is land over 3,000 
feet above sea level.
Brazil possesses a considerable range in climate, 
but the section soath of the city of s£o Paulo is the only 
area in the Temperate Zone. Temperatures in considerable 
parts of central and northern Brazil are moderated by alti­
tude and sea breezes and seasons are the reverse of those
in the United States. In the tropical and subtropical 
regions seasons are marked primarily by extreme changes in 
the degree of rainfall rather than temperature variations. 
Usually the dry season is in the winter and the wet in the 
summer.
In 1960 Brazil had a population of 67 million with 
an average rate of increase of 2.5 per cent during the 
1950's.^1 More than half of the inhabitants were under 20 
years of age, indicating a young nation damographically.
^ Survey of the Brazilian Economy. 1960 (Washington, 
B.C.: Brazilian Embassy, n.d.J,p. 1.
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Population increases were primarily due to the domestic 
birth rate. Immigration into the nation was only 114*085 
in the years 1940-49 and 491*510 during the 1950-60 period.^ 
The census of 1950 recorded 98 per cent of the people as 
being native b o m .  Population movements have taken place 
within Brazil from the northeast toward the south. Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are the largest cities. As of July 
1* 1958, the estimated population of Sao Paulo was over 3>5 
million, while Rio de Janeiro had slightly over 3 million 
persons.
This giant of South America has rich and diverse 
resources; and whether one speaks of soil, forests, fish­
eries or mineral deposits, Brazil is well supplied. Within
its borders is found one-fourth of the world's known re­
serves of iron ore. East Central Minas Gerais contains huge 
deposits of hematite and magnitite, which are 50 to 65 per 
cent pure. Coal and iron deposits, however, are too far 
apart; and this has hindered the establishment of an iron 
and steel industry. Approximately one-third of the world's 
known sources of zirconium are found in Brazil and she sup­
plies almost all the high grade rock crystal mined in the
world. In 1956 it was estimated that Brazil ranked fourth 
in the world in potential hydroelectric power. Other
A O
U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Brazil, op. cit.. p. 31•
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minerals found In Brazil comprise a long list and include: 
manganese, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, molybdenum, chromium 
ores, titanium, tantalite, columbium, mica, lead, aluminum, 
bismuth, mercury, zinc, tin, platinum, gold, silver, dia­
monds, asbestos, gypsum, limestone, marble, graphite, build­
ing stone and talc. Brazil, however, has suffered greatly 
from the lack of mineral fuels. Hope is held that large 
petroleum fields may be discovered and developed in the in­
terior. The fact that the Brazilian government has chosen 
to develop the petroleum industry as a public monopoly and 
not permitted foreign oil companies to develop resources has
undoubtedly contributed to the slow progress made in this 
43area. J
Prom the almost virgin forests come commodities which 
usually comprise four of the top ten leading export items of 
Brazil. These are: lumber and fine cabinet wood, Parana
pine, mate tea, carnauba wax and Brazil nuts. In 1954 it 
was estimated that 57 per cent of Brazil was forest land 
totaling 1,854*000 square miles. This made Brazil the pos­
sessor of the second largest forest area in the world after 
Russia. However, only 463*500 square miles, or 14 per cent 
of the forest land, is considered to be accessible. Also, 
only 115*900 square miles, representing 25 per cent of
^"Brazil," Encyclopedia Americana (1961 ed.), IV,
432.
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accessible forests and 6 per cent of all forest land Is 
being utilized. Approximately 40 per cent of the accessible
4. A
forests are privately owned.
An analysis of the resources and conditions of Brazil 
leads to but one conclusion: very few countries in the
world are better prepared to maintain an industrial complex 
of their own.*^
Government
Brazil was discovered on April 22, 1500, by Pedro 
Alvara Cabral, a Portuguese admiral. Under the Treaty of 
Tordeslllas, which allocated Spanish and Portuguese dis­
coveries in the New World, Brazil came under the domination 
of Portugal. After driving out the French in 1567, the 
Portuguese consolidated their foothold in Brazil. In 1580 
Philip II of Spain took over the throne of Portugal and in­
corporated Brazil into the Spanish Empire. Portugal became 
independent of Spain in 1640 and succeeded in regaining 
control of Brazil.
In 1808 the colony of Brazil achieved the rank of a 
kingdom. She declared her independence in 1822 and in 1824 
Brazil's constitution came into existence. This constitu­
tion "provided for the separation of the exeoutive, judicial
^ Ibid.. p. 6 .
*^Jos4 Jobim, Brazil in the Making (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1943J« p.*76.
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and legislative powers; concentration of provincial admin­
istration under the control of the imperial government; a 
Senate appointed for life and indirect election of a Chamber
of Deputies; union of church and state, with religious tol-
4.6eration; and a bill of rights." The constitution was 
amended in 1 8 3 4 to permit the provinces to elect provincial 
legislatures.
Additional constitutions were proclaimed in 1891,
1934 and 1937. In 1891 Brazil became a republic after the 
overthrow of the Empire. The Constitution of 1891 was 
modeled to some degree after that of the United States and 
specific functions were allocated to a weak central govern­
ment. Church and state were separated and direct elections 
were Introduced. The 1934 Constitution placed greater 
authority in the hands of the central government. Brazil 
was divided into municipalities and districts in relation to 
population concentration and the federal government was 
granted extensive authority to start social and economic 
reforms. In 1937 a constitution was proclaimed which fur­
ther tightened the control of the central authority. A 
plebiscite was to be conducted prior to the constitution 
going into effect, but it was never held. Getullo Vargas 
served first as president and then as dictator; under him 
Brazil became a highly centralized dictatorship.
^ "Brazil," Encyclopedia Americana, op. cit., p. 444.
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Brazil is today a Federal Republic; the constitution 
now In effect was promulgated on September 1 8 , 1946. The 
present constitution provides for a government similar to 
that of the United States. The executive branch is made up 
of a President, and Vice-President elected for five-year 
terms; both are ineligible to serve consecutive terms. The 
legislative branch consists of the Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies.
The members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected 
for four-year terms with proportional representation of the 
States, Territories and the Federal District according to 
population. Three senators are elected from each state and 
the Federal District for eight-year terms. The Federal 
Judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Federal Court 
of Appeals and the military, electoral and labor courts.
All persons over 18 years of age, except illiterates, have 
suffrage.^
Brazil ie divided into 20 states, 5 territories and 
the Federal District of Rio de Janeiro. States enjoy con­
siderable autonomy and may exercise those powers not dele­
gated to the Federal Government. Each state has a governor 
and a constitution; territories are governed by Federally 
appointed governors. States and Territories are divided 
into municipalities and these in turn are subdivided into
^ Survey of the Brazilian Economy. 1960. op. clt.,
p. 4.
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districts.
The government sinoe the 1930's has pursued a program 
of encouraging industrial development. Toward this end 
trade restrictions and exchange controls have been utilized. 
Recently government emphasis has been on the development of 
basic manufactures, Including rolled steel, non-ferrous 
metals, heavy chemloals, cement, paper and pulp, automotive 
trucks, ships and heavy industrial and electrical equip­
ment.^®
Economic Development
The economic development of Brazil has been charac­
terized by five principal cycles. There have been four 
export cyoles: (1 ) the sugar oycle, (2 ) the mining pros­
perity cycle, (3 ) the coffee oycle, and (4 ) the short-lived 
rubber boom. A movement of economic development based on 
industrialization began to take place at the turn of the 
twentieth century. J
Sugar production started on a large scale in the 
middle of the sixteenth century; and although it continued 
to be a major crop of Brazil, it declined from the second 
half of the seventeenth century. Sugar declined in price 
because of the development of Haitian production and with 
its reduction in value lost much of its ability to generate
48Ibid.. p. 11. 49Ibid., p. 100.
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income. With the subsequent rise of Cuba as a producer and 
the production of sugar from beets in Europe and the United 
States* Brazilian sugar exports declined. HIn the last half 
of the seventeenth century the volume of sugar exports was 
hardly half of the exports around 1650. Furthermore, prioes 
had also declined by about 50 per cent, in other words the 
income generated by the sugar sector was reduced in a few
decades to one-fourth of the level attained during the most
*50prosperous t i m e s . A t  the end of the sugar oycle the 
Northeast comer of Brazil, where sugar had dominated, was 
left with a surplus labor force and very narrow capital 
base. These factors set the environment for long run under­
employment in that section of Brazil.
Mining activity during the eighteenth century in the 
Central-Southern part of the nation provided a powerful, 
although short-lived, stimulus to the nation's economic 
development. Cold and diamond mining was carried on over 
scattered areas, primarily rivers and river banks, which 
aided the migration of population to previously empty land 
areas. This movement brought self-employed miners and wage 
earners into a labor force which had been made up primarily 
of slaves. The fact that miners depended on other areas for 
the means of life aided specialization and the development 
of a market economy. Thus the mining movement helped the
50Ibid.
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cause of internal economic development more than had sugar 
exports. Many of the advantages were not continued after 
the gold boom died out by the end of the eighteenth century. 
Most of those who had been employed in mining reverted to 
subsistence employment on the farms. The diamond and gold 
boom led to a considerable manpower pool in the Central- 
Southern region that was available when the coffee cycle 
came.
The coffee cycle may be divided into three periods: 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century to 1 8 5 0 , from 
1 8 5 0 to the end of slave labor in 1 8 8 8 , and finally from 
1888 to 1 9 2 9 * With the collapse of coffee production in 
Haiti in the nineteenth century, Brazilian production was 
given an impetus. Manpower surpluses as a result of the end 
of the mining cycle were also beneficial. Coffee production 
utilized a larger number of workers and less capital than 
had sugar output and thus had a positive impact in spreading 
the money economy. In 1850 the use of slave labor began to 
decline. This factor had a favorable impact on economic 
development because it diversified funds which before had 
been used in the slave trade. The decline in the utiliza­
tion of slaves also stimulated immigration from Europe since 
employment opportunities increased. Brazil experienced 
rapid economic growth during the second half of the nineteenth
51Ibid., p. 102
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century, based largely on coffee production. By the end of 
the century, however, coffee market conditions began to 
operate adversely for Brazil.
Coffee production around the turn of the century 
began to experience cyclical fluctuations which were 
"cobweb" in nature. Producers took measures to stabilize 
prices and curtail production which were sometimes tempor­
arily successful, but in the long run stimulated production, 
particularly in other countries. Attempts were made to 
protect export levels by devaluation of exchange rates, but 
this had the effect of reducing the capacity to import and 
caused inflation. To these problems were added the mis- 
allocatlon of resources through coffee surpluses and the 
failure to find alternative uses for capital and labor pre­
viously employed in coffee production.
Price declines in coffee markets in 1929 plus the 
fact that Brazil produced twice as much coffee a» she could 
sell brought a change to the existing economic structure. 
Brazil liquidated its foreign exchange reserves as coffee 
prices in the New York market dropped sharply from 22.5 
cents per pound in September 1929 to 8 cents in September 
1931. ^ 3 Devaluation of the exchange rate plus government 
purchases of surpluses followed. Income in domestic cur­
rency was thus maintained and incentive toward
52Ibid. 53Ibid., p. 103.
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Industrialization was provided with a fairly large real 
purchasing power in the domestic market, plus protection 
from foreign competition.
A short-lived rubber boom, externally initiated, 
developed in the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
lasted until after World War I. Prices increased from 120 
pounds sterling per ton in 1 8 7 0  to about 5 0 0 in 1 9 1 0 .
After World War 1, with the rise of competition from 
Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia, prices fell to one-fifth 
of their former level.^ This caused a collapse in the 
regional economy which unfortunately had diverted its normal 
economic activities such as the production of cocoa, Brazil 
nuts and spices to rubber plantations.
Industrialization is the development which many 
economists feel is the latest of the cycles of Brazilian 
development. In the 1880's, as a result of the rise of 
urban centers, the skills possessed by immigrants, foreign 
Investments in social overhead and the government's protec­
tionist policy, manufacturing output began to Increase.
Table VIII gives an indication of Brazil's growth in manu­
facturing.
Prom the end of the 19th century up to the 1 9 3 0 's, 
there were periods of pronounoed booms followed by sharp 
recessions. During the depressed 1930's devaluation of
54Ibid.
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exchange rates and pronounced fall in export prices made 
production for the domestic market more attractive. Using 
1 9 2 5 - 2 9  as the base, industrial production increased to 160 
by 1935-39.^ Over the same period, the index of iron and 
steel rose to 570, that for cement increased to 8 6 5  and the 
index of tire production rose to 1,039.^ Physical produc­
tion in steel and cement rose rapidly between 1 9 2 6  and 1 9 4 9 . 
Steel output increased from 10,000 to 610,000 metric tons
while cement production was augmented from 1 3 to 2 8 7 , 0 0 0
5 7metric tons during the same period. Domestic cotton tex­
tile output had by 1949 almost completely replaced imports, 
the number of spindles increasing from 1 ,1 5 3 , 0 0 0  in 1 9 1 5  to 
3,280,000 in 1949-58
TABLE VIII
GROWTH OP MANUFACTURING IN BRAZIL, 1889-1920
1889 1907 1 9 2 0
Number of manufacturing firms 6 3 6 3,250 13,336
Capital* 402** 6 6 6 ** 1 ,8 1 6 **
Number of workers 54,169 150,841 275,512
Value of production* n.a. 742** 2,989**
*In millions of cruzeiros. **At 1920 prices.
Source: Survey of the Brazilian Economy, I960, op.
cit., p. 104.
5 5 Ibid., p. 1 0 4 . 5 6 Ibid.
5 7^United Nations Commission for Latin America, Eco 
nomio Survey of Latin America, 1949, op. cit.. p. 250.
38Ibid.. p. 25.
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Part of thla industrial increase is attributable to 
the world-wide excess industrial capacity present at the end 
of the 1920's. As full capacity was utilized further ex­
pansion was aided by the acquisition of second-hand equip­
ment on a large scale from world industrial centers, made 
possible by the depression. The Second World War assisted 
industrialization because former external sources of imports 
were no longer available. Alsot the war served to bring the 
government more directly into the economy as a stimulus of 
economic growth. Scarcity of capital goods imports did, 
however, limit the rate of growth during the war period.
The relative importance of Brazilian agriculture and 
industrial production is revealed in Table IX.
TABLE IX
BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL FROKJCTION,
1920-1947
(Values at 1939 prices in millions of cruzeiros)
Year AgriculturalProduction
Industrial
Production
1 9 2 0 4,916 3,301
1929 6,472 4,726
1930 6,554 4,595
1933 7,455 4,875
1940 7,865 7,707
1942 7,702 8,820
1943 8,275 10,114
1944 7,947 10,906
1946 8,767 11,597
1947 8,766 1 1 , 2 1 2
Source: United Nations Commission for Latin America,
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949, op. cit., p. 206.
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In 1942 the value of Industry output exceeded that 
of the agricultural sector for the first time. By 1949 the 
value of agricultural production was 1 . 8 times and that of 
industry 3.4 times what they were in 1 9 2 0 .
The yearly rate of growth of the Brazilian economy 
from 1920 to 1947 is presented in Table X. It is apparent 
that the rate of growth of the 1 9 2 0 's was not maintained 
during the 1930'e nor in the World War II period. This fact 
is attributable to a great degree to the fall in income as 
a result of the decline of international prices for raw 
materials, specifically coffee. Also, wartime conditions 
further curtailed export earnings, making Increases in per 
capita income more difficult. Nevertheless, the trend of 
growth has been a rising one.
TABLE X
AVERAGE YEARLY GROWTH IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT,
1920-1947
GNP Yearly Rate Per Capita
Period Average Rate of Population Rate of
of Growth Growth Growth
1920-1929 4.5 2.0 2.5
1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 7 2.3 2 .0 0.3
1937-1947 2.9 2.2 0.7
Source: Survey of the Brazilian Economy, I960, on.
cit., p. 106.
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A study of Brazilian economic development up to the 
late 1940's Indicates that Brazilian economic growth over 
the years has become less dependent on external factors.
This has been the result of the expansion of Brazilian in­
dustry and the use of a greater part of agricultural produc­
tion for domestic consumption. The per cent of gross 
national product invested also increased from 10.5 during 
the 1925-29 period to 13.7 during 1945-1949*^ However, by 
1949 the rate of Brazil's growth was still greatlydependent 
on external forces.
International Trade
Brazil, although the possessor of great natural re­
sources, has faced a barrier in its quest to industrialize 
in the dearth of capital goods. She has been compelled to 
import a considerable amount of her equipment requirements. 
Her rate of economic growth and improvement of living 
standards are to a considerable degree dependent on her 
capacity to import. Since the capacity to import is a 
function of the quantity of exports and the terms of trade, 
the world demand and prices of agricultural products and 
raw materials thus assume considerable importance. Funds 
for the importation of capital goods must come out of the 
export sector along with loans and foreign investments.
59Ibid., p. 106.
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The Brazilian capacity to import suffered during the 
1930's. In spite of recovery in the 1940'a, the level 
reached in the late 1 9 4 0 's was not much higher than that 
attained during the late 1920's. Tahle XI presents annual 
average data for the quantity of exports, terms of trade, 
capacity to import and quantity of imports. The average 
annual capacity to import during this twenty-year period, 
measured in terms of exports and the terms of trade, in­
creased 7 per cent. However, population during the same 
period rose 41 per cent; thus, per capita capacity to import 
declined by 25 per cent.^0 Quantity of exports declined by 
38 per cent and quantity of aggregate imports rose 9 per 
cent. Henry W, Speigel, using the 1901-1905 period as the 
base, concluded that Brazil's terms of trade rose to 136 
during 1911-1915; but by 1936-1940 they were down to 50 and 
during World War II rose only to 65.^^ Thus, the adverse 
Influence of the Great Depression on Brazil's foreign trade 
was still being felt in 1949. Basically, it was the decline 
in Brazil's terms of trade that explains why, although there 
were increases in the quantity of exports, the capacity to 
import improved only slightly in the aggregate and declined 
on a per capita basis.
6 0 Ibid., p. 209.
61Henry William Speigel, The Brazilian Economy, 
Chronic Inflation and Sporadic Industrialization (IHiiiadel- 
pEi'at'Tiie Blakist'oS^Tompaiiy, 194577 p ”T ST.-----
TABLE II
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BRAZIL'S QUANTITY OP EXPORTS, TERMS OP TRADE AND 
CAPACITY TO IMPORT, 1925-19*9 
(1937 - 1 0 0 )
Yearly Quantity Terms of Capacity Quantity
Averages of Exports Trade to Import of Imports
1925-29 73 197 1*3 1 2 2
1930-3* 80 119 95 63
1935-39 111 9 0 1 0 0 89
1 9 *0 -** 97 105 1 0 2 75
19*5-*9 1 2 * 123 153 1 3 2
Souroe: United Rations Economic Commission for 
Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 19*9» op* 
cit.. pp. 2 1 1- 2 1 2 .
United Nations studies for the 1920's through the 
1940's reveal that Brazilian imports of capital goods have 
fluctuated more erratically than other goods. Not only has 
capital formation been retarded during the downward swing 
of international cycles, but recovery has often been slow.
It took 17 years before the level of imports of capital
62goods achieved the level prior to the Great Crash. These 
factors have stimulated Brazilian efforts to utilize import 
substitution whenever possible; in steel and cement, for 
example, production rose noticeably. In 19*1, for the first 
time, Brazil's combined production of steel and cement
62United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Economic Survey of Latin America. 19*9. op. cit., p. 216.
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exceeded the volume of imports. Although the excess of 
home production over imports was not maintained during the
1 9 4 4 - 4 7 period, it re-asserted itself in 1 9 4 8 and 1949 when 
domestic output exceeded imports by more than 50 per cent. 
Using average annual figures for 1925-1929 as the base, by
1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 imports of iron, steel and cement had declined 20 
per cent while domestio production of iron and steel in­
creased by 2,360 per cent.^^
Traditionally, agriculture haB been the main source 
of Brazilian exports. Table XII indicates the relative im­
portance of the major export items of Brazil during the 
1821 to 1945 period. During most of the nineteenth century 
the eight primary products liBted in Table XII accounted 
for approximately 90 per cent of the total value of exports. 
The First and Second World Wars tended to lead toward greater 
diversification; in 1 9 4 2 this group represented only 47 per 
cent of the toted. Coffee, since 1831* has been the leading 
export item although declining in relative importance.
Sugar went from first place in 1821-30 to last by 1945; 
cocoa held its share and cotton demonstrated considerable 
variability, recovering somewhat starting with 1 9 3 1-4 0 .
The fluctuations in these figures are largely explained by 
the product cycles in Brazil's economic development.
63Ibid., p. 2 1 9 .
TABLE III
VALUE OF EIGHT EXPORT COMMODITIES, IN PER CENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS, BRAZIL
(1821-1945)
Tear AllEight Coffee Sugar Cocoa Mate Tobacco Cotton Rubber
Kidee and 
Skins
1 8 2 1 - 3 0 8 5 . 8 18.4 30.1 0.5 n.a. 2.5 20.6 0 . 1 1 3 . 6
1831-40 8 9 . 8 43.8 24.0 0 . 6 0.5 1.9 1 0 . 8 0.3 7.9
1841-50 8 8 . 2 41.4 26.7 1 .0 0.9 1.8 7.5 0.4 8.5
1 8 5 1 - 6 0 90.9 48 . 8 2 1 . 2 1.0 1.6 2.6 6 . 2 2.3 7.2
1 8 6 1 - 7 0 90.3 45.5 12.3 0.9 1. 2 3.0 18.3 3.1 6.0
1 8 7 1 - 8 0 95.1 56.6 1 1 . 8 1. 2 1.5 3.4 9.5 5.5 5.6
1 8 8 1 - 9 0 92.3 61.5 9.9 1 . 6 1 . 2 2.7 4.2 8.0 3.2
1 8 9 1 - 0 0 95.6 64.5 6.0 1.5 1.3 2.2 2.7 1 5 . 0 2.4
1 9 0 1 - 1 0 95.2 51.3 1 . 2 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.1 28.2 4.3
1 9 1 1 - 2 0 85.5 53.0 3.0 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.0 12.1 6.2
1921-30 8 8 . 6 69.6 1.4 3.2 2.7 2.1 2.4 2.6 4.6
1931-40 77.5 50.0 0.5 4.2 1 . 6 1.5 14.2 1.1 4.4
1941 57.2 30.0 0 . 1 4.7 0.9 0 . 6 15.0 1.4 4.5
1942 47.3 26.2 0 . 6 2.9 1 . 0 0.7 8. 6 2.0 5.3
1943 4 8 . 2 32.1 0 . 2 3.9 0 . 8 0 . 8 4.7 2.2 3.5
1944 54.9 36.2 1 . 1 2.9 0 . 8 1.5 6. 2 3.4 2.8
1945 54.9 35.5 0.4 1.9 0.9 2.1 8.7 2.9 2.5
Source: Speigel, 0£. cit., p. 123.
o>o
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The noticeable decline in the role played by these 
eight commodities was offset by increases in exports of 
manufactures from one per cent of the total in 1939 to 18 
per cent in 1945.^* Noticeable among manufactured exports 
were: textiles, menthol, caffeine and rubber tires and
tubes. Strategic materials, minerals being the most im­
portant, also helped to fill the void. The latter included: 
cotton 1inters, seeds, nuts, waxes, oils, iron, manganese, 
mica, rock crystal, tantalite, beryl, tungsten, rulite and 
diamonds. '
Brazilian imports also reflected the changes in eco­
nomic development, particularly the Increase in raw material 
imports. At the beginning of the twentieth century primary 
materials accounted for 15 to 20 per cent of total imports. 
In the following decades primary materials ranged from 20 
to 34 per cent, reaching a peak of 34 per cent during the 
early part of World War II. Over the years machinery and 
equipment represented the most important single group of 
imports ranging from 14 to 21 per cent of the total.^
Wheat usually ranked second making up from 9 to 14 per cent 
of the total. Other leading import items were iron and 
steel plate, automobiles, gasoline, and coal. Table XIII 
presents a percentage breakdown for Brazilian ImportB by
^*Ibid., p. 219. ^Speigel, op. cit.. p. 214.
66Ibid., p. 126.
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major groups in 1 9 0 5 and 1945.
TABLE IXII
MAKE-UP OP BRAZILIAN IMPORTS, PER CENT OP VALUE,
1 9 0 5 and 1 9 4 5
Foreign Investments
Englishmen made their first important investments 
in independent Brazil in 1824-25. For the next 60 years 
Brazil was the main area of British investments in Latin 
America, primarily because of its stability. By 1890, how­
ever, English investments were greater in Argentina and she 
held the lead until 1946 when Brazil again became the most 
important area of British Investments In Latin America. At 
the end of 1880 British investments in Brazil amounted to
38.9 million pounds sterling; of this amount 23.1 million
67was in government loans. At the end of 1910 British capi­
tal amounted to over 151.4 million pounds; it reached 2 2 3 . 8
Year RawMaterials
Foodstuffs and 
Livestock Manufactures Total
1905
1945
17
28
35
26
48
46
100
100
Source: Speigel, o£. cit.. p. 126.
Fred Rippy* "Early British Investments in the 
Latin American Republics," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 
VI (Summer 1962), 41.
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million in 1923 and aohieved a paak of 287.3 million in
68
1930. At the end of 1946 the sum was 170.5 million pounds.
Traditionally, more than half of these investments were in
government bonds and until 1900 railroad investments were
second in importance. Other British capital was heavily
concentrated in public utilities and was lees diversified
then English investments in Argentina.**9
The French and Belgians, particularly the French,
also made investments from 1908 to 1910. German funds began
to be important during the 1890's, primarily in shipping,
trading and banking. United States investments valued at
only $40 million in 1914 became important after World War I.
Total foreign investments in Brazil in 1930 were estimated
at $2,628 million; of this amount the British owned one-
7 0
half and the United States one-fifth.
Table XIV presents United States investments in 
Brazil for selected years. Paul Horn and Hubert Bice reached
similar figures for direct United States investments as did
7 1
William B. Bale. Horn and Bice estimate that American 
direct investments in Brazil in 1940 represented nine per
68Ibid., p. 83. 69Ibid.. p. 86.
^George Wjrthe, Royce Wight, and Harold Mldkiff, 
Brazil: An Expanding Economy (Hew York: The Twentieth Cen- 
tury Fun<T7 194-9)» pT 295 •
^William B. Bale, Brazil; Factors Affecting Foreign 
Investments (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research 
Institute, 1958), p. 30.
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cent of the total United States direct Investments In Latin 
7 0
America.'
TABLE XIV
UNITED STATES INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL, 1929-1945 
(In millions of dollars)
Year Direct Go: ? ™ ? 6nt Total
1929 194 346 540
1936 194 366 560
1940 240 335 575
1943 337 288 625
1945 n.a. 207* n.a.
*1946 data.
Source: Speigel, 0£. cit., p. 136.
In 1940 foreigners supplied 40 per cent of the capi­
tal of industrial enterprises; without public utilities the 
foreign share was 27 per cent.^ During the same year esti­
mates of foreign participation in Brazilian industry as per­
centages of total investment were: mechanical shops, 58
per cent; non-metalllc minerals, 49 per cent; clothing and 
toilet articles, 44 per cent; beverages, 42 per cent; wood,
7 2 Horn and Bice, ojs. cit., p. 365.
7  3^ George Vythe, "Brazil: Trends in Industrial Devel­
opment," Economic Growth (Brazil: Simon Kuznets ed., 1955),
P . 60.
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7428 per cent; and metallurgy, 26 per cent. Foreign invest­
ments probably reached a peak: in 1930 and then declined.
This decline was the result of the readjustment of the 
bonded debt and the nationalization of foreign enterprises 
previously foreign-owned. Also, during the Second World 
War some German and Japanese holdings were liquidated and 
the British were forced to sell some of their investments 
to help finance the war effort. United States and Canadian 
interests, however, have had a tendency to increase over the 
years.
The significance of foreign investments to Brazil 
cannot be measured merely in terms of the amount of funds. 
Perhaps more significant was the initiative, management and 
general industrial knowledge that went to Brazil with this 
capital. This is evidenced by the trend from 1930 through 
World War II for Brazilians to put up more of the capital 
while foreigners supplied the patents, speoial skills and 
management.
Brazilian-United States Relations
"Since the founding of the republic the relations 
between the United States and Brazil have unquestionably 
been more cordial than between the United States and any
7* I M d
66
other South American country."*^ President Harry S. Truman 
in 1947 in a speech before the Brazilian Congress stated: 
"It is not too much to describe our relations as those of 
lifelong friendB."^® Truman further stated that Brazil and 
the United States had common interests, principles and 
ideals. Simon Hanson wrote, "the United States of America 
has had no better friend than Brazil in the western hemi­
sphere."*^ Mauricio Nabuco, formerly prominent Brazilian 
Foreign Service official, stated that: "In this troubled
world, when a great effort is necessary simply for nations 
to live in peace with one another, it is gratifying to see 
two countries whose lasting friendship seems to come natur­
ally. There are geographic ad, historical, economic and 
political sources for the traditional understanding which 
twice in this century has led Brazil and the United States 
to a full alliance in war."^® Through the World War II 
period, Brazil and the United States could well be
7 5 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United 
States. 4th ed. (New York: Apple‘feon (Century Company. 1943)* 
p ” W .
7 6
Harry S. Truman, "The Ties Between United States 
and Brazil," Vital Speeches. XIII (September 15, 1947)♦ 713.
7 7''Simon Hanson, "Brazlllan-American Relations: A
Case Study in American Foreign Policy," Inter-Amerloan 
Economic Affairs. V (Spring 1952), 3«
*^®Mauricio Nabuco, "The Good Neighbor— A Half Cen­
tury of Brazilian-American Friendship," Atlantic. CIIIC 
(February 1956), 101.
67
classified as having had excellent relations.
It wae Thomas Jefferson who, as early as 1787, ex­
pressed the need and hope for an Independent, strong, 
friendly Brazil to carry out in the Southern part of the 
hemisphere the role the United States was to play in the 
Northern. Emperor Bon Pedro II was one of the greatest con­
tributing factors to Brazilian-United States friendship by 
striving to develop democratic institutions in Brazil during 
his 58-year reign. Relations were further cemented in 1906 
by the visit of Secretary of State Elihu Root to Brazil.
This history-making venture marked the first time that a 
Secretary of State left United States territory during his 
term of office. Buring World War I, Brazil severed its re­
lations with the Axis and allied itself with the United 
States.
Buring World War II, Brazil controlled Axis assets, 
cut off exports to them and aided the Allied cause with 
military assistance as well as the production of strategic 
materials. Throughout the war the Brazilian example con­
trasted markedly with the actions of Argentina. While the 
war was still being fought the United States gave Brazil 
materials neoessary for the Volta Redonda integrated steel 
mill. At the end of the war Brazil emerged as a great ally 
of the United States.
Economic factors have been responsible to a great 
degree for the existence of cordial relations between the
68
two nations. Brazil's trade with the United States has 
been complementary rather than competitive* The United 
States has needed the tropical and strategic products of 
Brazil, while the latter has purchased many of its manufac­
tured items in the United States. Since World War I the 
United States has been the major trading partner of Brazil. 
Table XV presents the relative position of the United States 
as a trading partner of Brazil. The inorease in 1945 is 
indicative of the fact that World War II gave a great im­
petus to the promotion of inter-American trade. Trade with 
the United States during the decades of the 1920's, 1930's 
and 1940's usually resulted in a favorable balance for 
Brazil.
TABLE XV
PERCENTAGE OF BRAZILIAN TRADE WITH 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1913-1945
■■a.. i i . - ' T ' t  i ,i ■ . . . - i n i r - n  1 i .. j- s  a a t a a ^ M a a a B B a e a a i
Imports  Exports____
Year United Great  United Great LL.
States Britain Garmany States Britain 0ermany
1913 16 24 18 32 13 14
1919 48 16 0 42 7 0
1929 30 19 13 42 6 9
1939 36 9 20 37 10 12
1945 55 4 0 49 12 0
Source: Speigel, 0£. cit.. p. 127.
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Since World War I the United States has been a sig­
nificant investor in Brazil. In 1949* of total estimated 
foreign Investment in Brazil of $1,500 million, the United 
States was the second largest investor with from $400-500 
million, and England was first with $550-600 million.^
In addition to the economic factore underlying rela­
tions between Brazil and the United States, Maurlcio Nabuco, 
Brazilian statesman, feels that part of the amiable rela­
tions is explained by the long friendship between England 
and Portugal. The Brazilian with a Portuguese background 
has an easier time comprehending American habits than do his 
Spanish-speaking counterparts in Latin America.
Relations between the United States and Brazil have 
not been as cordial since the end of World War II, At the 
conclusion of the war Brazil expected to achieve its goals 
of industrial expansion with American assistance. Instead 
of receiving United States assistance, Brazil became the 
center of a controversy between the United States and Bra­
zilian governments over private direct Investment versus 
public investment policy. In the postwar period with the 
rise of Communism, other nations successfully were black­
mailing Washington by threatening to turn to the Communists 
for assistance; Brazil did not resort to such threats but
^Wythe, Wight and Midkiff, oj>. cit.. p. 299.
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still expected economic assistance on her terms. However, 
funds were not forthcoming and Brazil's industrialization 
ambitions were adversely affected. The seeds were thus sown 
for some of the strained relations of recent years. This 
development will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 
V.
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL COMPARED
To permit a more accurate appraisal of United States 
economic relations with these two countries, a comparison 
of the areas covered in this chapter is in order. The com- 
parison will not be extensive, but is merely intended to 
complete the limited presentation of the resources and his­
torical evolution of these nations.
Although both countries are well endowed with natural 
resources, Brazil's are by far the most extensive, both from 
the viewpoint of variety and quantities available. Brazil's 
extensive resources are, however, so geographically located 
as to make their utilization often difficult. In area,
Brazil is over three times the size of Argentina and within 
her borders are many mineral resources lacked by Argentina. 
Petroleum and hard coal appear to be the only materials 
needed for industrial development which Brazil at the present 
time does not have in adequate amounts. The situation in
RO
Hanson, 0£. cit., p. 9*
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petroleum may be due to the failure to permit foreign capi­
tal with ite •'know howH to develop the oil potential of the 
nation. Argentina solved a similar problem by allowing 
foreign capital to develop its oil potential. Forest re­
sources are great in Brazil and she ranks second in the 
world after Russia as the possessor of the world's largest 
forest area. Argentina, on the other hand, is an importer 
of many forest products. Although south and southeastern 
Brazil has fertile soil, much of the country is in the Amazon 
basin, which at present is unfit for planting. Argentina 
has an advantage in the availability of agriculture land 
because of the Pampa.
From the viewpoint of climate there is a significant 
contrast between the two countries. Host of Argentina is 
in the temperate zone while only a small portion of Brazil 
is within this range. This factor partly accounts for the 
difference in United States relations with these two coun­
tries. The United States, being in the Temperate Zone, 
produces agricultural products which are quite similar to 
Argentina's, while she needs to import tropical products 
such as coffee and cocoa, of which Brazil is a leading pro­
ducer.
The population composition of the two countries is 
very different. Argentina's population is 97 per cent Cau­
casian with about 16 per cent being European-born. By South 
American standards Argentina's inhabitants are very literate
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and their educational levels and technical skills are prob­
ably the highest In South America. Brazil's population, on 
the other hand, is composed of different racial groups and
8lis not as well educated or trained as is that of Argentina. 
Both nations have population concentrations along their 
coasts in one or two major cities. Argentina's inhabitants 
are concentrated in the Buenos Aires area while Brazil's 
population density is greatest in Rio de Janeiro and S3o 
Paulo.
Brazil's native language is Portuguese, while Argen­
tina's is Spanish. This fact has tended to some degree to 
set Brazil apart from the rest of Latin America. Mauriclo 
Nabuco feels that the close ties between England and Portu­
gal over the centuries have had an influence on Brazilian- 
American relations. He feels that those with a Portuguese 
background are more prone to understand better the ways of 
the Americans because of the extensive, friendly relations 
between Portugal and England over the years. The fact that 
Brazil speaks a language which is different from that spoken 
in most of Latin America has probably tended to help bring 
Brazil and the United States somewhat closer.
Both nations have forms of government which are quite 
similar and resemble that of the United States. Argentina 
declared her independence from Spain in 1816 and Brazil from
8l "Brazil," Encyclopedia Americana, op. oit., p. A2A*
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Portugal In 1822. Attempts at a democratic form of govern­
ment soon after their independence failed, but Argentina 
obtained a democratic constitution in 1853 and Brazil became 
a republic in 1891. Neither has escaped the adversities of 
political instability and a return to totalitarian forms of 
government during their history. Differences are that 
Brazil had an emperor for a significant part of its histori­
cal evolution while Argentina did not, and that Argentina 
has experienced more political upheavals than has Brazil.
Argentina started its industrialization development 
push before Brazil. Adequate statistics were not kept in 
Argentina prior to 1935; in that year the value of indus­
trial output exceeded agricultural production by 14 per
O p
cent and in 1943 by 134 per cent. By 1948 the value of
q
manufacturing was more than twice that of agriculture. J 
Brazil's manufacturing output first exceeded the volume of 
agricultural production in 1942; however, in the years im­
mediately following this relationship was not maintained.
Both countries have been vulnerable to external fac­
tors which greatly influenced their ability to develop eco­
nomically. Brazil experienced export cycles, while Argen­
tina was dependent on a small number of agricultural
82Weil, o£. cit., p. 149-
8^Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949, op. cit.,
p. 106.
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products whose world demand fluctuated considerably. The 
two nations have attempted to reduce reliance on external 
forces and become more self-sufficient by pushing industri­
alization. It appears that some success was achieved along 
these lines during the 1930's and 1940's.
The lack of mineral resources has hindered Argen­
tina's industrial expansion. Brazil, on the other hand, 
appears to have all the resources necessary for an indus­
trial society with the possible exception of petroleum and 
hard coal. With its greater resource base, Brazil has the 
potential to become a great industrial power while Argen­
tina in the present stage of technology is not so blessed.
Brazil was the South American leader in obtaining 
foreign investment up until the late 1880's. By 1890 Argen­
tina took the lead and held it to 1946 when Brazil again 
regained her former leadership. Britain was the leading 
investor in both countries; her Argentine investments in 
1940 totaled $2 billion®^ and those in Brazil 11.2 billion.®"* 
The United StateB was a closer second in Brazil than in 
Argentina in terms of total investments with approximately 
$575 and $578 million respectively in 1940. Up to World 
War II, sterling and dollars Invested in Brazil were
Q j
*Speigel, op* cit.. p. 136. (I have converted 
Brazilian data from pounds sterling into dollars.)
85'Haring, ££. cit.. p. 50.
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primarily in government bonds and usually they exceeded 50
86per cent of the total investments. In Argentina, on the
other hand, direct investments were of primary importance
with the British Investing in railroads and the Americans
in meat packing and public utilities. By absorbing large
sums of foreign investments in government bonds Brazil faced
an annual problem of servicing this debt. During five of
the eight decades from 1861-70 to 1931-40, these remittances
accounted for from 10 to 20 per cent of all federal expendi- 
8 7tures. Argentina did not face such a heavy burden. A 
difference also occurred after World War II in the attitudes 
of these nations toward foreign investors. Peron paid off 
most of Argentina's foreign debt and nationalized many 
foreign holdings; Brazil took no similar measures.
International trade has been very important to Brazil
and Argentina over the years. Both have depended on export
earnings to finance the importation of needed capital goods. 
Argentina's trade has been more significant to her in terms 
of value than has Brazil's. In 1913* for example, Argen­
tina exported $510 million compared to Brazil's $316
million. During 1946 the figures were $1,183 and $981
88million for Argentina and Brazil respectively. The data
®^Speigel, op. cit.. p. 135. ^ Ibid., p. 144.
88The Poreign grade of Latin America (Washington:
Pan American UnionT 19^2), p. 4-4.
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on exports and imports assume greater significance when it 
is kept in mind that Brazil's population is ahout three 
times that of Argentina.
Both nations have been primarily exporters of pri­
mary goods, particularly agricultural products. Although 
Brazil exported some minerals, it appears that over the 
years Argentina's exports have been more diversified than 
those of Brazil. Argentina has traditionally exported 
grains and livestock products. In 1938, for example, in 
terms of per cent of total. Argentine exports, corn accounted 
for 27 per cent, linseed for 13 per cent and wheat for 10 
per cent. Brazil has, since 1850, relied primarily on 
coffee. During 1938 coffee made up 46 per cent; cotton, 19
8 9per cent, and cocoa, 5 per cent of total Brazilian exports. 
Thus, while the three leading exports composed 50 per cent 
of Argentine exports, for Brazil they represented 70 per 
cent.
The terms of trade, using 1925-29 as the base of 100 
for both countries, had declined to 81 for Argentina by 
1940-41 and to 53 for Brazil.^ On the other hand, the 
quantity of exports in termB of index numbers dropped to 68 
for Argentina and rose to 133 for Brazil. The capacity to
8 9•^Horn and Bice, o£. cit.. p. 134*
9 07 Brazil's statistics calculated from Table XI, 
page 58.
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import, using 1925-29 as the base, declined to 55 by 1940-41 
for Argentina and 70 for Brazil. Thus, while both suffered 
adversely in their terms of trade, Brazil, because of in­
creased exports during the 1940-44 period, managed to main­
tain her capacity to import at a higher per cent of the 
1925-29 level.
Relations between the United States and Argentina 
and Brazil represent a pronounced contrast. Economic as­
pects appear to be the most significant factor motivating 
the difference. Total trade with the United States has 
usually been more important for Brazil than for Argentina. 
Brazilian trade with America in 1938* for example, was 34 
per cent of her exports and 24 per cent of her total im­
ports. Argentina during the same year made 8 per cent of 
her foreign sales to the United States and purchased 17 per 
cent of her foreign commodities from the United States. In 
1938 Brazil was the leading exporter of coffee. This com­
modity was the second leading export item in Latin America 
and accounted for 12 per cent of the total exports of Latin 
America. Argentina was the leading exporter of meats which
represented 7 per cent of the total exports of Latin
91America. While America was the leading buyer of Brazilian 
goods in 1938, she was a distant second after Great Britain 
as a buyer of Argentine products. Buring 1938 England
^ H o r a  and Bice, 0£. cit., pp. 122-123.
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purchased 33 per cent of Argentina's exports and sold her 
20 per cent of her i m p o r t s . A r g e n t i n e - U n i t e d  States trade 
tends to create a deficit for Argentina while Brazilian- 
Amerioan trade usually results in a surplus for Brazil.
Relations during wartime reveal a significant con­
trast. Buring both World Wars Brazil allied herself with 
the United States end contributed to the war effort. Argen­
tina, on the other hand, partly because of her dependence 
on European markets, tended to be very uncooperative with 
the United States. In World War II she did not sever rela­
tions with the Axis until 1944 when the outcome of the war 
was fairly evident. Brazil, on the other hand, contributed 
facilities, troops and strategic materials to the Allied 
cause.
Up to 1947 factors such as competition in world 
markets between Argentine and United States agriculture 
products and Argentina's desire to assume undisputed leader­
ship of Latin America created strained relations between 
her and the United States. Resources and climate and their 
influence on the pattern of trade, plus the political 
leadership aspirations of the Spanish-speaking nation were 
responsible for this situation. Brazilian-United States 
relations were dominated by a large volume of complementary 
trade between the two countries. This trade was the result
92Ibid.
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of different resource endowments and the fact that two 
nations were in different stages of economic development. 
Amicable Brazilian-United States relations based on these 
economic factors were strengthened further by Brazilian 
support of the United States in the two World Ware of our 
century.
CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES TRADE WITH ARGENTINA 
AND BRAZIL, 1947-1960
The Important role played by trade In determining 
relations between the United States, Argentina and Brazil 
prior to 1947 was enumerated In the previous ohapter. An 
Investigation of commodity exchanges between the United 
States and the two South American nations during the 1947- 
1960 period will now be undertaken. Methodologically, the 
procedure utilized Is to: (1) Present the composition and
magnitude of trade by major groups; (2) undertake an analy­
sis of the major subgroups of trade; (3) appraise the major 
difficulties arising out of these trade relationships, and 
(4) examine possible courses of future development. This 
procedure will be applied first to United States trade with 
Argentina and then to her trade with Brazil. The presenta­
tion will conclude with a comparison of American trade with 
the two nations In reference to the four areas covered.
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UNITED STATES TRADE WITH ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
BY MAJOR GROUPS
Argentina
Table I In the Appendix represents United States ex­
ports to Argentina during the 1947 to I960 period. An ex­
amination of the data reveals several significant faotors 
pertaining to American exports to Argentina. (1) It is ap­
parent that the high value of over $680 million recorded in 
1947 has never been approximated during the ensuing 
thirteen-year period. Only twice, after 1948, did the 
value of United States exports exceed $280 million, rising 
to almost $282 million in 1957 and to $349 million in 1960.^ 
The low level of $104 million was reached in 1953* Starting 
with 1949» the average yearly value of United States exports 
to Argentina, including re-exports, was $196 million. An 
upward trend appeared in 1955, which after a slight decline 
in 1958 and 1959, reached a total of $249 million in I960, 
a sum exceeded only in the somewhat abnormal years of 1947 
and 1948. (2) Machinery and vehicles have been the most
important exports. The high mark of almost $364 million 
that this group reached in 1947 has not been approached 
since. Excluding 1947 and 1948, this group averaged $111 
million and represented approximately 37 per cent of the
^All numbers are rounded to the nearest million.
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total United States exports to Argentina. Commencing in 
1956, an increase of exports in this group has taken place, 
reaching a peak of 1240 million In I960. (3) Metals and
manufactures, and chemicals and related products have repre­
sented important export groups, averaging $25 and $24 million 
respectively since 1949• The fourth group in importance is 
non-metallic minerals. (4) The composition of the leading 
export groups indicates that Argentina needed to import the 
capital equipment and metals which she lacked. This compo­
sition reveals part of the problem which has confronted 
Argentina in her quest for eoonomio growth. Argentina is 
dependent on external sources for many of the implements of 
industry. (5) The relatively Insignificant values for ex­
ports of animals, animal products and vegetable food prod­
ucts Indicate the presence of a source of United States- 
Argentlne trade conflict.
The data representing United States imports from 
Argentina during the 1947 to I960 period are presented in 
Table II of the Appendix. Certain characteristics concern­
ing this trade are discernible. (1) The total value of 
imports during the period averaged $150 million and has 
been more stable over these years than the corresponding 
United States exports to Argentina. (2) Leading groups of 
imports, by value, have been textile fibers and manufac­
tures, edible animal and animal products, inedible animal 
and animal produote and inedible vegetable products, in
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this order. Textile fibers and manufactures averaged $63 
million during this period and represented 42 per cent of 
Argentina's total exports to the United States. The mean 
totals for animal and animal products, edible and Inedible, 
were $33 and $22 million respectively, representing 22 and 
14 per cent of total Imports. (3) It is evident that the 
Argentine exports of manufactures to the United States are 
insignificant. (4) Prom 1947 to I960 there is not the gen­
eral decline In the total value of Imports as there was in 
the exports sector. The deoline in exports was accounted 
for by a reoovery in the productive ability of England and 
continental Europe, and their recapture of much of the Argen­
tine market they had lost during World War II. There was 
not a oomparable impact on American purchases from Argentina.
Brazil
United States exports to Brazil are revealed in 
Table III of the Appendix. A study of the data indicates 
several characteristics of the exports during the period 
under examination, (l) The total value of trade was some­
what erratic, ranging from a high of $699 million in 1931 
to a low of $241 million in 1933* Average total Brazilian 
purchases from the United States, including re-exports over 
these years were $446 million. The largest group was 
machines and vehicles with an annual average of $231 million. 
This group represented 56 per cent of the total United
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States exports to Brasil during these years. Chemicals and 
related products ranked a distant seoond in importance with 
an annual average of $50 million and 11 per cent of the 
total. Metals and manufactures, vegetable food products 
and beverages, and non-metalllc minerals followed in rela­
tive importance with annual averages of $42, $36 and $30 
million respectively. (2) The make-up of the leading United 
States export groups during these years indicates to some 
degree the nature of the Brazilian economy* She was an im­
porter of the products of an industrialized society and was 
somewhat dependent on external sources for the supply of 
vegetable food products and beverages.
Table IT of the Appendix reveals several aspeots of 
United States Imports from Brazil. (1) The total value of 
United States imports increased sharply from 1947 to a 1951 
peak. This Increase was primarily the result of increased 
purchases of vegetable food products and beverages. Since 
1951 a downward trend prevailed, whioh is explainable by a 
decline in American purchases of vegetable food products 
and beverages. Over-all, the average of total imports was 
$655 million annually with a range from $446 million in 
1947 to $904 million in 1951* (2) By far the most important
import group was vegetable food products and beverages with 
an annual mean value of $560 million o n  85 per cent of the 
total. (3) A very distant second in importance by value 
was the inedible vegetable products group averaging $36
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million or: five per cent of the total value of imports*
(4 ) The metals and manufactures group has shown a tendency 
to inorease in value over these years. This group rose 
from a low of $4 million in 1947 to a high of $54 million 
in 1957* During the years under study this group annually 
averaged $23 million and 4 per cent of the total value of 
United States imports.
Argentina and Brasil Compared
A comparison of the trade by groups between the 
United States on the one hand, and Argentina and Bra2 il on 
the other, leads one to several conclusions. From a value 
viewpoint the total trade of the United States with Brazil 
has been much more important, averaging $1,101 million per 
year to $346 million per year for Argentina. Trade with 
Brazil did not experience the sharp reduction from the 1947 
level that can be noted in Argentine-United States commodity 
exchange. This occurrence is explainable by the political 
Ideology of the Peron regime in Argentina and the return of 
England and continental Europe as purchasers of Argentine 
commodities. Since 1955* United States exports to Argen­
tina have increased. This is perhaps partly explainable by 
the change in governments in Argentina, which has led to
2The years 1947 and 1948 have been omitted from the 
calculation of the Argentine average because they represent 
extremely abnormal years never again even remotely approxi­
mated.
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the liberalization of trade barriers and reduced restric­
tions against foreign oapital. Several American firms have 
established plants in Argentina and Import many of their 
needed capital goods. United States Imports from Brazil 
reached a peak in 1951 and sinoe then have followed a down­
ward secular trend. American exports to the same country 
have followed a similar, although not as pronounced, trend.
The major import group from the United States for 
both of these nations was machines and vehicles. In Brazil 
this group represented 56 per cent of the total imports, 
while in Argentina the figure was 57 per cent. Brazil's 
major export group was vegetable food products and bever­
ages, representing 85 per cent of Brazil's total exports to 
the United States during these years. Argentina's major 
group of exports to the United States was textile fibers 
and manufactures, representing 42 per cent of the total 
United States imports from this nation. It thus appears 
that the trade of Argentina with the United States was more 
diversified than that of Brazil.
Figure 1 indicates the balanoe of trade in the mer­
chandise account of the United States with Argentina and 
Brazil. With the exception of 1947, Brazil enjoyed a favor­
able balanoe of merchandise trade with the United States. 
Argentina's situation was different. Buring the 14 years 
under consideration she experienced favorable balanoes with 
the United States in only 3 of these years. In 1947 and
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I960, the deficits were sizeable, amounting to $526 and $230 
million respectively. In Figure 2, combined Argentine and 
Brazilian trade with the United States is shown. The pie- 
ture revealed is that since 1949 combined United States im­
ports from Argentina and Brazil have exceeded exports to 
these nations with the exception of 1938 and I960. After 
the large United States deficit in 1933, a trend toward the 
narrowing of this American deficit balance is noticeable and 
continued through I960. United States Imports have tended 
to decline and exports to increase. The year 1939 indicates 
a reversal in this trend, as imports increased while exports 
decreased. However, in I960 the secular movement reasserted 
Itself. This movement toward the elimination of American 
deficits has been accounted for by a decline in United 
States purchases from Brazil and increased sales to Argen­
tina. It appears from Figure 2 that total United States 
imports from these two nations have followed a more stable 
pattern than total United States exports to them.
Figure 3 represents the percentages of exports and 
Imports of the total world trade of Argentina and Brazil 
accounted for by the United States. During the years under 
consideration, United States exports to Argentina accounted, 
on the average, for about 20 per cent of her International 
purchases.^ Argentine exports to the United States
^Calculated from data used in Figure 3*
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FIGURE 3
UNITED STATES SHARE OF TOTAL ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN TRADE, 1947-1960
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Source: Calculated from International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, Vol. VII, No. 6, p. 22; Vol. XIV, No. 12, pp. 44, 64 and 
Tables I-VIII in the Appendix.
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approximated 13 par cent of her total foreign sales. Brazil 
yearly Imported about 32 per cent of her foreign purchases 
from the United States and the United States annually ob­
tained almost 48 per cent of Brazil's exports. Statistical 
evidence appears to substantiate the thesis that for Brazil 
trade with the United States was much more significant than 
for Argentina. Argentina's trade was more diversified and 
alternative sources of Argentina's import needs were present 
in Europe and Japan. Brazil, on the other hand, was over­
whelmingly dependent on the export of vegetable products and 
beverages, with the United States being the most important 
buyer by far.
ANALYSIS OF TRADE BY SUBGROUPS
The previous section represented an attempt to pre­
sent a descriptive, quantitative picture of the total volume 
and relative Importance of trade between the United States 
and Argentina and between the United States and Brazil.
These trade relations from a subgroup point of view will 
now be analyzed for the three countries. The procedure used 
will be to: (1) present in a quantitative form the major
commodities involved in trade; (2) analyze the Importance 
to the trading partners of the leading commodities;
(3) examine the stability of the leading commodities from a 
volume and price point of view; (4) look for trends and 
changes during the 1947 to I960 period including the terms
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of trade, and (5) contrast Argentine and Brazilian trade 
with the United States from a subgroup approach.
Argentina
Values of United States exports to Argentina by sub­
groups are presented in Table V of the Appendix. Automobiles 
and related products represented the major exports from the 
United States during this period, averaging $39 million per 
year. The yearly values of this subgroup were erratic, 
ranging from a high of $150 million in 1947 to a low of $5 
million in 1954. Steel mill produote, rolled and finished, 
represented an average annual sum of $23 million while con­
struction, excavating and mining equipment had a mean of $15 
million. Fourth in importance, by value, was electrical 
machinery and appliances with a yearly average of $19 
million.
American exports to Argentina followed a fairly di­
verse pattern within the area of industrial products. 
Petroleum end petroleum products exports were greatly re­
duced after 1956. This development is explainable by the 
increase in production of the Argentine fields, enabling 
Argentina to become nearly self-sufficient. Petroleum de­
velopment is significant, for it will free Argentine foreign 
exchange for the importation of more capital goods which in 
turn may reduce further Argentine dependence on external 
factors.
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The list of major United State® exports to Argentina 
gives an indication of the degree of import substitution 
practiced by Argentina. It may be noted that all of the 
leading Import subgroups represent commodities of an essen­
tial nature either for industry, agriculture or health 
usage. Comparatively high expenditures for railroad equip­
ment since 1 9 9 7 were indicative of the attempts of the 
Argentine government to rebuild the decrepit transportation 
system. After 1948, exports of textile manufactures greatly 
decreased, indicating the rise of the Argentine textile in­
dustry to a position of supplying most of the home market 
needs. Importation of agricultural equipment from the United 
States after 1953 was not in large amounts. This partly ex­
plains the problem of low agricultural productivity that 
Argentina faced during the last decade.
Analysis of United States imports from Argentina in­
dicates that by far the most important commodity entering 
America from Argentina was unmanufactured wool.* United 
States purchases of wool averaged $96 million in value over 
these years and represented 37 per cent of the mean yearly 
total of United States imports from this nation. The seoond 
most important subgroup was meat products, which is not sur­
prising considering the nature of Argentina's economy. In
*5ote Table VI in the Appendix for detailed data
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spite of tariffs and quotas on Argentine neats, their annual 
average imports Into the United States approximated $29 
million. Vegetable, dyeing and tanning materials, mainly 
quebracho extract, ranked third in importance.
American imports of raw hides and skins were sizeable 
until 1992 but after that year diminished in importance. 
Commencing in 1953, Argentine exports of ferroalloys to the 
United States increased. This, in a small way, may be the 
beginning of a future trend of considerable significance. 
Geological explorations are finding an increasing number of 
minerals in Argentina. Should these findings continue, it 
may be that Argentina will achieve a diversification in her 
export picture which she does not have at the present time.
Brazil
An examination of United States exports to Brazil by 
subgroups reveals that automobiles and related products 
represented the most important United States export sub­
group to Brazil, averaging $76 million during the 1947 to 
I960 period. Other leading subgroups with yearly averages 
during the postwar period were: electrical machinery, $35
million; grains and preparations, $34 million; construction, 
conveying and mining machinery, $27 million; steel mill 
products, rolled and finished, $25 million, and industrial
c
machines and parts, $25 million.
^Note Table VII in the Appendix for detailed data
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Since 1952 American export* of agricultural equip­
ment and tractors were sizeable, averaging $21 million. In 
1953i 1957 and 1958, shipments of railroad equipment were 
$21, $29 and $43 millions respectively. Air craft and parts 
exports totaled $20 million during 1957 and 1958, while 
machine tool exports amounted to $33 and $31 millions in 
1958 and 1959 respectively.
The data indicate that Brazil, although primarily an 
importer of United States industrial products, is also a 
sizeable purchaser of grains and preparations. The latter 
subgroup has experienced severe fluctuations, varying from 
a high of $96 million in 1952 to a low of $8 million in 
1955* Weather factors and plant diseases put pressures on 
Brazil's food supply which the domestic agricultural sector 
cannot always meet. For a nation the size of Brazil with 
its sparse population and abundant resources this indicates 
that all is not well in the agricultural sector. That the 
nation is attempting to solve this problem is partly indi­
cated by increased imports of agricultural equipment and 
tractors. The year 1954 was the peak year for imports of 
this subgroup with purchases totaling $50 million. Heavy 
emphasis on importation of industrial equipment indicates a 
trend toward industrialization in Brazil. The importance 
of the construction, conveying and mining equipment group 
denotes a trend in Brazil toward more emphasis on mineral 
production and the building of roads.
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The story of the United States imports is strikingly 
evident from an examination of the value of ooffee purchases. 
During this period, United States imports of this commodity 
averaged $506 million annually and represented 77 per cent 
of the total yearly purchases from Brasil. This fact indi­
cates an undesirable situation for Brazil because of a lack 
of diversification. The data reveal a deollne since 1951 
in the value of ooffee exports to the United States. This 
ie a trend whioh many experts feel will oontlnue because of 
declining coffee prices and increased production of coffee 
by other Latin American countries and Africa. Cocoa #as. a 
distant second in Importance, with an annual average of $34 
million. Inedible vegetable oils and waxes 1 m  third, aver­
aging $24 million per year and less than 4 per cent of the 
total annual Brazilian exports to the United States.^
An encouraging factor in the export picture for 
Brazil appears to be the noticeable increase in the trend 
toward greater exportation of minerals. This warn especially 
true in the ferroalloys, ores and metals, and iron ore con­
centrates subgroups. It appears that this may be Brazil's 
answer to the expected unfavorable future outlook for coffee 
exports. United States dependence on external sources tras 
expected to Increase as some of its best deposits of these
^See Table VIII in the Appendix for detailed data on 
United States imports from Brazil.
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ores have been, or are, in the process of being depleted.
FACTORS INFLUENCING TRACE
The terms of trade for the two Latin American nations 
during the past 13 years indicate developments unfavorable 
to them. Although these terms of trade are not specifically 
representative of trade with the United States, they present 
the general picture. This is particularly true of Brazil 
because of the large role that trade with the United States 
occupies.
Argentine terms of trade have been adversely affected 
since 1948. Using 1955 as the base, her terms of trade de­
clined from 143 in 1948 to 94 in 1959. The decline was most 
pronounced during the 1951 to 1956 period. Brazil's case is 
somewhat different. Her terms of trade improved during the 
1948 to 1958 period from 66 to 101. Curing I960 both 
nations experienced a reoovery.
Price trends for the exports of Argentina and Brazil 
have generally been unfavorable during the period under
study. Coffee prices increased until 1954 and since then
have declined; such a development is particularly detri­
mental because of the inelastic demand for coffee. Cocoa
has never recovered the 1954 high of 98 cents per pound.
Beef prices generally declined until 1956, when an upward 
trend commenced. Quebracho extract, wool and corn also
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experienced price declines.
Some Latin American nations have complained bitterly 
that the sale of United States agricultural surpluses on 
the world market at reduced prices has been a detrimental 
influence on the prioes of their commodities. The United 
States Government has been helping the exports of agricul­
tural commodities by: (l) grants of agricultural commodi­
ties (the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Program);
(2) emergency relief programs; (3) sales for foreign cur­
rencies (Public Law 480); (4) short-term credits by the 
Export-Import Bank to permit procurement of agricultural 
commodities in the United States; (5) barter programs where 
agricultural products are sold for stratsgic materials, and 
(6) subsidies for exports of agricultural commodities.
Table XVI indicates the percentage of total United 
States exports sold in foreign markets under government 
programs in 1996-1997. Grains and livestock, products of 
importance to Argentina, and cotton, whioh is of signifi­
cance to Brazil, have been heavily involved with government 
export assistance. During 1996 and 1997, 61 per cent of 
total United States grains and feed foreign sales and 47 per 
cent of cotton exports were executed under government aid 
programs. In addition, 34 and 30 per cent of total
^Note Table IX in the Appendix for more detailed 
data on the prioes of these oommodlties.
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livestock products end vegetable oils and seeds were exported 
with government assistance.
TABLE XVI
UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS EXPORTED UNDER 
GOVERNMENT AID PROGRAMS, 1956-57
Commodity „ of ttsports
v  Under Government Programs
Grains and Peed 61
Cotton 47
Livestock 34
Vegetable oils and Seeds 30
Fruits and Vegetables 7
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on
American Republics Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States-Latin American Relations. 86th 
Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Goveniment Printing 
Office, 1960), p. 451.
Table XVII presents data on the change between 1934- 
35 and 1955-57 of the United States* share of the world's 
export market and world's production for selected commodi­
ties. With the introduction of export assistance the United 
States share of world exports increased considerably for all 
major commodities exoept ootton. The United States share 
of world production, however, did not change appreciably 
except for a decline in ootton and an increase in eoybeans.
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TABLE XVII
UNITED STATES SHAKE OF WORLD EXPORTS AND PRODUCTION 
OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
IN ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1934-35 AND 1955-57
Percentage Share of Percentage Share of 
Commodity World Exports World Production
1934-35 1955-57 1934-35 1955-57
Wheat 6.4 46.1 21.0 20.2
Barley 12.0 28,7 12.5 13.7
Oats 5.9 29.3 31.0 37.1
C o m 9.0 63.9 59.3 59.2
Rice .8 14.8 1.0 1.8
Cotton 43.0 43.6 51.9 35.5
Tobacco 41.0 37.6 30.2 32.3
Soybeans 2.3 82.0 9.5 51.3
Source: U.S. Congress, United States-Latin American
Relations, op. oit.. p. 452.
Tahle XVIII reveals data on the changes in the 
sources of imports of cotton and wheat of four European 
nations during the first six months of 1956 and 1957. The 
data is presented at this point because it specifically 
relates to the two Latin American nations. The considerable 
increase of European cotton purchases from the United States 
was harmful to Brazil's ootton exports. Argentina has ap­
parently been adversely affected by Increased American 
wheat sales to Europe and Brazil. Brazil, for example, 
during 1954-55 imported 41 million bushels of wheat from 
Argentina and 0.3 million bushels from the United States.
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Two years later, however, Brazil purchased 34 million 
bushels from Argentina and 18 million bushels from the 
United States. It appears that United States Government 
assistanoe to agriculture and the subsidization of agricul­
tural export sales has hurt Argentine exports and helped 
Brazil to obtain some needed foodstuffs more cheaply than 
would otherwise have been possible.
TABLE XVIII
CHANGES IN COTTON AND WHEAT IMPORTS OP POUR WESTERN 
EUROPEAN NATIONS, PIRST SIX MONTHS OP 1956 AND 1957 
(In millions of dollars)
_________Cotton_______  Wheat
Nations Imports Imports Imports Imports
from U.S. from L.A.* from U.S. from L.A.*
United Kingdom + 7 7  - 9 + 1 3  - 1
Germany + 83 -51 + 2 6  -12
Prance + 13 +12 + 1 9  - 2
Italy + 40 - 5 + 6 - 5
Totals +213 -53 + £4 -20
♦Latin America.
Source: U.S. Congress, United States-Latin American
Relations, on. cit.. pp. 460, 441.
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL COMPARED
Analysis of Argentina's and Brazil's trade with the 
United States during the 1947 to 1960 period permits several
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observations. By value, unmanufactured wool, the leading 
export commodity of Argentina, averaged 37 per cent of her 
exports to the United States. Coffee represented an annual 
average of 77 per cent of Brazil's exports to America during 
these years. These two products were the major export items 
of the two Latin American nations to the United States 
during the years under study. Their slgnifloanee from a 
value point of view was considerably different, as coffee 
sales averaged nine times greater per year than wool.
The pattern of United States Imports reveals that 
Brazil was in the process of diversifying her exports to 
America. A noticeable trend developed in her sale of min­
eral exports to the North American nation. Argentina 
started on a similar trend, but on a much more modest scale 
and at a later date. These trends indioate a possible 
future hope for both nations; however, at present it would 
appear that Brazil's future along these lines is much 
brighter.
A noticeable difference between the two oountries is 
evident in the trade of grains and preparations. Vhile the 
United States exports of these commodities were practioally 
nil to Argentina, they were sizeable to Brazil. Also, meat 
Imports from Argentina were sizeable, while they were rela­
tively much less significant from Brazil. One is led to 
reason that perhaps this may be an area of increase in 
future trade relations between Argentina and Brazil.
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Prom 1947 through 1952, Brazil engaged in the importa­
tion of considerable textile machinery from the United States. 
This is an indioatlon of the movement toward self-sufficiency 
within this area made by Brazil in the postwar period. 
Argentina by comparison did not procure much textile equip­
ment from the United States because she had reached a more 
advanced level of textile output at an earlier period.
The leading export items of the United States to 
Argentina and Brazil and those of the latter two to the 
United States experienced erratic fluctuations. United 
States exports of automobiles and parts to Brazil varied 
within a range of $116 million in 1947 to a low of $21 
million in 1955. With Argentina, the range was from $150 
million in 1947 to a low of $5 million in 1954. Unmanufac­
tured wool sales by Argentina ranged between a high of $95 
million and a low of $33 million in 1955 and 1958 respec­
tively. Brazilian coffee sales ranged from $298 million in 
1947 to $720 million in 1951. The need for export diversi­
fication becomes evident, particularly in Brazil. One has 
but to study the trade data in the tables in the Appendix 
to realize the much greater diversification in the nature of 
United States exports to these nations as compared with 
United States Imports from them.
The general terms of trade have influenced Argentina 
more adversely than Brazil from 1948-1954. Since 1953, how­
ever, Brazil has also experienced a considerable decline in
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Its terms of trade, although in I960 they were still higher 
than in 1948. Argentina reversed the trend of deterioration 
in her terms of trade after 1956 and by I960 they were al­
most at the 1954 level.
Argentina has complained during the postwar period 
of competition from United States agricultural produots, 
which have been sold in world markets at prioes much below 
competitive levels. This criticism appears to have consid­
erable validity as is indicated by the increase in the United 
States' world market share of selected agricultural products, 
while her world percentage of production has revealed no 
corresponding increase. The PI 480 program has contributed 
considerably to this situation. Brazil, on the other hand, 
is not so adversely affected by this action of the United 
States Government. She can, as a result, obtain wheat, 
which in 1959 and I960 was her leading Import by value,
Q
more cheaply. The fallacious development policies of the 
Argentine government were partly revealed by the $19 million 
purchase of grains and preparations in 1952. Argentina, a 
traditionally large exporter of grains, was foroed because 
of mismanagement to import a group of commodities she pre­
viously produced in surplus quantities.
o
Companhia Auxiliar Be Bmpr6eas Eltfotricas Brasil- 
eiras, This Is Brazil. 1960 (!few York: Companhia Auxiliar, 
1961), pTT.
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AN ANALYSIS OP CHIEF EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES
An attempt will be made in thie section to project 
the future outlook for coffee, cocoa, iron ore, wool and 
meat exporte to the United States. A brief look at Ameri­
can import polioy dealing with these two nations will be 
undertaken along with possible methods to promote increased 
export sales to the United States. Projections are made on 
the basis of certain assumptions. It is assumed that the 
United States Cross National Product will increase at a rate 
of 4.3 per cent between 1957 and 1965 and at a rate of 4.5 
per cent between 1965 and 1970. A 25 per cent increase over 
the population of 1957 is estimated by 1970. We should keep 
in mind that these assumptions may lead to conclusions that
are somewhat optimistic because they appear to overstate the
q
rate of growth of the American economy.
Specific Commodities
The outlook for United States coffee imports is not 
favorable. Coffee consumption in the United States during 
the next ten years is expected to be determined by popula­
tion increases and coffee prices. In addition, more subjec­
tive factors such as possible substitute products, ohanges
^Louis 0. Delwart, The Future of Latin American 
Exports to the United States. 1^55 •Eo‘‘T970 (.Washington: 
Waxional“Tlanning Association, I9oOJ7 pp. 1-130.
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in consumer taste and changes In the efficiency of extrac­
tion techniques may be of importance. Louis 0. Delwart uti­
lized a formula whioh encompassed the first group of factors 
enumerated above. He assumed that a 10 per cent increase in 
real income will result in a 2.5 per cent increase in per 
capita coffee consumption. A price elasticity of demand is 
assumed which indicates that a 10 per oent inorease in cof­
fee prioes will usually reduce coffee consumption by 2.5 per
cent.^ The projections disclosed that with lower prices 
(52 cents per pound retailed in New York), per capita con­
sumption might amount to 26.4 pounds in 1965 and 27*3 pounds 
in 1970. Total consumption is expected to amount to 3*65
billion and 4*1 billion pounds in the two respective years.
The previous all-time per capita consumption high was 26.1 
pounds in 1946.^ This future estimate appears somewhat 
optimistic in light, of the increasing use of soluble coffees 
which yield more cups per unit of green coffee.
Surpluses are expected to be a problem to exporters 
during the next deoade. In spite of agreements among pro­
ducers of coffee, the surplus problem is expected to become 
worse. Prices fell from 78.3 cents per o.i.f. New York for
Santos No. 4 in 1954, to 38 cents per pound during the first
19
three quarters of 1959* Most Latin American nations have
10Ibid., p. 40. 11Ibid. 12Ibid., p. 41
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experienced increased output since 1950 and African produc­
tion has doubled in the last decade. The peak of production 
is expected to be reached in the early I960*a and estimates 
for prices of SantoB o.i.f. New York for these years are 33 
cents per pound.
Table XIX presents data pertaining to the expected 
value of United States coffee imports from Brazil during 
the next decade. It is anticipated that Brazilian coffee 
will be unfavorably affected by increased United States im­
ports from Colombia and other Latin American producers.
The projections indicate that in 1965 and 1970v the total 
dollar value of coffee imports will be less than the 1957 
sum, which amounted to $528 million. Brazil's share of 
Latin American exports is also expected to register a slight 
decline. Over the whole future of Brazilian coffee exports 
hangs the grim specter of synthetic coffee, which could in­
validate markedly the projections made. In the past fif­
teen years coffee production in Brazil has experienced a 
rising trend averaging 17 million bags during 1946-51 and 
45 million bags in 1959-60.
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TABLE XIX
UNITED STATES COFFEE IMPORTS FROM BRAZIL, 1957-1958,
AND EXPECTED IMPORTS FOR 1965 AND 1970
(In millions of dollars)
Year
Total from 
Latin 
America
From
Brazil*
Brazil's Share of 
Total Latin American 
Exports (in *)
1957 $1,206 $528 44*
1958 $1,014 $407 40*
1965 $1,005 $410 41*
1970 $1,140 $470 41*
•Estimate based on 33 oents per pound for Santos 
No. 4, New York wholesale price.
Source; Delwart, 0£. clt.. p. 43.
During the last decade Brazil has produced about 20 
per cent of the world's cocoa production, and she is one of 
the principal exporters of cocoa beans to the United States. 
Since World War II, consumption in America has not kept up 
with either income or population increases. Per capita 
annual consumption has not reached the pre-war level of 
five pounds, and since 1950 it has been less than four 
pounds.13 The factors accounting for this decrease are re­
lated to diet and higher prices. Cocoa prices ranged during 
the postwar period from 27 to 57 cents per pound as oompared
13Ibid.. p. 37.
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with from six to Wight cents prior to the war, Indicating a 
considerable increase in the ooet of cocoa to consumers* 
During 1959, the mean price of Brazilian cocoa in the New 
York market declined from 43*3 cents per pound to 35*4 
cents. The outlook is poor because of excess supply and in 
I960 there were about 260,000 surplus tons in the form of 
stocks.1* Cocoa consumption for 1965 and 1970 is estimated 
at about four pounds per person. Prices have experienced a 
wide variation in the past and Louis 0. Delwart of the 
National Planning Association estimates a price of 30 oents 
for his projections. Table XX indicates the projected esti­
mates of total United States cocoa bean imports and imports 
from Brazil. Although from a percentage point of view the 
dollar value by 1970 is expected to double over 1957, not 
much variation is anticipated in Brazil's share of total 
American imports.
Iron ore is expected to experience the most rapid 
Increase of any of the Brazilian exports to the United 
States. In 1957, the United States imported 20 per cent of 
its iron ore consumption, and by 1970, it is expected that 
the United States will be purchasing, externally, about 47 
per cent of its total needs. At the present time approxi­
mately 60 per cent of total Imports come from Latin America.
^ Survey of the Brazilian Economy. I960 (Washington: 
Brazilian Embassy, I960}, p . 34.
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TABLE XX
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OP COCOA BEANS, 1957-1958,
AND EXPECTED IMPORTS PROM BRAZIL IN 1965 AND 1970
(In millions of dollars)
Ysar Total Prom Brasil's Percentage
Imports Brazil of Total
1957 1135 132 24*
1958 1173 $39 22*
1965 $236 $59 25*
1970 $257 $65 24*
— — — — 11 ■ ■ i ■ ■ ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ' ■ !  . ■ i— — — —  ■ , — — . i  ......  t _ m. ii.
Source: Del wart, oj>. cit., p. 39*
Expectations are that the St. Lawrence Seaway, which reduced 
transportation costs, will mean greater Imports from Canada. 
In spite of this factor, United States needs are expected 
to increase so rapidly that Brazil's exports will perhaps 
double in value between 1957 and 1965. Table XXI indicates 
the total United States imports of iron ore expected in 
1965 and 1970 and the amounts and percentages expected to 
come from Brazil. The latter's production of iron ore in­
creased from 0.6 to 4.0 million metric tons between 1948 
and 1 9 59.^ Although not expected to inoreaee as rapidly 
as total imports, Brazil's sales to the United States should 
more than double between 1957 and 1970.
15Ibid., p. 51
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TABLE XXI
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OP IRON ORE, 1957-1958,
AND EXPECTED IMPORTS PROM BRAZIL.IN 1965 AND 1970
(In millions of dollars)
Year TotalImports
Prom
Brasil
Brasil's Percentage 
of Total
1957
1958 
1965 
1970
t 285 
$ 231 
$ 694
$1,080
$20
$12
$28
$42
7% 
5* 
4* 
4*
Source: Delwart, op. olt.t p. 23.
Brasil appears to have promise as an exporter of 
zinc, columbium, asbestos, meat, soluble coffee and sugar. 
Brazil is the third largest sugar producer in the world 
after Cuba and the Soviet Union. With the loss of the Cuban 
suppliers this item will become more important in trade be­
tween the United States and Brazil. Tropical hardwoods in 
the Amazon region may also provide an export item of value.
The outlook for wool and meat products exports to 
the United States is closely allied with the American tariff 
policy. At the present time restrictions, particularly 
sanitary regulations, hinder the inflow of fresh and frozen 
Argentine beef into the United States. Delwart olaims these 
restrictions are justified beoause of the lack of an adequate 
system of Inspection in Argentina. Indications are that
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Argentine exports to the United States would probably in­
crease with a reduction of American trade barriers. An 
estimate of the impact of a possible liberalization of 
United States restrictions on these commodities is presented 
in the next section dealing with American tariff policy.
United States Import Polioy
United States import policies have become somewhat 
more restrictive since the 1958 recession and barriers have 
been increased on petroleum, lead, zinc, copper and meat. 
Table XII in the Appendix indicates the estimated changes 
in the imports of certain products which would be expected 
to follow a reduction in United States restrictions.
Argentina would probably benefit considerably from a 
reduction of United States restrictions since she needs to 
expand export sales and not primarily to diversify exports. 
Although a concentration on agricultural and livestock prod­
ucts is evident, in recent years only 25 per cent of all 
export receipts have resulted from meat sales. Wool and 
wheat have each provided 15 per cent of her export sales 
and only 5 per cent of total exports have been manufactured 
products. Argentina supplies 75 per cent of United States 
imports of canned beef and meat extracts, about 70 per cent 
of all imported inedible casein and quebracho extract and 15 
to 20 per cent of all imports of b e r y l l i u m . F o l l o w i n g  a
^ D e lw a r t, ojd. o i t . . p. 51.
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non-discriminatory suspension of United States import re­
strictions, it is estimated that Amerioan purchases of 
cattle and beef would Increase about 100 per cent; preserved 
beef, 25-50 per cent; wool apparel, approximately 50-100 per 
cent; canned beef, 25-50 per cent; and leather pocketbooks, 
100 per cent.1^ In terms of value this would be an increase 
of from $41 to $56 million and much of this Increase would 
be expected to accrue to Argentina.
Brazil would probably not be very much aided by a 
reduction of trade barriers by the United States. Coffee, 
cocoa and iron ore, her chief exports, are permitted entry 
duty free. Perhaps in sugar, cotton and zinc, some Increase 
in sales to the United States could be expected if trade 
barriers were reduoed. Brazilian sugar exports in 1958 
amounted to 776,000 tons, but very little of this was ex­
ported to the United States.
The United States cannot proceed as it has in the 
past to demand "quid pro quo tariff reductions from the two 
Latin American countries, since both face foreign exchange 
shortages. To reduce tariffs would merely mean the in­
creased importation into these two nations of goods not es­
sential to the development of their economies. Reductions 
in restrictions by the United States would cause a small 
shrinkage in American merchandise trade surplus as indicated
^Note Table XII in the Appendix.
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by Table XII In the Appendix. However, if we do not grant 
tariff concessions to Argentina and Brazil, increased bi­
lateral trade agreements with the Soviet Bloc and other 
countries may be expected. This would hurt our political 
cause and also the cause of multilateral trade. A reduction 
of tariffs on semi-processed metal products, which are 
higher than those on ores, would help remove the Latins' 
fear that the United States wishes to stifle industrializa­
tion in their countries.
Coffee may present a serious problem to the United 
States in the future. A synthetic product would wreak havoc 
with the Brazilian economy. It is suggested by Delwart that 
the United States under such circumstanoes would have to 
come to the assistance of Brazil. Perhaps at first the 
United States could place a high excise tax on the synthetic 
product to permit a more orderly adjustment in the economy 
of the coffee exporting nation.
Promotion of Exports
Louis 0 . Delwart suggests some methods by which the 
Latin American nations can stimulate exports during the 
coming decade. Although these suggestions are intended for 
the whole of Latin America in general, they are applicable 
to Argentina and Brazil specifically. This is particularly 
true in view of the importance of these two nations in Latin 
America. To aid the increase of export sales, the govern­
ments of these two countries should pursue policies of
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economic stabilisation. (1) Inflation should bs controlled. 
Argentina and Brazil have been victims of rapidly rising 
prices. Inflation causes higher production coBts and may 
result In reduoed exports because of attempts to charge 
higher prices In world markets to covsr the increased pro­
duction coats. Rapidly rising domestic price levels also 
make foreign goods more attractive in the domestic market 
because they tend to become cheaper relative to domestic
products. It appears that perhaps stabilization is becoming
18politically respeotable in Argentina and Brazil. Argen­
tina has attempted a belt-tightening program with some de­
gree of success; President Quadros' attempts in Brazil 
failed, but it is hoped that President Goulart will renew 
efforts along these lines. (2) Argentina and Brazil will 
have to rely on other policy instruments besides the re­
discount rate and open market operations. Experience has 
shown that the rediscount rate is not very effective in 
periods with great price increases and the expectation of 
continued increases, as have existed in these countries. 
Under such conditions people pay the high Interest rates 
and continue to borrow in expectation of higher prioes, 
higher Interest rates and, for businessmen, higher profits. 
Open market operations have not been successful because of 
the laok of a well developed securities market as compared
1 8 Delwart, op. cit., p. 84.
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with the United States and traditional patterns of Invest­
ment In real estate. Delwart suggests the use of direct 
ceilings in total central bank credit expansion, direct 
ceilings in the total amount of claims on the public that 
can be held by commercial banks, increases in and enforce­
ment of the legal reserve requirements and requirement of 
advance deposit on imports as being the types of monetary 
policies proven most successful in the past.^9 (3) Serious 
attempts should be made to balance the budgets in these two 
nations. This is probably one of the main causes of price 
instability in Brazil and Argentina in the postwar period.
To solve the problem a sounder tax system, along the lines 
of that in the United States, needs to be instituted. Tax 
increases and not reductions in government expenditures 
present the major answer to this problem. (4) Wage stabi­
lization must be stressed. Argentina is a prime example of 
a country in which wage increases have been granted without 
regard to productivity increases, while Brazil is not much 
better off than Argentina in this respect. The major prob­
lem in this area is the low level of earnings of the major­
ity of the masses. Authorities must not only use sound 
reasoning in granting wage increases, but must guard against 
speculative profits. (5) The freeing of the exchange sys­
tem from oppressive direct controls would be helpful to the
19Ibid., p. 83
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expansion of trade, liberalization of restrictions has been 
accomplished to a considerable degree In both Argentina and 
Brazil starting with 1959* It is hoped that further liberal­
izations will be made as economic conditions permit it. The 
elimination of exchange controls will also tend to encourage 
United States Investments in these nations. (6) The United 
States should make loans to Argentina and Brazil to help 
them achieve economic stabilization. In return for theBe 
loans the recipient nations should promise to follow poli­
cies designed to correct the problem of internal economic 
instability. It would be fallacious, however, to judge 
Latin American nations by United States standards in regard 
to price and economic stability. We should not judge, for 
example, Argentine and Brazilian efforts on the basis of 
highly desirable, but impossible goals.
Specific incentives should be utilized by Argentina 
and Brazil to stimulate exports; the two countries have done 
very little along these lines in the postwar period. In 
fact, only Mexico and Peru of the Latin nations can be given 
credit for successful endeavors along these lines. It is 
doubtful that monetary and fiscal controls alone can accom­
plish the task of stabilization in Argentina and Brazil 
during the 1960's. There must be oomblned and properly 
coordinated strict policies of a monetary and fiscal nature 
with specific Incentives to promote exports.
Tax Incentives, particularly in the area of mining,
118
to provide an attractive climate for investment, would be 
helpful. Brazil appears to have started a much needed di­
versification toward mineral production. Argentina, since 
1938* has discovered that some of her ills resulting from 
a lack of minerals and fuels were due to a lack of explora­
tion and development in these areas. Both nations appear 
to have considerable resources which need to be developed, 
but at the present time foreign capital is needed to do the 
job. An example of the rewards which may be obtained ie the 
recent petroleum achievement in Argentina.
A revision of existing codes regulating mining com­
panies would be helpful. For example, revised codes might 
include a guarantee against expropriations, a commitment 
not to raise taxes for a period of time and a provision for 
repatriation of current earnings. Taxes should be levied 
only when profits are registered and they should not ap­
proximate more than 50 per cent of profits realized in the 
country. Initial tax-free periods might be offered to 
attract investors.
Credit incentives may be helpful in stimulating cer­
tain types of exporting industries. This would be particu­
larly true in dealing with new exports. Perhaps through the 
new Inter-American Development Bank some assistance could be 
rendered by sending funds through government owned or pri­
vate banks to small export establishments. In most cases, 
however, it appears that this has not been a major problem
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In selling the major exports from Argentina and Brazil.
Social overhead must be developed through government 
investment to remove bottlenecks in the growth process.
This would help set the foundation upon which export indus­
tries could grow. Prom an export industries viewpoint, 
measures to provide better storage facilities, high quality 
standards, quality controls to insure that these standards 
are met, and export inspection should be emphasized. Irri­
gation projects to increase agricultural production for ex­
ports should be carried out. Better port facilities would 
be a stimulus by reducing transportation costs. Improved 
roads, railroads, communications and power development are 
essential.
It appears that when one speaks of conditions needed 
to Increase exports, or improve the export sector, one is 
merely echoing the basis for general economic development.
It becomes difficult to improve the export sector without 
general economic Improvements and development.
COMPARISON OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
A comparison of United States trade relations with 
Argentina and Brazil leads to several conclusions. Total 
trads with Brazil during the years under consideration was 
much greater in value than that with Argentina, averaging 
$1,101 and $346 million respectively. The United States has 
generally experienced an unfavorable balance of trade with
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Brazil and a favorable balanoe with Argentina.
The trade of the United States and Brazil la comple­
mentary , while the trade patterns of the United States and 
Argentina tend to be oompetltive. This is exemplified by 
the fact that the three major imports of the United States 
from Brazil are duty free, while the products which Argen­
tina generally sells in the American market are highly pro­
tected by tariffs and quotas. United States tariff policy 
has much more significance for Argentina than for Brazil. 
This factor accounts for part of the hostility which has 
existed between the United States and Argentina, and the 
general existence of friendship between the United States 
and Brazil. Argentina is thus by economics as well as cul­
ture more oriented toward Europe than toward the United 
States, who annually purchases only about 13 per cent of her 
exports.
Political factors have tended to play a greater role 
in United States trade with Argentina than with Brazil. 
Politics started playing a major role during World War II 
and the rise of Pascist movements in Argentina led to 
strained relations between the United States and Argentina. 
Brazil, on the other hand, cooperated with the United States 
during World War II and the amioable politioal relationship 
favorably influenced trade between Brazil and the United 
States. Under the Peron Administration, further political 
conflicts developed to disrupt Argentine-United States trade
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relations. Since 1938* when political conditions became 
more favorable in Argentina from a United States viewpoint, 
exports to Argentina increased and further increased trade 
with Argentina may be realized.
Argentina's trade with the United States appears to 
be more diversified than that of Brazil. While Argentina's 
problem is to increase the volume of exports, Brazil is also 
confronted with the necessity to diversify away from coffee. 
Brazil appears to be making initial steps toward greater 
diversification by the exportation of minerals, particularly 
iron ore.
Projections for the exports of foodstuffs to the 
United States, which at the present time represent the major 
group of Brazil's exports and are second only to wool for 
Argentina, are not very favorable. The outlook for mineral 
exports is more favorable and it appears that in the immedi­
ate years ahead Brazil will do more in the way of exporting 
minerals than Argentina, although both are taking steps in 
this direction.
Coffee may in the future present a great economic 
problem to the United States in its dealings with Brazil.
It is apparent that a synthetic substitute will become a 
reality with time and the impact of this on the Brazilian 
economy will be very adverse. Preparations to meet such a 
possible eventuality should be undertaken by Brazil and the 
United States.
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Inflation has been a severe economic curse of both 
countries and has hurt export trade considerably. It 
appears that economic stabilization Is now politically more 
respectable In these two nations. Frondlzl took steps to 
achieve stabilization; Quadros* failure has left Brazil in 
an uncertain position. Unchecked rising price levels in 
Argentina and Brazil will make the task of increasing ex­
ports difficult.
Both Argentina and Brazil should take more positive 
steps to stimulate exports to the United States as well as 
to other areas. This would call for tight monetary and fis­
cal policies and specific measures such as tax incentives, 
increased credit availability and the more rapid development 
of social overhead by government and private investment. 
Further liberalization of trade restrictions by Argentina 
and Brazil would help increase trade.
The United States should review her import policy on 
certain Argentine commodities. A reduction in import re­
strictions might be more beneficial to the Argentine economy 
and United States-Argentlne relations than the funnelling of 
American funds to her through loans and grants.
Trade between Argentina and Brazil may increase in 
the future. There is a basis for Brazilian imports of 
grains from Argentina and Brazilian exports of chemicals 
and minerals to the latter. In recent years wheat has 
been Brazil's most important import followed by crude
20petroleum. Argentina la a wheat exporter and In 1962 she
21is expected to hegin exports of petroleum. Brazil, on 
the other hand, ia developing her output of Iron ore and 
other minerals needed by Argentina. Thue there is a growing 
basis for increased trade between Argentina and Brazil.
20Companhia Auxili&r Be Emprfiaas ElActrioas Brasil- 
eiras, o£. cit., p. 5.
^ “"How '62 Business Is Shaping Up Overseas," U.S. 
News and World Report, III (January 8, 1962), 39.
CHAPTER III
UNITED STATES PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Economic Aspects of Investmentb
One of the major difficulties experienced by both 
Argentina and Brazil during the 1950 to I960 period was a 
shortage of dollars. Dollars to purchase imports from the 
United States were obtained by export sales to America, bank 
credits, United States Government grants and loans, borrow^ 
ing from the World Bank, loans from the International Mone­
tary Fund and private American investments. In attempting 
to develop economically, foreign capital is of great impor­
tance to Argentina and Brazil. Foreign capital is particu­
larly important because of the nature of Argentine and Bra­
zilian political institutions. A ruthless dictatorship can 
cut consumption to the subsistence level, but a democracy 
will probably always have to rely on foreign capital in its 
early stages of development to help avoid possible political 
upheaval.
Several claims are made in behalf of the beneficial 
Influence of foreign Investments in the reoiplent nation.
(1) It is generally held that foreign investment has a
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positive Influence on the level of employment and Income.
The beneficial Influence is attributed to: (a) the addition
in the physical capital of the receiving nation; (b) the in­
crement in social overhead capital which may facilitate and 
encourage further domestic and foreign Investment by cre­
ating more favorable facilltiesf and (c) the multiplier 
effect which will usually generate income by a multiple of 
the quantity invested. This claim appears to be valid as 
long as foreign capital does not compete with domestic in­
vestment funds or divert domestic factors from the produc­
tion of essential to non-essential goods. In an under­
developed nation, with some degree of planning in the chan­
nelling of external sources of capital into essential areas, 
it would appear that in most Instances external capital 
should complement rather than compete with domestic sources.
(2) Technical knowledge is often a significant benefit 
derived by nations receiving foreign direct investment. 
Imported technical Mknow how" permits the utilization of the 
results of expensive research which underdeveloped areas 
generally cannot afford. (3) Better managerial techniques 
may accompany the direct investment and be of assistance to 
the recipient by emphasizing cost consciousness and compe­
tent administration. Furthermore, external managerial 
"know how" may institute in the developing managerial 
classes of nations like Brazil and Argentina a sense of the 
responsibilities the executive group has toward society in
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a free enterprise economy. (4) Balanoe of payments bene­
fits may be realized from foreign Investments. This can be 
accomplished by: (a) producing items previously imported;
(b) providing funds for the purchase of needed capital 
goods, and (c) producing products for export markets that 
earn foreign exchange. Some of these beneflolal aspects 
could be minimized if increased exports result in a deteri­
oration in the terms of trade. Also, if Increased foreign 
exchange holdings, as a result of decreased imports, are 
inefficiently utilized possible benefits may not be realized. 
It appears that to obtain some indication of the effeot of 
foreign capital on a nation all the possible impacts must 
be considered and weighed together.
An evaluation of the significance of United States 
private investments in Argentina and Brazil faces several 
obstacles. (1) Detailed data is only available for direct 
investments and this information does not include all United 
States private funds channeled to these nations. In 1957 it 
was estimated that United States direct investments comprised 
approximately 66 per cent of total American Investments over­
seas and 75 per cent of total long term Investments. How­
ever, since moat United States portfolio investments have 
taken place in Western Europe the percentage of direct in­
vestments for Brazil and Argentina may be somewhat higher
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than the over-all averages.^* (2) Records of valuee of in­
vestments are by book value rather than real value. With 
inflation being a real problem in Brazil and Argentina the 
reported values understate the true amounts of United States 
direct investments in these nations. (3) United States 
official agencies gather data on a voluntary basis from 
individual firms. This method of gathering Information 
means that the basis of evaluation may be different in the 
various firms and also there is no assurance that total in­
vestments data have been gathered. (4) The method of 
coverage considers a firm United States owned if over 25 
per cent of the voting stock is held by American residents. 
This approach may result in unrealistic conclusions since 
the problem of evaluating foreign ownership in some of the 
firms is difficult. The Brazilian Embassy, for example, 
estimates that of the $644 million United States direct in­
vestment reported in Brazil during 1950, approximately $68
2
million was owned by foreign nationals other them American. 
These shortcomings of the data should be kept in mind in 
the analysis of United States direct investments in Argen­
tina and Brazil.
^Survey of the Brazilian Economy, 1960 (Washington: 
Brazilian Embassy, 1$60J, p. ^8.
2Ibid., p. 99.
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ARGENTINA
Government Regulations
The book value of United States direct Investments 
In Argentina at the end of I960 was estimated at 1472 
million.^ ThiB sum compared with $202 million in 1946 and 
represented an increase of almost 134 per cent during the 
period.* The upward trend in United States investments re­
flects gui improvement in the investment climate in Argentina 
commencing in 1953 when Peron began to favor foreign invest­
ment. In 1955 the Provisional Government opened the free 
exchange market, although requiring that investments by for­
eigners must Involve new, modern, and efficient machinery 
and must also include power producing facilities when the 
plant was constructed in an area which did not have adequate 
power.^ Law No. 14»780, signed on December 3t 1958, con­
tinued the trend toward encouraging foreign capital. This 
law permits foreign capital to enter Argentina in the form 
of foreign exchange, machinery, spare parts or raw materials. 
At the end of 1958 the United States and Argentina signed an
%.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business (Washington: Government Printing OfTTce, August,
T95TJ'“ . 22.
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business 
Economics, U.S. Investments in the Latin Jjaerioan Boonomy 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 112.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the 
Economy of Argentina, World Trade Infonnaljion""Service, Part
To. 5B^73, p. 12V
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agreement whereby American Investors could obtain Insurance 
against the non-convertibility of peso holdings.^ In March, 
1961, Argentina ratified a new Investment Guaranty agree­
ment with the United States providing Insurance against in-
7
convertibility.
There are numerous regulations on foreign capital 
flowing to Argentina. Under Law No. 14,773/58 all solid, 
liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon deposits are the exclusive 
property of the national government and private exploitation 
of these minerals is precluded. Coal la practically a gov­
ernment monopoly, but government agencies may utilize pri­
vate Argentine or foreign firms in their development. Rail­
road, telecommunication and electric power are primarily 
government owned, although private firms operate in power 
production. The government permits investment of foreign 
capital in property, stocks, bonds, and mortgages without 
joint permission. Foreigners in Argentina enjoy all the 
rights of citizens of the country. They may buy and sell 
property and cannot be deprived of property without recourse
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Developments 
in the Western Hemisphere. 1960, World ifrade Information 
ServTce7 T a r Y  1  ,"lfoT , pTT.
7
'Kenneth W. Hynes, Economic Developments in Argen­
tina. 1961, World Trade Information Service, ParT-!, Wo. 
62-36, p. 9.
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to legal prooess. The president of Argentina la empowered 
by law to assist and protect producing firms in Argentina 
whether foreign or domestically owned. He can: (1) grant
exemptions ttom customs duties and other changes to facili­
tate acquisition of needed capital equipment; (2) grant in­
creased protection to firms producing in Argentina who would 
be endangered by importation of foreign goods; (3) limit the 
inflow of raw materials and manufactured goods domestically 
produced; (4) grant preferential treatment in authorizing 
credits and other means that would assist the financing of 
industrial projects; (5) grant preferential, treatment to 
firms in reference to raw materietls, energy, fuels and
Q
transport, and (6) grant teuc exemptions. These regulations 
have hindered foreign sales in Argentina and encouraged the 
foreign manufacturer to establish factories within her 
borders. This plus the fact that Argentina is a developed 
nation with a high standard of living by Latin American 
standards are stimuli to foreign investors.
Foreign firms may carry on isolated transactions in 
Argentina without subjecting themselves to requirements for 
domestic businesses. Companies legally incorporated in 
foreign nations but without any domicile, branch or any
®U.S. Department of Commerce, Establishing a Business 
in Argentina. World Trade Information Service, ParT 1, l»o.
W - T C pT T
9 Ibid.. p. 3.
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other kind of company representation in Argentina may engage 
in commercial transactions not contrary to Argentine law. 
However, these firms must satisfactorily establish that they 
have been incorporated in accordance with the law of the 
foreign nation and they must inscribe the incorporating 
documents in the Commercial Register. Companies that are 
formed abroad to carry on their principal business in Argen­
tina or that have their management centered in Argentina 
are considered domestic entitles. Firms formed abroad but 
establishing branohes or any other kind of representation 
in Argentina are subject to the same requirements as Argen­
tine companies with regard to registration and publication.^ 
Work legislation is somewhat restrictive on the em­
ployer and employers are liable for industrial accidents and 
sickness. The employee is entitled to compensation during 
three months of absence from duty when he has been employed 
for less than ten years or for six months if he has served 
for over ten years. The compensation is to equal the aver­
age of the salary received during the previous six months 
of employment. If after the three or six month period the 
worker cannot return to his job, the employer has to keep 
the position open for him for a year, after which time he 
must pay a dismissal indemnity. Maximum indemnity payments 
are 30,000 pesos. Social security coverage is very
10Ibid., p. 4.
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extensive and costly in Argentina. Employer limitations on 
interference with labor unions are similar to section 7 of 
the Wagner Act.
Taxation
Taxes on corporations are a straight 30 per cent of 
taxable income for Argentine firms during the fiscal year. 
Corporations constituted abroad are taxed at a rate of 38 
per cent on Income (except dividends and capital gains) paid 
or credited to them. Local branches of foreign companies 
are also taxed at 38 per cent as are fees paid to directors 
and other managers located abroad. Interest payments on 
foreign credits used to import industrial equipment acquired 
as fixed assets are exempt and may be deducted from gross 
income. Other deductions permitted are:
1. "One hundred per cent of investment in agricul­
tural machinery and implements and machinery for mining, 
timbering and shipyards.
2. Fifty per cent of Investment in fixed assets, 
except real estate, provided investment exceeds 10 per cent 
of amount of such assets held at the beginning of the year.
3* Ten per cent of the cost of construction or ac­
quisition of buildings excluding land value to be utilized 
for p r o d u c t i o n . T h e  government is authorized by law to
11Ibid.. p. 18
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Increase, reduce or eliminate these above enumerated deduc­
tions .
All business enterprises are also subject to an ex­
cess profits tax. Excess profits are considered profits in 
excess of 12 per cent of capital and free reserves. Capital 
and free reserves are defined as the difference between the 
value of assets and liabilities to third parties at the be­
ginning of the fiscal year plus 50 per cent of the year's 
net taxable profits. Securities other than government bonds, 
real estate not used in the business, and loans granted as 
Investment of capital are not Included as assets nor is 
Income from them included in excess profits subject to 
taxes.
In Table XXII an example of the computation of the 
tax on a typical firm in Argentina is presented. It is as­
sumed that a foreign-owned, locally organized corporation 
operating in Argentina during a given year has capital of 
12.5 million and profits of $1 million. The normal tax is 
at 30 per cent of profits or $300,000. The corporation has 
to pay an eight per cent dividend tax on payments to share­
holders situated abroad on the difference between total 
profits and the sum of the normal tax. In this case it 
would amount to eight per cent of $700,000 or $56,000. An 
excess profits tax also has to be paid by the corporation. 
Excess profits are computed as profits in excess of 12 per 
cent of capital assets plus 50 per cent of the year's net
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taxable profits. According to these assumptions this would 
mean that excess profits would be the sum exceeding 12 per 
cent of $3 million or $640,000 (capital assets equalled 
$2.5 million, 50 per cent of taxable profits equals $0.5 
million or a combined sum of $3 million; 12 per cent of $3 
million equals $360,000 or $1 million minus $360,000 equals 
$640,000). The excess profits tax rate is a scaled one 
ranging from 10 to 30 per cent. In this illustration the 
rates would be 10 per oent on the first $150,000 of excess 
profits, 15 per cent on the next $150,000, 20 per cent on 
the next $150,000, 25 per cent on the next $150,000, and 30
per cent on the remaining $40,000. These calculations would
12arrive at an excess profits tax of $117,000. Therefore, 
total taxes as a per cent of taxable income equalled 47.3 
per cent compared with 52 per cent in the United States.
Thus as far as the tax situation is concerned, a firm oper­
ating in Argentina has a slight advantage over one in the 
United States.
12United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Poreign Private Investments in Latin Amerioan 
Pree-Trade Areas tNew Tories United Nasons, 1961J, p. 28.
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TABLE XXII
IMPACT OF TAXES IN ABGENTINA
Taxes 
(in dollars)
Normal tax (at the rate of 30$ on profits 
of $1 million) $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0
Dividend tax (at the rate of on 
$700,000— total profits less amount 
of normal tax) 56,000
Excess profits tax (profits in excess of 
12^ of capital plus 50^ of net taxable 
profits, rates scaled from 10^ to y>$)
Total Taxes $
117.000
473,000
Total taxes as a percentage of net 
taxable income, 47.3 per oent.
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, foreign Private Investment in the Latin 
American Free-Trade Zone I New York: United Nations, 19 (>1),
p. 28.
Inflation
United States firms contemplating investing in Argen­
tina should take into consideration the rampant inflation 
in that country. From 1948 to I960 price increases have 
averaged 28 per cent yearly. This pronounced inflationary 
spiral has been primarily due to easy monetary policy, and 
large government deficits. Thie excessive Inflation will 
mean rising labor and material costs for American investors 
producing in Argentina. If production is for the Argentine 
market problems may arise in converting pesos which are
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declining in value into dollars for home repatriation. A 
firm hoping to produce in Argentina for export will find that 
inflation which increases costs may make international com­
petition difficult to meet because of the need to charge 
higher prices. Policies to curb this price spiral have not 
been forceful enough to be effective and until such policies 
are instituted, the inflation will undoubtedly be a signifi­
cant barrier to United States investment.
Magnitude and Impact of United States Investments
Two polyvinyl chloride plants built by United States com­
panies were placed in operation in March, I960. They have 
a combined total capacity of 8,000 tons, which satisfies 
the nation's requirements. In I960 construction was com­
menced on a Joint United States-Argentlne aluminum fabri­
cating plant with an annual capacity of 20,000 tons. The 
Argentine government also approved an investment project to 
build an aluminum reduction plant.^ During I960 Argentina 
authorized a $70 million investment project by United States 
firms to establish an integrated petroleum complex which 
will utilize her petroleum and natural gas reserves. This 
complex will produce butadiene, synthetic rubber, styrene, 
ethylene, polyethylene, plastldlsers and fertilizers. In
tina,
American Investors have been active in Argentina.
51=35,-p. 3.
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I960 the Argentine Government approved a $4 million invest­
ment to construct a plant to produce carbon blaok. light 
plane production was started by Lockheed Aircraft Inter­
national. Prom September 1950 to the end of I960 the Argen­
tine Government approved proposals for investments totaling 
$316.4 million. Of this sum $185.5 million represented 
United States Punds. Host of the foreign investments were
concentrated in chemical, petro-chemical and automotive
1 4 .vehicle plants.
To evaluate the significance of United States invest­
ments to the Argentine economy an examination of specific 
contributions of American investments to the economic life 
of Argentina is necessary. AreaB to be examined are:
(1) the sales of manufactured products by American owned 
enterprises; (2) amounts of imports acquired by these firms 
from the United States; (3) production of other American 
owned firms, and (4 ) the contribution made to local incomes 
and employment levels. The United States Department of 
Commerce conducted a survey which it published in 1958 re­
vealing this information. Because in 1955 the value of 
United States direct investments in Argentina totaled $447 
million as compared with $472 million in I960, the 1955 
survey may be considered to be a rough approximation of the
14Ibid., p. 5.
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situation in I960.1 ** It should be noted that the data covers 
only those companies which voluntarily engaged in the survey. 
The writer has no way of determining the extent of non­
participation of American owned firms. One may conclude, 
at any rate, that the figures would be somewhat higher if 
100 per cent participation had been realized.
United States companies, excluding trade and service 
industries, operating in Argentina in 1955 had sales of 
$571 million of which $438 million was accounted for by 
manufacturing and $9 8 million by petroleum. Of total sales, 
$505 million was sold in local markets including all of the 
petroleum. Only $66 million was exported, all comprising 
manufactured goods of which the United States market ab­
sorbed $23 million. Approximately $40 million was utilized 
by these firms to make foreign remittancesfor imports and 
income payments. This meant that almost all of their sales 
proceeds were paid in Argentina for wages, taxes, materials, 
and other local expenditures.1^
Approximately $21 million of manufactures consisted 
of foodstuffs, mainly meat products. Other large signifi­
cant sales by American firms were in chemicals, $75 million;
15''U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Investments in 
the Latin American Economy, 1958. op. oiT.. p. 112. Cl 
have not chosen the data for -the 1$60 survey covering the 
year 1957 because the values for 1955 more closely approxi­
mate the I960 figures.)
16Ibid., pp. 57, 153.
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rubber goods, $45 million; and electrical machinery, $35 
million. Food products in 1955 represented a smaller por­
tion of United States investments in Argentina than in 
earlier times, indicating a trend toward investment diversi­
fication. Increased activity of American firms in manufac­
turing meant a relief for Argentina's balance of payments 
problems as a result of home production of previously Im­
ported items.
In addition to the manufacturing companies, United 
States owned public utilities in Argentina in 1955 had 
sales of $12 million. American owned petroleum firms spent 
$53 million in Argentina for wages, taxes, and materials.
At this time petroleum was a critical item in Argentina's 
import picture. Under the Frondizi regime United States 
investors were influential in making Argentina self- 
sufficient in petroleum consumption. This proved a great 
help in coping with balance of payments problems.
Approximately $530 million was paid out by American 
owned firms in Argentina during 1955* Of this total $120 
million was for wages, $100 million in taxes (primarily 
direct taxes), and $280 million for materials produced in 
Argentina. These firms reporting in the survey employed
79*000 workers in Argentina, of which only approximately
1 7200 were Americans. Of the $21 million earned by these
17Ibid., p. 59.
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companies, 115 million was reinvested in Argentina.
Expenditures for plant and equipment by United States
investors in Argentina totaled $28 million in 1959, $51
million in I960 and approximately $ 1 0 3  million, plus $52
18million for petroleum plant equipment, in 1961.
The sales volume of United States firms in Argentina 
has increased markedly since 1957. During 1957 these enter­
prises sold $385 million; by 1958 sales rose to $426 million,
and by I960 they totaled $696 million. This increase is
19primarily explained by increased automobile production. ^
In I960 the net capital outflow to Argentina totaled $70
20million and undistributed subsidiary earnings $36 million. 
American owned firms thus assisted Argentina's economy by: 
developing the petroleum industry; helping to alleviate the 
balance of payments problems; producing products needed in 
the Argentine market; providing employment for nationals, 
and paying taxes.
BRAZIL
Government Regulations
Prior to presenting the role of United States invest­
ments in Brazil, a brief examination of the factors
18U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business (September 1961), p. 19.
19Ibid.. p. 23. ^°Ibid.. p. 22.
141
Influencing foreign Investment In Brazil Is In order.
Foreign investors have generally been welcomed in Brazil 
during the postwar period. The main exception to this 
statement is petroleum exploration, production, refining, 
and transportation, which excludes foreign participation. 
Since October of 1953»the petroleum industry has been a 
monopoly of the federal government. Although foreign com­
panies still operate some tankers, refineries and retail
distribution services, they cannot expand except in distri-
21bution. Petroleum policy in Brazil has apparently sparked 
a continuing controversy within that nation. Those defend­
ing the government policy of excluding foreigners from in­
vesting in the petroleum industry do so on the grounds that:
Hl. Petrobras, the government company, is doing a 
good job, as attested by the sharp rise in crude-oil output 
and the successful refinery program. The attainment of the 
Development Program is now assured and there is a good
prospect the goals may be exceeded.
2. Petrobras is a well-run, well-managed enterprise. 
It uses the services of capable foreign individuals and 
companies extensively in its exploration and production pro­
grams and therefore has access to the most modern scien­
tific and technical advances in its work.
^William B. Dale, Brazil; Factors Affecting Foreign 
Investment (Menlo Park, California! Stanford BeaearcE 
Institute, 1958)» p. 14.
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3* True, the development of Brazil's oil resources 
is a costly undertaking, specifically in foreign currency 
outlay. However, if the development is done by Petrobras, 
all the resulting profit will be retained in the country 
and used for its development; it will not have to be shared 
with foreign enterprises, which would take their share 
abroad. "22
Those attacking the government monopoly of petroleum 
are just as vociferous in presenting their views. They 
feel that:
"1. The program of Petrobras and even its objectives 
are too modest to meet the vast needs of the country.
2. In the difficult and risky business of discover­
ing and producing oil, there is no substitute for the 
seasoned private enterprise which has a large financial 
stake in success and which has repeatedly demonstrated its 
ability to produce results elsewhere.
3. Brazil can ill afford to invest the huge re­
sources, especially of foreign exchange, that will be needed 
to develop her oil industry. This is particularly true at
a time when a shortage of foreign exchange is threatening 
to slow down the rate of industrial growth, and when foreign 
investors stand ready, under materially advantageous condi­
tions, to develop the oil industry."23
22Ibid., pp. 15-16. 23Ibid., p. 16.
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It appears at the present time that production and 
processing of petroleum will continue to remain In govern­
ment hands. Economic relations between the United States 
and Brazil would be improved by a settlement of this con­
flict. Attempts on the part of the United States to get 
Brazil to acquiesce to her demands may only lead to further 
obstacles in the path of American investors in Brazil.
This last statement is made in the light of the fact that 
Brazil is in a stage of economic and political development 
in which intense nationalistic and anti-foreign feelings 
are present.
Taxation
Tax burdens are an important factor to consider in 
attempting to determine whether to invest overseas and where 
to invest. Table XXIII presents the impact of Brazilian 
taxes in a situation identical to that examined for Argen­
tina. The assumptions made are that the corporation in 
question has $2.5 million in investment capital and $1 
million in profits. This corporation pays a normal tax of 
23 per cent on profits. The firm is also subject to a divi­
dend tax of 25 per cent on total profits less the amount of 
the normal tax. An excess profits tax is levied by Brazil 
which may be calculated in several ways. The method yield­
ing the lowest tax burden is utilized. For excess profits 
purposes profits are compared with 30 per oent of the
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capital in the business (30 per cent of $2.5 million « 
$750,000). Profits in excess of 30 per cent of capital are 
termed "excess" profits (in this case $1,000,000 - $750,000 a 
$250,000). In this illustration since profits do not exceed 
50 per cent of the excess profits tax law they are taxed at 
the lowest rate which is 20 per cent (the tax is thus 
$50,000 or 20 per cent of $250,000).
TABLE XXIII 
IMPACT OP TAXES IN BRAZIL
Taxes
(in dollars)
Normal tax (at the rate of 23^ on 
$1 million)
Dividend tax (at the rate of 25^ on 
$770,000— total profits less 
amount of normal tax)
Excess profits tax (profits in excess of 
30^ of capital assets at a scale of 
rates in this case 20^ of $250,000)
Total taxes
Total taxes as a percentage of net
taxable income, 47.25 per cent.
$ 230,000
192,500
50.000 
$ 472,500
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Foreign Private Investments in the Latin 
American Free Trade Zone INew York: United Nations, 1^6l). 
p. 2tJ.
Inflation
A rapid inflationary spiral averaging annual in­
creases of 53 per cent between 1948 and I960 has plagued
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Brazil. C&u b &I factors have been expansion of private 
credit, government deficits and electric power bottlenecks. 
The inflationary spiral has stimulated the conversion of 
savings into investments because of expected divergences 
between money costs of production and prices. Inflation 
strengthened a traditional tendency in Brazil to invest in 
agriculture and real estate construction. Belays in com­
pleting investment projects as a result of a shortage of 
materials indicate that inflation has outlived its useful­
ness in facilitating the shift of resources to new ventures. 
It thus appears that excessive inflation has hindered eco­
nomic development by: (1) channeling investments into
speculative areas such as real estate, leaving fewer funds 
for basic sectors of the economy; (2) reducing savings 
levels because of the tendency to maintain high levels of 
consumption, and (3) creating unstabilizing social and 
political tensions.2^ Attempts to curb runaway inflation 
in Brazil by limiting the expansion of the money supply, 
balancing the federal budget, keeping wages within the 
bounds of productivity increases and aohieving a balance in 
the balance of payments have generally failed. The cost of 
living in Brazil rose 36 per cent over I960 during 1961 and 
56 per cent over 1961 during the first eight months of
2*Suryey of the Brazilian Economy, 1958 (Washington: 
Brazilian Embassy, 19^9)t p* 75.
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Other Investment Factors
Power shortages have hindered the development of 
some areas of the Brazilian economy. Most of the available 
power is In the southeastern coastal area; in 1954* for 
example, 80 per cent of Brazil's total generating capacity 
was in this area. In spite of the fact that much of Brazil 
does not possess electric power, the nation has a vast 
hydropower potential. The slowness of private companies to 
develop power is attributable to: (1) the reduction in
power demand in the 1930's as a result of the depression;
(2) a nationalistic movement which opposed private power 
companies, and (3) legislation which curbed the profit­
ability of investments in this area. In 1934 a limit of 
1C per cent of capital assets was established for net re­
turns and the "historical costs" principle was used in 
evaluating assets to establish the basis for permanent 
earnings. This base did not consider replacement costs, 
which had risen significantly, and the power-producing 
firms were not able to reinvest sufficient funds for expan­
sion. Also a 10 per cent return limit was not sufficient 
when cost of living indexes were averaging increases of 20
2^U.S. Department of Commerce, Living Conditions in 
Brazil, World Trade Information Service, Part II, Wo. 62^4, 
p. I T
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per cent annually from 1948 to I960. During this period 
returns in manufacturing enterprises averaged 25 per cent
and financial institutions were obtaining 12 per cent inter-
26eat on short-term advances. As a result most of the capi­
tal for development of power has come from public agenciest 
the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank. Power rates are 
presently among the lowest in the world and the outlook for 
future foreign investment in this area is poor. Thus, a 
bottleneck to foreign capital in the manufacturing sector of 
the Brazilian economy still persists.
Comparative cost figures between the United States 
and Brazil are not always reassuring to the potential Ameri­
can investor. In 1957 a study was made comparing unit pro­
duction costs in the United States with Brazil and 19 other 
nations. The cases used were those where an American firm 
manufactured a similar product at home and in one or more 
foreign nations; 13 firms were involved in the United States- 
Brazilian comparison. In 6 of the 13 firms total unit costs 
in Brazil were from 85 to 115 per cent of American costs and 
in the other 7 costs in Brazil were more than 115 per cent 
of United States costs. Analysis of direct material costs 
revealed that in one of the firms costs were from 85 to 115 
per cent of those in the United States while in 12 of the 
reporting companies these costs were more than 115 per cent
26Dale, oj>. cit., p. 18.
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of those In the United States, labor costs revealed Brazil
to have a considerable advantage. Of 12 reporting firms, 11
had labor costs of less than 85 per oent of those of plants
2 7located in the United States. Overhead costs revealed a 
situation which was approximately the same in the two 
nations. The high material costs in Brazil are explainable 
by several factors. There ie the need to import items not 
available in Brazil. Even when some commodities sure avail­
able in Brazil, their quantities are often limited and 
sporadic imports are required. The uncertainties as to the 
availability of materials necessitate high inventories.
The potential American investor may thus find Brazilian- 
American cost comparisons to be unfavorable to Brazil as a 
result of high material costs in the Portuguese-speaking 
nation. American investors will find it generally advan­
tageous to invest in industries that have a high percentage 
of labor costs and that do not require the importation of 
materials.
Magnitude and Impact of United States Investments
Book values of United States direct investments in 
Brazil increased from $323 million in 1946 to $953 million 
in I960, a rise of 192 per cent. Of the I960 sum, $515 
million was invested in manufacturing, $200 million in
27Ibid.. pp. 33. 34.
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public utilities, $130 million in trade and $76 million in 
petroleum. United States direct investments in 1955 were 
estimated at $1,115 million.2®
During 1955 United States owned manufacturing firms 
in Brazil had total sales of $355 million. Of this sum 
approximately 33 P®r cent represented sales of food prod­
ucts, chemicals, rubber products, electrloal machinery and 
automotive products.2^ These manufacturing companies helped 
Brazil's balance of payments by accounting for $15 million 
of capital goods imports. American firms involved in the 
importation and distribution of petroleum and petroleum 
products reported sales of $300 million. Together United 
States owned companies contributed about $80 million to 
Brazilian exports. United States direct investments in 
public utilities had gross revenues of $27 million which 
were approximately equal to the total payments in Brazil of 
these firms.^
Expenditures during 1955 of United States owned 
firms in Brazil for wages, taxes, materials and other items 
totaled $600 million. Manufacturing firms accounted for 
50 per cent of the sum and spent over 80 per cent of their
28u.s. Department of Commeroe, United States Assets 
and Investments Abroad. August, 1961, p. £2.
^U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Investments in 
the Latin American Eoonomy. op. cit., p. 61.
30Ibid.. p. 63.
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total sales proceeds within Brazil. Approximately $250 
million was spent for supplies and utilities exclusive of 
purchases by trade and distribution companies. Brazilian 
governments received $80 million in taxes including $22 
million of direct taxes on income. Two-thirds of the income 
taxes were paid for by manufacturing firms and petroleum 
companies accounted for most of the indirect taxes such as 
sales taxes and import duties.3^
Approximately $85 million was received in the form 
of wages and salaries and about 50 per cent of this sum was 
accounted for by manufacturing. United States firms em­
ployed 94,000 persons, which represented the largest number 
in any of the Latin American countries, and of this total 
only 630 were sent from the United States. Out of a toted 
8,500 supervisory and technical positions, about 8,000 of 
these jobs were occupied by local personnel. For each 
worker the companies had total assets of approximately 
$9,000, including current assets and fixed assets less de­
preciation reserves. Gross fixed assets per employee were 
$6,000, ranging from $3,000 in manufacturing to $17,000 in 
public utilities.32 During 1955 these firms invested $60 
million and much of this came from earnings since only $16 
million of dividends were paid out of total incomes of $51 
million. Since World War II, United States direct
31Ibid. 32Ibid.
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investments in Brasil had, by 1955, grown faster than any 
other Latin American nation. Total United States invest­
ments in Brazil were exceeded only by American investments 
in Canada, England, and Venezuela.
COMPARISON OP ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
An analysis of Argentina and Brasil in relation to 
foreign investment must consider that Argentina is not an 
underdeveloped country. She is a decapitalized country, 
similar to postwar Europe rather than to Africa or most of 
Latin America. Peron's reckless policies caused the nation 
to live off the fat of the land. In so doing, transporta­
tion facilities, including highways and railroads, deteri­
orated, cattle herds were depleted, agricultural methodology 
became archaic, factory facilities were permitted to become 
obsolete and worn out, power was inadequate, foreign ex­
change reserves were very low and trade deficits were 
occurring regularly. In testimony before Congress Senator 
Wayne Morse stated that Argentina needed more recovery and 
rehabilitation rather than development.^ Brazil, on the 
other hand, can be termed as an underdeveloped nation and 
unlike Argentina she has never achieved a desirable living
■^Wayne Morse, "South America: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia end Venezuela," U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 36th Congress, 2d 
Session, I960 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
I960), pp. 23-25.
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standard for her people. Her resources are relatively much 
less developed than Argentina's. W. W. Rostow places Brazil 
in the "talcs off" stage of economic development. This stage 
is characterized by key industries expanding rapidly, fac­
tory workers Increasing, incomes and savings rising and the 
rate of investment jumping from about 5 per cent of national 
income to 10 per cent or more. Professor Rostow indicates 
that Argentina has completed the "take off" stage. It 
appears, however, that the stagnation experienced by the 
Argentine economy in the 1950's has prevented any real 
progress in the drive toward the maturity stage.
Savings as a percentage of gross national product is 
very different in the two nations. For selected years in 
the 1950's Argentina'8 savings averaged 20 per cent of gross 
national product while Brazil has managed a mean saving of 
14 per cent.^ It is interesting to note that the percent­
age of savings has been higher in Argentina than in the 
United States during the years under consideration. As was 
stated, the disastrous policies of Peronware to a great 
degree responsible for Argentina's dilemma and need for 
foreign capital. Brazil is and will be for a long time more 
dependent on foreign capital sources than Argentina.
^W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1960J, p. 1if7
•^Note Table XIIIin the Appendix.
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From a magnitude point of view Brazil is much more 
important to American investors than Argentina. The value 
of United States direct investments during I960 in Brazil 
was approximately twice those in Argentina, being $953 
million to $472 million. ^  During the same year Brazil had 
12 per cent of total United States direct investments in 
Latin America and Argentina had 6 per cent.^ It follows 
that in absolute dollar terms the contribution made by 
United States investment to the Brazilian economy was 
greater than that to the Argentine economy. Sales in Brazil 
totaled $682 million during 1955 compared to $583 million in 
Argentina. United States owned firms spent $600 million in 
Brazil for wages, materials and other items and $530 million 
in Argentina. Approximately 94t000 persons were employed by 
these firms in Brazil compared to 79*000 in Argentina. 
Manufacturing ventures attracted the most funds in both 
countries. The petroleum industry was second in signifi­
cance in both Brazil and Argentina.
United States government assistance of all types from 
1946 to I960 totaled $452 million for Argentina and $1*234 
million for Brazil. The difference in the amounts of loans
^Note Table XII: in the Appendix for more details 
during the 1946 to I960 period.
^Chase Manhattan Bank, "U.S. Direct Investments in 
Latin America*M Latin American Highlights. Fourth Quarter*
1961, p. 4.
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by the Export-Import Bank accounts for most of the differ­
ential. In both nations loans were used primarily to obtain 
needed capital goods.
The role of politics and the ensuing "investment 
climate" in attracting foreign funds is very evident from a 
study of these two nations. Although Brazil still leads in 
the total acquisition of both public economic assistance 
and direct private investment, the picture commenced to 
change in 1959. At this time the Argentine government began 
to attempt to attract foreign capital and undertook to have 
closer relations with the United States. Thus during 1959 
and fiscal I960 Argentina received EXport-Import Bank loans 
totaling $64 million. Brazil, on the other hand, continued 
to deny foreign development of its petroleum resources and 
to a degree drifted away from the United States politically. 
The result was a sharp reduction in Export-Import Bank loans 
to Brazil and during 1959 and the first half of I960 only $7 
million in credits were authorized to the Portuguese speak­
ing nation. In recent years, while much foreign private 
investment has been made in the Argentine petroleum industry, 
the same has not been true of Brazil. The climate toward 
the foreign investor has deteriorated in recent years in 
Brazil. Much of what occurs in the area of United States 
direct investments will depend on the nature of the politi­
cal philosophy which prevails in the two nations.
Firms locating in Argentina will in all probability
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find a more skilled local labor force to draw from than in 
Brazil. In 1950, 81 per cent of all Brazilians had com­
pleted less than 4 years of schooling compared with only 37 
per cent in Argentina.3® It is estimated that in 1957 il­
literacy in Brazil prevailed in 50 per cent of the popula­
tion while in Argentina it was 13 p«r cent.3^ From 1947 to 
1953f 56 to 65 per cent of the Brazilian labor force was 
employed in agriculture, while in Argentina the percentages 
were from 25 to 35.*^ Male life expectancy, which reveals 
something of the health of the labor force and possible ex­
perience and skills, was 54 years in Argentina and only 38 
years in Brazil during 1957.*^
Considering economic potential in general terms, it 
appears that in the long run Brazil may have more of a 
future to offer the American investor than Argentina.
Brazil has greater resources, a larger population, and her 
economic potential is very great. In recent years the Bra­
zilian economy has fared better than Argentina's. Per 
capita share of the gross national product was static from 
1950 to 1958 in Argentina while it increased 3-7 per cent 
annually in Brazil.*2 During 1953-58 Argentina's
^Committee for Economic Development. Cooperation for 
Progress in Latin America (Washington, 1961), p. 25.
39Ibid., p. 23. *°Ibid., p. 18. 41Ibid.. p. 15.
*2Ibid., p. 46.
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population averaged annual increments of 1.9 per cent and 
Brazil's 2.4 per cent.4  ^ In the short run Argentina's 
higher per capita income and more advanced stage of economic 
advancement may make her a more desirable area in which to 
invest.
The foreign investor will be affected by the degree 
of inflation present. It will have a bearing on wage levels, 
material costs, possible foreign exchange difficulties and 
depreciation allowances. Although the inflationary problem 
of Brazil has received much publicity, Argentina slnoe 1953 
has suffered more from the Inflation virus. Using 1953 as 
the base for both nations, the consumer price index in 
Brazil climbed to 326 in 1959 and 433 in I960 while the 
corresponding figures for Argentina were 464 and 590. In 
both countries galloping Inflation is a serious problem
44which may present difficulties to the foreign investor. ^
Potential American Investors will find the tax treat­
ment in Argentina and Brazil to be approximately the same 
as Indicated by Tables XXII and XXIII. These tables assume 
that there are two corporations, one located in Argentina 
and the other in Brazil. They further assume each firm has 
$1 million of net taxable profits and $2.5 million of capi­
tal assets. The calculations made in this chapter reveal a
43Ibid.. p. 12.
44Note Table XIVin the Appendix.
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very similar tax burden in tbe two countries. Although the 
normal and the exoess profits taxes are higher in Argentina, 
the much higher dividend tax rate of Brazil offsets them, 
so that the over-all tax rate is almost identical. In most 
cases taxes would not be a prominent faotor in determining 
whether to locate in Brazil or Argentina. The tax rates of 
47.3 per cent in Argentina and 47.25 per cent in Brazil are 
quite high when one considers that the rate in the United 
States is 52 per cent, but the risks Involved much less.
In summary, at the present time, Brazil is more de­
pendent on foreign investment funds than Argentina. From 
the viewpoint of volume of funds Brazil is approximately 
three times as important to American investors as is Argen­
tina. Recent dollar contributions made by United States 
investments to the economies of the two Latin American 
nations, in the forms of sales, wages, materials, products 
for exports and employment of nationals, were much greater 
in Brazil than in Argentina. Brazil has been the recipient 
of greater United States public funds than Argentina. How­
ever, in 1959 the picture commenced to change and Argentina 
acquired a larger share than Brazil of United States public 
funds during 1959 and I960. Potential American investors 
will find inflation to be a factor to consider in both 
nations and tax treatment to be approximately the same in 
Argentina and Brazil. Brazil appears to be in the process 
of making greater progress in economic development than
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Argentina. Increases in per capita gross national product 
during 1958 to I960 averaged zero for Argentina and 3.7 per 
cent for Brazil. The American investor may find that Argen­
tina offers the greater short run potential because of a 
higher per capita income, a more skilled labor force and a 
more advanced state of economio maturity. In the long run, 
however, Brazil's greater resources, larger population and 
faster rate of economic growth would seem to Indicate that 
she offers the greater economic possibilities.
CHAPTER IV
ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN BALANCE 
0? PAYMENTS PROBLEMS
Argentina and Brazil have been greatly Influenced by 
external economic factors. A study of the balance of pay­
ments of these two countries will reveal Information per­
taining to the nature of these factors. Through an analy­
sis of Argentina's and Brazil's international financial 
statements the relationships between external and Internal 
economic Influences may be more clearly comprehended. 
Furthermore, the balance of payments reveals not only a 
nation's relationship with the rest of the world but also, 
if compared over a period of several years, the stages of 
the country's economic growth. Thus, the Information con­
tained in the balance of payments is indispensable to the 
economist attempting to analyze a nation's economy. As 
W. W. Jevons once said, "what the Periodic Table of Ele­
ments is to the chemist, the Balance of Payments is to the 
international economist.
^Paul Samuelson, Economics (fourth edition; New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), p. 627.
159
%
160
The procedure in this chapter will be to: (1) Ex­
plain the method used in measuring surpluses and deficits 
in the balances of payments of Argentina and Brazil.
(2) Discuss Argentina's international financial statement 
in relation to; (a) exchange controls; (b) the postwar 
crisis in her balance of payments; (c) the balance of pay­
ments and economic stagnation during the 1950 to I960 period;
(d) the factors causing balance of payments problemsf and
(e) the role of the United States in Argentina's balance of 
payments. (3) Examine Brazil's balance of payments in rela­
tion to: (a) exchange controls; (b) factors Influencing 
exports, imports and terms of trade; (c) future balanoe of 
payments prospects, and (d) the role played by the United 
States. (4) Compare the role of the balances of payments
in the economic development of Argentina and Brazil.
MEASUREMENT 0? SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS
In discussing the balances of payments of Argentina 
and Brazil the need arises to arrive at a basis of measuring 
deficits and surpluses. Professor Machlup provides a means 
of obtaining an insight into this problem. He differenti­
ates between the Market Balance of Payments, the Program
2
Balance of Payments and the Acoountlng Balanoe of Payments.
2Fritz Machlup, "Three Conoepts of the Balance of 
Payments," Foreign Trade and Finance, ed. William R. Allen 
and Clark Lee Alien INew York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), 
pp. 97-123.
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The market approach le an "ex ante" one where at a given 
time there is a given demand and supply situation prevailing
between a nation and the rest of the world. This concept is
very useful in the foreign exchange market. Its major con­
tribution is revealing the effects which changes in the 
exchange rate might have upon the amounts of exchange de­
manded and supplied. The market balance approaoh is thus
inadequate as a means to analyze the over-all role of the
balance of payments in a nation's economic development. The 
program approach is also an "ex suite" concept which considers 
planned foreign exchange needs relative to some fixed stand­
ard. Deficits occur when planned foreign exchange needs 
exceed the expected acquisition of the foreign exchange and 
surpluses occur under the reverse situation. Finally, the 
accounting balance of payments is considered. This is an 
"ex post" concept based on statistical records and is a 
fully balancing accounting statement. With the double entry 
system the only imbalance can be errors and omissions, and 
these are statistical errors, not economic factors.
Of the three balance of payments concepts the ac­
counting balance with consideration of the program approach 
will be mainly utilized to arrive at deficits and surpluses. 
However, a differentiation will be made between autonomous 
payments and accommodating items. Autonomous payments are 
those which have taken place for reasons other than the 
status of the balanoe of payments. Accommodating items are
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payments which are induced by other items and serve to fill 
the gap in the net autonomous entries of the balanoe of pay­
ments. These accommodating items are generally taken to be 
gold flows and short-term capital movements. This state­
ment is made with the realization that for gold-producing 
countries gold may be considered normal autonomous merchan­
dise rather than a balancing item. Also, under specific 
instances short-term capital movements may be autonomous 
and dlsequlllbratlng, as were the capital flights in the 
1930's. Long-term capital may also serve as a balancing 
item on occasion. Over-all, the net of autonomous items is 
equal to the net of accommodating items. If the autonomous 
items result is a net defioit, the balance of payments is 
in deficit disequilibrium and must be matched by aooommo- 
datlng financing.^ This difference represents the true 
balance of payments deficit as it will be used in this 
study.
The program balance enters the picture because to 
understand the accounting balance, deficit or surplus, the 
factors which result in a particular accounting statement 
must be understood. It is from the program approach that 
the impact of economic policy on the balance of payments 
can be seen. The relationship between the balance of
^William R. Allen and Clark Lee Allen, (eds.), 
Foreign Trade and Finance (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1 9 5 g 7 r ' p F T T T 4= I 8b:---------
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payments and a nation's economio development can best be 
grasped from the program approaoh. Because a thorough pro­
gram balance of payments complete with data cannot be ob­
tained, the procedure will be to start with the accounting 
balance, then study the available program balance to be 
able to understand the former.
ARGENTINA
Exchange Controls
Controls over exchange were established In Argentina 
in 1931 when the law dictated that all exchange transactions 
be handled through authorized banks at authorized rates. In 
1933f a free exchange market was created and all Importers 
of items not previously covered by controls could obtain 
foreign exchange In this market. During the years 1934 to 
1939* some exporters were permitted to sell their foreign 
exchwage at the free market rate. This free exchange sector 
was discontinued in 1 9 3 9 for merchandise transactions and a 
system of multiple exchange rates took its place. This 
system became more and more complex* and by 1930 there were 
four rates each for imports and exports plus a free rate. 
Imports were grouped Into preferential A* preferential B, 
essential and non-essential. Exports were classified as 
basic exports, preferential A, preferential B and special
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exports. The free rate was applied to financial remit*
A
tances.
The application of controls was motivated by the 
desire of the government to correct what it felt was an 
imbalance between agriculture and Industry in the Argentine 
economy. Primarily, the Idea was to apply as mUch of the 
limited foreign exchange funds as possible to procure those 
items needed to enhance the industrial development of Argen­
tina.
Revisions were made in the above system in August 
1950. The system of multiple exchange rates was replaoed 
by two fixed rates of 5*00 and 7.50 pesos per United States 
dollar. These rates applied to the buying, selling and 
controlled free rates. The latter rates were free in name 
only as the government controlled their fluctuation. Fur­
ther adjustments were made in the system over the next few 
years. Export rate variations were added which permitted 
the exporters to dispose of some of their foreign exchange 
at the free rate. Controls were extended over the free 
market and rates were not permitted to fluctuate. This 
form of exchange regulations was replaoed by the exchange 
reform of 1955.
The "aforo” system came into operation in 1955 and 
was amended in August of that year. This was a multiple
*For details see Table XV In the Appendix.
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exoh&nge rate system. It was based on a fixed offloial 
rate of 18 pesos per dollar, and a fluctuating free rate. 
The rates for a given transaction could be: (1) the of­
floial rate less various surcharges for certain exports;
(2) the combination of the official and free rates In fixed 
proportions, or (3) rates resulting from the "aforos" and 
the free rates.
"Aforos" were unit prices expressed in terms of for­
eign exchange established for some of the exports and im­
ports negotiated in the official market. The part of the 
export proceeds equal to the "aforo" had to be surrendered 
at the official rate and anything above this could be sold 
at the higher free rate. For imports the balance of the 
actual price over the official price had to be covered by 
the purchase of exchange in the free market. To the extent 
that the "aforos" understated the actual prices, exports 
received a premium and imports were taxed.
Major changes were made in the above system in 1958* 
Foreign exchange earned from the sale of beef, mutton, 
greasy wool and sheepskins was sold 65 per cent at the of­
ficial and 35 per cent at the free rate. Exports of raw 
hides, some types of wool, beef produots and other animal 
by-products were made 50 per cent at the official and 50
^"Argentina," International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund, Volume Xl, no. 7, 19^8, pp. 
38-41.
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per cent at the free rate. Some exports were subject to a 
surcharge of 10-25 per cent. A maximum rate of 50 per cent at 
the official and 50 per oent at the free rate was put into 
effect In August 1958 for epeciflc imports such as medi- 
oines, paper, some fertilizers, rubber and tin. Host other 
imports were transacted under the free rate and were sub­
ject to a surcharge of 20 to 40 pesos per United States 
dollar. Official valuations were established for some im­
ports made at the official rate, and in those oases the im­
porter had to purchase the difference in the free market. 
Thus, the effective rate at the end of August, 1958, varied 
from 1 8 to 87 pesos per dollar.**
The Paris Club Agreement between Argentina, Austria, 
Belglum-Luxembourg, Denmark, Prance, Germany, Italy, Hol­
land, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
was signed in November of 1957* This is a multilateral 
trade end payments agreement which provides that the Argen­
tine authorities will not discriminate in trade and payments 
among or against European participating countries. Argen­
tina's receipts from or payments to these countries may be 
made in any of their currencies. Exchange rates approxi­
mate the rates currently quoted on the European foreign
7
exchange markets.
6Ibid., p. 39. 7Ibid.. p. 38
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A single fluctuating rate system replaced the earlier 
multiple rate system In January, 1959; thus the system of 
"aforos” was eliminated. All controls over trade, invisible 
and capital transactions were removed except for the stipu­
lation that all export Income be surrendered within 30 days 
of shipment. At this time three import lists were announced. 
Commodities on two of the lists would be subject to sur­
charges of 20 te 40 per cent of their o * f value. Imports 
not included in these lists would automatically be subject 
to a 300 per cent surcharge; this was reduced on December 
31, 1959, to 150 per cent. Number three and all unlisted 
imports were subject to advance deposits to be held for 180
days. The deposits ranged from 50 to 500 per cent of the
o
c & f value of the goods plus the surcharge. A detailed 
summary of the surcharges is presented in Table XVI in the 
Appendix.
The government attempted to use exchange restrictions 
of various types to aid industrial development. Prior to 
1955, this was to a considerable degree accomplished by dis­
criminating against agriculture. Since 1959 the movement 
has been toward freer trade. By the end of 1961, imports 
were free of import and exchange licenses and exohange to 
pay for them could be purchased in a truly free exchange
o
"Argentina,” Exchange Restrictions. Eleventh Annual 
Report, International Monetary ^und (Washington, 196071
p. 27.
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market. For import purposes, commodities were grouped in
accordance with their essentiality and local production.
Items needed to develop local industries were exempt from
surcharges. Exports were free of direct controls and the
surrender of exchange proceeds was not required. Payments
q
for invisibles were made freely through the free market.
During 1947-51, the system of exohange controls was 
generally detrimental to the economic development of Argen­
tina. Under the operation of state trading and multiple ex­
change controls no incentive was given agricultural produc­
tion and basic Argentine economic endeavors such as cereal 
growing and stock raising were penalized. Through the use 
of controls producers were denied the benefit of prevailing 
high export prices by being forced to sell their products 
to state agencies which paid prices lower than those pre­
vailing in world markets. As a result of these policies 
agricultural production declined and subsequently so did 
Argentine agricultural exports. Also, foreign Investors 
were partly discouraged from investing in Argentina because 
of restrictions through exchange controls on remittances of 
profits. The over-all result was that exchange restrictions 
hurt agricultural production, reduced the quantity of 
available exports and hindered the inflow of foreign
q
^"Argentina," Exchange Restrictions. Thirteenth 
Annual Report. International Monetary Fund (Washington,
May 10, l$€>2), pp. 23-25.
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capital. These developments resulted In serious balance of 
payments disequilibrium and greatly reduced foreign exchange 
earnings. The shortage of foreign exchange funds reduced 
Argentina's ability to purchase capital goods needed in her 
quest for industrial development.
The Postwar Crisis, 1946-1949
World War II presented some advantageous economic 
conditions for Argentina. She was a neutral and the demand 
for her agricultural commodities during and immediately 
after the war was high. A summary version of the balance 
of payments for 1946-1959 is presented in Table XVIII in 
the Appendix. The surplus or deficit is represented by the 
combined gold and short-term capital movements.
The data in Table XVIII in the Appendix reveals that 
Argentina experienced balance of payments deficits in eaoh 
of the four years under consideration. One apparent reason 
for these negative balances, particularly in 1946, was the 
heavy deficits in long-term capital. This was attributable 
to the desire on the part of the Argentine government to 
nationalize foreign holdings. The railroad industry fur­
nishes an example of this policy. English investors were 
paid, so that the incessant desire of Argentina to own its 
railroads could be accomplished. Repayment of capital was 
accompanied by deficits in the merchandise balance in 1946, 
1948 and 1949. Merchandise account difficulties were the
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result of European recovery and United States sales of sur­
pluses. The statements made are only in general terms. A 
more detailed examination of the factors during 1946 to 1949 
which caused Argentina to begin experiencing economic stag­
nation, mal-distribution of capital, and declining exports 
is necessary.
Argentina's position changed during the course of 
World War II. Its population increased by 40 per cent, 
gross national product rose by 40 per cent and industrial 
production expanded by 65 per cent.1*’5 The result was an 
increase in foreign exchange needs to keep the economy 
going. This meant that import requirements for fuel, raw 
materials and capital goods to replace worn out capital 
rose. The change, unfortunately, was accompanied by a de­
cline in exports from 25 to 13 par cent of gross national 
product. Once again Argentina was placed in the dilemma of 
having to utilize a small amount of exchange to finance the 
imports which she needed to increase her national output. 
This situation was aggravated by several other factors.
(1) No further squeezing of non-essential imports could be 
practiced as had been done previously; (2) The transporta­
tion industry needed capital expenditures to replace
^"The Problem of the Economic Development of Argen­
tina, " Economic Bulletin for Latin America. United Nations 
Economic Commission for La4;in America, Vol. 12, No. 1,
March 1959* p. 15.
171
depreciated equipment In oontraet to the condition of ex­
cess capacity In the 1930's, (3) Agriculture found It 
difficult to expand merely by the expansion into new lands 
of the Pampa because these had been fairly well utilized by 
the 1920's. During the 1930's the problem in agriculture 
had been one of inadequate demand. After World War II the 
new situation in agriculture was insufficient production to 
meet domestic and foreign needs. (4) The rise of industrial 
development and motor transportation brought pressure for 
greater importation of petroleum. All these factors exerted 
their adverse influence on the balance of payments.
Economic conditions called for a change in Argen­
tina's growth pattern fluid methods had to be devised to ob­
tain more foreign exchange. Two possibilities became appar­
ent. One alternative was the expansion of exports and the 
other called for more stringent import substitution. Changes 
in import composition would have had to come in the eurea of 
intermediate products, especially fuels and capital goods 
themselves.11 Argentina chose again to emphasize industri­
alization euid import substitution whenever possible. No 
conscientious effort to augment exports through increased 
agriculture^. productivity was noticeable.
Argentina at this time was in a good position to put 
the industrialization policy to a successful test. Two
11Ibid., p. 16
172
factors wers now working In ths nation's favor, (l) The 
terms of trade In 1946 began to Improve, rising from 81 per 
cent of the 1925 level in the 1940-44 period to 116 in the 
1945-48 years. (2) Foreign exchange reserves were consider­
able as a result of the war period. Unfortunately, the 
management of the industrialization policy was poor. Ex­
change was allocated for items that were not very essential 
to Argentina and to nationalize foreign investments pro­
ducing low economic yields. These two factors to a great 
degree explain the lack of capital formation in the key 
areas of the Argentine eoonomy. Transportation, petroleum 
and capital goods Industries were neglected. This develop­
ment in turn explains to a great extent the forces which 
hindered Argentine economic development.
The poor distribution of investment capital also led 
to problems in the distribution of labor among the various 
areas of employment and labor productivity. Inside the 
manufacturing and transportation industries poor use was 
made of the increases in manpower. Agriculture suffered a 
labor shortage which was partly the result of labor going 
Into industry and the lack of increased productivity on the 
farm. The construction and railroad industries were the 
ones who absorbed the largest number of laborers and both 
experienced declines in productivity. Thus, while the vol­
ume of production in Argentina's industry increased, this 
benefit was neutralized by declines in construction and
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transportation and stagnation In agriculture. This fact is 
largely responsible for the stagnation in the per capita 
Income of the nation.
Argentina lost her opportunity in the export field 
as well. The situation after the war was such that the 
demand for Argentina's commodities expanded rapidly. Many 
areas of the world, particularly Europe, were in the pro­
cess of rehabilitating themselves from the holocaust of war 
and the demand for food was high. Argentina, however, could 
not take advantage of this opportunity and her share of the 
world export market, exoept for wool, actually declined as 
can be seen from Table XXIY.
TABLE H I T
ARGENTINA’S SHARE OF EXPORT MARKET FOB 
SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES IN SELECTED TEARS
(In per cents)
Period Maize Wheat Linseed Wool Meat
1934-38 61.4 19-3 67.5 11.7 39.7
1945-49 42.8 8.7 30.5 14.0 35.0
Source: "The Problems of Economic Development in
Argentina," Economic Bulletin for Latin America. United 
Nations Economic Commission for Laiin America, Vol. X, 
No. 1, March 1959, p. 17.
The situation in the above table is explained by
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several factors: (1) agriculture was not an attractive
area to investors; the government re-distributed income in 
favor of the city areas through keeping relatively low 
prices for agriculture commodities and direct consumer sub­
sidies, resulting in a large increase in domestic consump­
tion and thus a reduction in the amounts available for 
export; (2) farm methods in Argentina were not modernized 
and this hindered production, and (3) the agricultural sub­
sidies of the United States led to dumping of farm commodi­
ties on the world market. This point, however, is not of
pronounced significance, because regardless of price levels
12Argentina did not have sufficient commodities to sell.
These developments had an Impact on the domestic 
economy. The gross national product lnoreased from $6.5 
billion in 1945 to $9.2 billion in 1948 and declines were 
experienced after 1948.^ At the same time the need for 
foreign exchange required to maintain the level of economic 
activity increased. This led to a situation in which the 
margin of foreign exchange available for expansion of Argen­
tina's Industrial equipment disappeared. Sums received for 
exports barely covered the oost of importing the intermedi­
ate factors of production, particularly fuels and eapltal
"Argentina," Eognomic Survey for Latin America, 
1951-52 (New Tork: United Nations department of Economic 
Affairs, 1953), p. 30.
13Ibid.
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goods for replacement of depreciated equipment. The balance 
of payments had once again placed great pressure on Argen­
tina's economy and her means of Industrial expansion were 
being curtailed.
The outcome of these problems was economic stagna­
tion. Argentina's inability to expand economically coupled 
with attempts to redistribute income in favor of the city 
workers on one side, and attempts to maintain the level of 
Investment on the other, resulted in inflation. Rising 
prices were almost Inevitable because of the conflict be­
tween the goals of high workers* incomes and efforts to 
maintain the level of investment. The redistribution of 
income to workers tended to reduce the amounts of goods 
available for export. This in turn reduced the ability to 
import capital goods and the internal ability of the 
nation's economy to expand. During this period the little 
progress that was made was accomplished at the expense of 
reductions in Argentina's gold and foreign exchange holdings. 
A decline of $914 million in gold and foreign exchange 
holdings was experienced by the nation from 1946 through 
1949- After 1946 there followed a period of stagnation and 
decline in the Argentine economy which brought a reduction 
in per capita income from $564 in 1948 to $428 by 1952.
^ I n  terms of 1952 U.S. dollars.
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Stagnation and the Balance of Payments, 1950-1960
Based on per capita income data, Argentina did not
make any real over-all advances in the decade of the 1950's. 
In an attempt to explain this situation a summary balance of
payments for the 1950 to 1959 period is presented and defi­
cits or surpluses in trade balances for these years deter­
mined. Table XVIII in the Appendix gives a numerical pres­
entation of the Argentine trade for the years in question.
Argentina's trade balance was unfavorable during most 
of the period. What factors account for this unfavorable 
picture? The main answer suggests itself in the forms of
(1) the terms of trade, (2) the capacity to import, (3) do­
mestic Inflation, (4) volume of exports, and (5) volume of 
imports. Between 1950 and I960 there were declines of 24 
and 15 per cent respectively in the terms of trade and unit
value of exports. This was accompanied by a rise of 16 per
1 5cent in the unit value of imports. '
A decline was experienced in the oapaclty to import 
of 25 per cent between 1946 and 1 9 5 5 * ^  The declines were 
at first offset by short and medium term foreign credits 
made possible by bilateral agreements. By 1955 the
1 5'For details see Table X in the Appendix.
"Comparative Study of Capaoity to Import in Selec­
ted Latin American Countries," Boononic Survey of Latin 
America, 1956 (Hew York: United Nations department of Eco­
nomic and Sooial Affairs, 1959)» p* 45.
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liquidation of these credits had to be faoed and a debt of 
approximately $360 million had to be met over a very short 
period of time. Added to this sum in the form of medium
term obligations were about $400 million, resulting in a
1 7total short term and medium debt of $760 million. For­
tunately, Argentina's authorities succeeded in consolidat­
ing these obligations over a longer period of time. In 1956 
a change toward multilateral trade with some European 
nations was made, which replaced the then existing bilateral 
system. At this time an agreement was made providing for 
the repayment of the debt over a ten-year period. Along 
with this went a move towards the reduction of imports from 
creditor nations. An inorease in exports made possible 
payments to Germany, who had not agreed to the consolidation 
proposal. Purchases from the convertible currency area in­
creased sharply, particularly from Venezuela in the form of 
petroleum. To meet this situation gold reserves were tapped 
and this resulted in a drop in gold reserves from $370 
million at the end of 1955 to $224 million at the end of 
1956. The combined gold and foreign exchange holdings de­
clined to $130 million during 1958. In 1959 a recovery 
commenced in Argentina's trade agreement which increased 
the volume of gold and foreign exchange holdings to $658
1 7' "The Balance of Payments,'' Eoonomic Survey of Latin 
America. 1956. op. oit., p. 44.
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million during I960.
Argentina's balance of payments during the 1950's 
was further aggravated by considerable domestic Inflation. 
Rapidly rising domestic prices tend to reduce foreign de­
mand for one's exports while increasing domestic demand for
foreign commodities. Using 1953 equal to 100 the consumer
18
price Index was 69 in 1951 and 590 in I960. This pro­
nounced inflationary trend could not help but put additional 
pressure on the balance of payments. Vages drove production
costs up, rising from an hourly rate index of 100 in 1950
IQto 451 by 1959. The over-all Impact was that the prices 
of Argentina's commodities on the foreign market were in­
creased.
To evaluate import and export requirements it is 
necessary again to examine the relationship between indus­
trial development and agriculture during this period. The 
growth in industrial production from 1951 through I960 was 
inadequate with the exception of mining. Increases in I960 
over 1951 for the general, mining, manufacturing, and elec­
tricity and gas categories were 8, 128, 2, and 17 index
20points respectively. Table XX in the Appendix indicates
^ S e e  Table XIV in the Appendix.
^ T h e  very pronounoed increases in prices between 
1958 and 1959 are largely attributable to an across the 
board wage increase by the Frondlzl government of 60 per 
cent.
JA __
Note Table XX in the Appendix.
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that industrial growth is partly sxplalnabls by the balanos 
of paymsnts. As was stated earlier, between 1944-45 and 
1949-50, manufacturing had experienced a sharp rise due to 
the policies followed by the government. In 1951 the defi­
cits in the balance of payments began to be a problem. The 
government, in attempting to correct the balanoe of payments 
disequilibrium, was forced to reduce imports, including some 
raw materials and nearly all kinds of machinery, and to re­
strict credit. This action led to stabilization of manufac­
turing output rather than continued Increases as a result of 
reduced capital equipment Imports. A reoovery trend in 
manufacturing output begaa in 1955 which was maintained 
until 1959. The manufacturing reoovery was accompanied by 
a deficit in the balance of payments and the deficit was 
partly the result of increased equipment purchases which 
assisted manufacturing production. Thus it appears there 
was a close relationship between the balance of payments and 
manufacturing production in Argentina.
Industrial development by 1955 had failed to isolate 
Argentina from external pressures. The investment oyole was 
greatly dependent on the level of exports and poor export 
years meant less exchange to purchase capital equipment. 
Domestic production also followed variations related to the 
level of exports and investment. The problem of industrial 
development was to a great degree traceable to poor economic 
policy during the prosperous years. Instead of developing
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the basic industries, expenditures went heavily for public 
works and less essential industries, such as factories for 
providing consumer durable goods. All this added to greater 
pressures on imports. By 1953« when the nation's gold and 
monetary reserves were under pressure, even Imports of fuels 
and spare parts were curtailed. This related the level of 
industrial activity even more olosely to the level of ex­
ports. By I960 a reduction of exports reduced not only 
foreign exchange income, but also resulted in a greater 
loss of lnoome derived from manufacturing.
When the authorities in 1951 attempted to stem the 
flow of imports, the decline in the purohases of finished 
capital goods Impeded the level of Investment. In addition 
to this, the unoertain prospects for exports and the credit 
restrictions imposed tended to discourage investment. Fur- 
theremore, the reduction in capital goods imports meant that 
some local projects were cancelled for lack of machinery and 
demand for domestioally produced capital goods was conse­
quently reduced also. In Argentina the situation was such 
that the level of investment was not limited primarily be­
cause of shortage of savings or investment opportunities,
but by lack of foreign exchange to pay for needed capital
21goods.
^"Preliminary Study of the Effects of Post-War In­
dustrialization on Import Status and External Vulnerability 
of Latin Amerioa," Economic Survey for Latin America. 1956.
•, p* 1 2 8 .
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Argentina resorted to extensive Import substitution 
policies for finished goods, materials, capital goods and 
consumer goods. The attempt to reduce importation of fin­
ished goods was directed over a wide area. Between 1950
and 1955 the imports of finished goods items were reduced
oo
by 45 per cent. Pood could not be cut very extensively 
because Imports were already at low levels. The pronounced 
deoline of 96 per cent in textile imports was not accom­
panied in this period by expansion at home, but rather by 
a decline in consumption of 30 per cent in per capita 
terms. The reduction in consumer durables, spare parts, 
tires for oars, bicycles, motorcycles, clocks, watches, 
pianos and refrigerators was in most cases compensated for 
by increased domestic production. Puel imports experienced 
an inorease of some items such as coke, lubricants and fuel 
oils.
Import substitutions resulted in decreased material 
imports for food, textiles and building materials. In the 
food group the main item eliminated was tobacco Imports be­
cause other food imports were already at low levels. As 
far as textiles were concerned, the development of wool 
spinning helped to reduce imports. Part of the reduction 
in textiles was also explained by a decline in the
22Ibid., p. 129.
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manufacturing of clothing at home. J
Problems were encountered In substituting material 
imports for light industry. Por example, although tires 
were to a considerable degree replaced by domestic produc­
tion, this substitution led to a tripling of the importation 
of rubber. Some savings were made in the chemical industry, 
particularly with the elimination of sulphur imports. The 
paper industry was affected by a reduction of $107 million 
in the importation of paper products, but some of these 
savings were offset by an increase of $71 million in pulp 
paper imports. External purchases of crude petroleum showed 
a considerable increase which can be explained by the import 
substitution in gasoline. Refining of crude petroleum as a 
percentage of national production rose from 180 in 1949-51 
to 227 in 1958.^* Metal imports showed an increase, par­
ticularly in pig iron, iron plate, rails and tin plate, the 
last for expansion of the canning industries. Domestic pro­
duction expanded considerably, particularly iron rod, wire, 
strip and galvanized sheets. Over-all, although the tonnage 
of these metal imports rose by 28 per cent, their values at 
1950 prices increased only 21 per cent. J Import
*23Ibid., p. 1 3 0 .
p A
*"Statistical Supplement," Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America. IV, No. 2, p. 76.
^"Preliminary Study of the Effects of Post-War In­
dustrialization Impact on Import Structures and External 
Vulnerability of Latin America," Economic Survey of Latin 
America. 1956. op. cit., p. 130.
183
substitution on lsad was complete. Building materials de­
clines are explainable by a reduction in capital Investment 
and import substitution. Domestic production met the demand 
for tiles, sand and pebbles, but cement production did not 
take up all the slack left by reduction in imports.
Capital goods substitution data are based on capital 
goods imports regardless of their stage of the manufacturing 
process. Import reductions of all capital goods amounted to 
27 per cent. Domestic production in the heavy industries
by and large made up for the reduction in imports. There 
was a rise in average annual value during the 1948-49 to 
1955-56 period of all types of durable goods produced from
3*9 to 5-1 million pesos, compared with a decline in im-
27ports in the same group from 2.0 to 1.0 million pesos. 
Unfortunately for Argentina the domestic production took 
place primarily in consumer goods rather than in producer 
goods. As a consequence industrial and transportation 
equipment could not be replaced at a desirable rate and 
outmoded, worn-out machinery was utilized. Economic stagna­
tion in Argentina is explained to a great degree by this 
development.
The over-all reduction in the importation of consumer
28goods was 18 per cent. Factors responsible for this 
change have been previously enumerated. Textile production
26Ibid. 27Ibid., p. 131. 28Ibld.
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at home increased and consumption declined. Consumer dur­
ables provided the greatest savings and fuel consumption 
the least.
It was from agricultural exports that Argentina had 
to obtain the foreign exchange which was so necessary for 
her over-all economic development. The pioture in agricul­
ture was a dismal one and appears to have been one of the 
main causes of Argentina's economic woes. During the 194-5 
to 1955 period while other nations, with the exception of 
Chile, were making substantial progress in agricultural
productivity, Argentina experienced stagnation in this
2Qsector. J
In summary, what factors account for Argentina's 
balance of payments dilemma in 1955 and I960? The answer 
lies in several areas. (1) The new areas of agriculture 
planting were not as productive as the fertile Pampa.
(2) The government's emphasis on industry reduced agricul­
tural prices and Incentives. (3) Outdated agricultural 
methods and equipment were the mode because of channelling 
of available foreign exchange resources to industry.
(4) The shift to industry involved more than surplus 
workers; it was a population shift which was not compensated
^"Productivity Qf Labor and Land in Latin American 
Agriculture," Economic Survey for Latin America. 1956. on . 
oit.. p. 175. See also Table ITT in the Appendix for de- 
tailed comparisons.
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for by Increased productivity on the farms. In the year 
1955 the situation was such that Argentina's economy could 
be characterized by a "deficit in the balance of payments, 
short term inflexibility to import, Inadequate energy sup­
plies, disinvestment in the transportation industry and in­
flation."^ The same situation generally prevailed in 1960.
Role of the United States
Argentina's trade with Europe has been more important 
to her than that with the United States. The South American 
nation usually Incurs trade deficits in commodity exchanges 
with the United States. United States subsidization of 
agricultural exports have at times reduced Argentina's ex­
port of farm products such as wheat and corn. In recent 
years American capital movements to Argentina, particularly 
into the petroleum industry, have made it possible for 
Argentina to improve her balance of payments position.
United States government loans have helped and can in the 
future continue to assist Argentina in overcoming her 
scarcity of capital goods. In addition, a liberalization 
of United States trade restrictions on Argentine meats and 
wool would be of great assistance to Argentina in her quest 
to obtain foreign exchange to purchase capital goods needed
30HTh.e Situation in Argentina and the New Economic 
Policy." Economic Bulletin for Latin America, I (January
1956), 35“
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for her economic development drive.
BRAZIL
Exchange Controls
Brazil first introduced exchange controls in the year 
1931 and this system prevailed until 1949 when it was revised. 
Import licenses were granted up to the limits of import 
quotas through exchange licenses required for both imports 
and non-trade payments. A multiple currency exchange tax of 
five per cent was placed on most payments abroad. All ex­
ports required licenses and shipping permits and foreign 
exchange earned had to be surrendered to the authorities.^1 
Rising coffee prices resulted in Brazil enjoying 
increasing export earnings in the immediate postwar period. 
Favorable coffee markets coupled with high foreign exchange 
reserves earned during the war put Brazil in a good position 
as far as foreign exchange was concerned in the late 1940's. 
The rising level of imports plus the repatriation of foreign 
capital soon led in the early 1950's to foreign exchange 
difficulties.
The multiple exchange system was revised in February 
1958. A greatly over-valued official rate of exchange was 
retained and a system of differential exchange bonuses was
^"Brazil," Exchange Restrictions. First Annual 
Report, Internetional konetary fund, Washington, March 1,
1950, p. 92.
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established. The available exchange, after meeting the 
needs of the government, was offered to importers at auo- 
tlons held In the major commercial centers. The bonus rates 
created for exports In 1953 permitted selected exporters to 
sell 15, 30 or 50 per cent of their proceeds at the free 
rate; however, most exports fell into the 30 per cent cate­
gory.
For some Import items Buoh as newsprint, wheat, coal, 
some machinery, diesel and fuel oil, crude petroleum, kero­
sene and lubricating oils, exchange was made available at 
favored non-fluctuating rates. Other non-enumerated Imports 
were handled at widely fluctuating rates under the auction
certificate system started in 1953* Imports were grouped
■»2
into five categories on the basis of essentiality.
Changes were made in the system during 1957. A new 
grouping for exports was created which divided the curren­
cies into two categories: convertible, and all others.
Four ourrenoy groupings were created; these were: coffee
and cocoa, hides and skins, most raw material exports, and 
all other exports.^ Also during this year a new Customs 
Tariff Law raised the tariff rates.
From October 4, 1958, to December 31, 1959, many 
exports were shifted to the free market and the number of
^See Table XXXI in the Appendix. 
^See Table XXIII in the Appendix.
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export categories reduoed from four to two. Coffee exports 
between June 1957 and January 1959 received a bonus in 
addition to the 37.06 cruzeiros per dollar. At first the 
bonus was one per cent on coffee sold at $43 per 60 kilo­
gram bag plus one per cent per additional dollar increase 
in price. The percentage was increased on July 1, 1958* to 
three.
On December 31* 1959* the free market rate was made 
applicable to all exports except ooffee, cocoa, castor seeds 
and crude petroleum. Starting July 1, I960, exports of 
coffee and cocoa beans have been made at fixed rates of 90 
cruzeiros per bag. Castor seeds, cocoa products and crude 
petroleum are exported at a fixed rate of 100 cruzeiros per 
dollar plus a bonus of 81.64 cruzeiros. Proceeds from ex­
ports at free market rates are converted at 130 cruzeiros 
per dollar. The exporter receives, in addition, the differ­
ence between this rate and the current free market rate in
central bank bills of six months maturity bearing Interest
34at six per cent per year.
In 1960, exchange for most imports was sold in public 
auctions at fluctuating rates. A fixed preferential rate of 
100 cruzeiros per United States dollar, however, applied to 
government payments and certain enumerated imports.
^"Brazil," International Financial Statistics. 
International Monetary Fund, January 1961* p. 68.
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Non-trade invisibles and capital transactions not made at 
the preferential rate were made at the free rate.
In 1961 the auctioning of exchange was abolished. 
Exchange to pay for imports in the General Category and in 
the Special Category was now obtainable in the free exchange 
market. A certificate of exchange coverage continued to be 
required for imports in the General Category. Speeial Cate­
gory Imports require import licenses granted to holders of 
"promesas de lioenza" and the latter were auctioned on the 
basis of general quotas. Some export proceeds had to be 
turned over to authorities at pre-determined rates. The 
free market rates at which some of the export proceeds were 
converted were determined by the Bank of Brazil.
As of January 31» 1962, buying rates in cruzeiros per 
dollar were: (1) exports of cocoa and cocoa paste, 263*4;
(2) free rate, all other export proceeds, 310. Selling 
rates were: imports of wheat, 237.34; imports of petroleum,
325.16; all other imports at the free rate of 318*0.^
Brazil's exchange control system has had both a 
favorable and unfavorable Impact on the nation's economic 
development. Prom a negative point of view, the system 
greatly over-valued the cruzeiro and this may have hindered 
the introduction of needed new export products. These
■^"Brazil," Exchange Restrictions. Thirteenth Annual 
Report, International Monetary Fund, Washington, May 1962, 
p. 49-
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regulations exerted pressure on the domestio price level to 
the extent that reduced imports were not replaced by home 
production. A serious weakness in the system was the penal­
izing of coffee exports by granting this commodity the least 
favored exchange rate. The penalizing of coffee exports led 
to dissatisfaction with the exchange system on the part of 
Brazilian coffee interests. As a result of this situation 
accusations of "exchange confiscation" were made against the 
Brazilian Government and attempts to evade the regulations 
were encouraged. When export bonuses were introduced they 
had to be frequently adjusted as a result of the need to 
compensate for rising domestic costs of production. These 
adjustments were often made too slowly, thus hurting the 
competitive position of Brazilian exports.
The system of exchange regulations appears to have 
accomplished several beneficial results. It helped to uti­
lize much of the available foreign exchange for needed im­
ports of capital goods and petroleum products. Investment 
outlays were increased because the Brazilian Government 
utilized some of the funds it obtained through the practice 
of having a lower buying rate than the selling rate for 
domestic economic development projects. Also Brazilian re­
strictions against some imports apparently assisted the 
development of domestic industries. Thus the system pos­
sessed both detrimental and beneficial aspects. In the 
Brazilian case and in light of the scope of this study it
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ia Impossible to make a positive unequivocal statement con­
cerning the impact of exchange oontrols on the nation's 
economic development.
Brazil1s Balance of Payments
Brazil's balance of payments in the last 15 years 
generally suffered from deep structural disequilibrium and 
rigidities. A summary version of the Brazilian international 
account for the 1946 to I960 period is presented in Table 
XXVI in the Appendix. The data reveal that Brazil had and 
still has serious balance of payments problems. Although 
she has, with the exception of 1952, had surpluses in the 
merchandise account, they have not been sufficient to offset 
other deficits in the balance of payments. The services 
sections of the current account reveal deficits in every 
year under consideration. Transportation and Insurance 
deficits averaged approximately $149 million during these 
years. Investment inoome data reveal a mean annual outflow 
of about $117 million and in some years Brazilian payments 
to foreign Investors exceeded the amount of new capital 
influx. This means that much of the benefit of the new 
capital reoeived is offset by the investment Income payments 
abroad for past capital acquisitions.
The obligations of foreign investment income payments, 
along with the need to import capital goods, makes for con­
siderable rigidity in Brazil's International account. If
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foreign capital ie properly utilized, then the burden of 
investment income payments is justified. Balance of pay­
ments problems, however, are augmented if improper utiliza­
tion of foreign capital is made. The foreign capital should 
be used to produce essential items at home which are justi­
fied by economic considerations. Such investments would 
reduce dependence on foreign products and also increase pro­
duction of commodities for export. If this is done, the 
pressure on the balance of payments may be relieved somewhat 
by eventually obtaining a greater surplus in the merchandise 
acoount. Over-all, Brazil experienced deficits in its cur­
rent account in 11 of the 13 years under study.
Private capital Inflows into Brazil have helped to 
reduce the size of the deficits experienced in the current 
account. In the late 1950's external sources of capital 
provided over $207 million yearly to offset deficits in the 
current account. The burden of the investment income ac­
count will thus continue to be considerable in years to 
come.
Errors and omissions have been sizeable at times and 
in 1958, for example, this totaled $211 million. It thus 
appears that in some years the errors and omissions entry 
is so great as to render questionable the accuracy of the 
balanoe of payments deficits or surpluses for these years.
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Exports
Brazil's balance of payments difficulties have been 
influenced by the composition of the nation's exports, by 
terms of trade adversities, and by rampant inflation. With 
the exception of the early 1950's Brazil's export value has 
increased very little, being $1,157 million in 1947 and 
$1,269 million in I960. The quantity of exports, with 1955 
equal to 100, w b b  121 in 1947* 91 in 1952 and 119 In I960. 
During the 1939 to 1954 period, export volume declined by 
15 per cent while gross national product doubled and popu­
lation Increased 40 per cent. Exports as a percentage of 
gross national product were 21.5 per cent in 1939» 17.3 per 
cent in 1946 and 9*2 per cent in 1954. Thus while the 
quantity of total world trade increased by 35 per cent be­
tween 1948 and 1956, Brazil's export quantity declined by 
11 per cent.^ The demand for goods of primary producing 
countries such as Brazil was adversely influenced by sub­
stitution of synthetic materials, technological advances 
leading to economies in the use of raw materials, the income 
Inelasticity of demand for food products and restrictions to 
protect domestic agricultural sectors.
It appears that the changes which have tadcen place 
in the Brazilian economy, causing a movement from the
^ Survey of the Brazilian Economy, I960 (Washington: 
Brazilian Embassy, I9 6 IJ, p. 69*
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country to the cltlee and a developing domestic market, have 
tended to emphasize production for domestic use rather than 
foreign markets. Furthermore, world demand for coffee has 
grown lesB them Increments In population, and since 1934 
coffee prices have been adversely affected. Coffee, of 
course, is critical to Brazil's balemce of payments, repre­
senting 42 per cent of total exports during 1945-49» 62 per 
cent in the 1951-55 period and 60 per cent in 1 9 6 0 . ^
Cotton and cocoa beans are a distant seoond and third in 
importance as exports, representing 9*5 and 6.4 per cent of 
total exports respectively during the 1951-55 period.
The three leading export commodities of Brazil face 
pronounced international competition. Coffee appears to 
have the best prospects and starting with 1959 a consider­
able recovery in Brazil's coffee market was noted. Brazil's 
1959 exports of 17.7 million bags represented 43 per cent of 
the world's coffee exports. The Portuguese-speaking nation's 
share of the world market had declined to 35 per oent in
1958. Expected price stability as a result of the coffee 
agreement of 1958 and a reduction in Brazilian production 
from 43 million bags in 1959-60 to 26 million bags in
■jO
1960-61 should help coffee export values. Brazilian
^Companhia Auxiliar de Empresas Electricas Brasil- 
eiras, This Is Brazil. 1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 4-5.
^ Economic Survey of Brazil. 1960. op. cit•, p . 29.
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officials are hopeful that world coffee consumption will 
increase from the present two per cent annual rise to three 
per cent. They base their optimistic expectations on in­
creasing world population, rising levels of income, customs 
reductions by the European nations and greater publicity 
efforts. As we have noted earlier, over all this optimism 
hangs the specter of the possibility of a synthetic coffee. 
Such a development would wreak havoc with Brazil's balance 
of payments and economic development hopes.
Brazilians are hopeful that cotton exports will con­
tinue to increase. Their hopes are based on the recovery in 
the 1959-60 marketing year, when quantity of exporte rose by 
93 and revenues by 43 per cent respectively. During I960, 
quantity increased 23 per cent and value 28 per cent over
1 9 5 9 . ^  It is unlikely, however, that significant increases 
in cotton exports will continue to occur. Prom 1954-55 to 
1958-59 there was a sharp reduction in exports from
1,040,000 to 243,000 bales. This decline was accounted for 
by United States exports of surplus cotton, Increased home 
consumption, adverse climatic conditions and diseases which 
hindered cotton production. As a result of these factors, 
in very recent years cotton has been surpassed by cocoa, 
iron ore and sugar in importance as export commodities.
■sq
JJCompanhia Auxlllar de Empreaaa Electrioas, op. cit.,
p. 5.
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Cotton production In Brazil la expected to Increase. This 
expectation of Increased cotton output is based on encour­
agement given to the cotton industry by Federal and State 
governments and private research organizations. Also, in­
creases in cotton yields are anticipated as a result of im­
proved farming methods, fertilizers, insecticides and new 
varieties of cotton, whioh yield more and are of a better 
quality. Farts of Brasil not presently under cultivation 
would lend themselves to cotton production if an adequate 
irrigation system could be introduced. Some steps have been 
taken in this direction and in 1959* for example, production 
of cotton with the aid of irrigation was started along the 
Sao Francisco River basin at Manga. In 1959-60 total pro­
duction amounted to 1,700,000 bales as compared to 1,989*000 
bales in 1938-39* This decline is explained by deolining 
export prices, adverse climatic developments and plant dis­
eases. Cotton consumption during the same period increased 
from 552,000 bales to 1,200,000. Exports whioh were
1,609,000 bales in 1938-39 were only 500,000 in 1959-60.
Here lies the reason for expecting minor increases, if any, 
of cotton exports even though production may be raised con­
siderably. The growing pressure of domestic demand will 
consume most of the lnorease in output.*0
^ Survey of the Brazilian Economy. 1960. op. oit.,
p. 37.
197
Brazil is the world's seeond leading cocoa producer, 
having produced 20 per cent of the world's output during the 
past decade. Table XXV compares Brazilian production 
during 1958-59 and 1959-60 with her two closest competitors.
TABLE XXV.
MAIN WORLD PRODUCERS OP COCOA, 1958-1960 
(In thousands of metric tons)
1958-59 1959-60
Ghana 243-8 319-6
Brazil 191-0 182.6
Nigeria 137.2 152.2
Other 314.0 350.2
Total World Production 886.0 1,004*6
Source: Survey of the Brazillam Economy. 1960. op.
cit., p. 33-
We note that while Ghana and Nigeria increased their 
production, Brazil's output declined. However, acreage de­
voted to cocoa in Brazil increased 4-9 p w  cent yearly dur­
ing the 1951-56 period. Since the cocoa plant takes seven 
years to mature, it can be expected that after the 1961-62 
crop a sharp rise in production will occur. Cocoa exports 
will suffer from African competition and the variability and 
weakness of prices. Prom 1954 to 1956, for example, cocoa 
prices fell from 52.7 cents per pound to 22.5 cents and 
during 1959 average prices in New York dropped from 43-3 to
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35*4 cents a pound.^ The immediate outlook is for quantity
supplied to oontinue to exceed quantity demanded at prices 
In the neighborhood of 35 cents per pound*
Production and exports of iron and manganese ores 
hold considerable promise. Iron ore exportsf which were
599,000 metric tons in 1948, increased to 5,239*807 by I960. 
Manganese ore exports rose from 141,000 metric tons in 1948 
to 866,318 in I960. These products have the advantage over 
agricultural exports of not being susceptible to climatic 
and disease factors. Also, demand is not limited to such a 
great degree by population changes. While individuals sire 
limited in the quantity of food they are able to consume, 
their desire for manufactured products tends to be insati­
able. This factor gives the exportation of mineral ores a 
greater potential than food exports.
Year Production Consumption Export Quantum Export Value
TABLE XXVI
BRAZILIAN SUGAR PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS
FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1956-1959 
(In thousands of metric tons and U.S. dollars)
1956 2,268
1957 2,714
1958 3,004
1959 3,128
2,014
1,905
2,254
2,233
19
424
776
606
I 1.6 
t 45.9 
% 57.4 
* 42.8
Source: Survey of the Brazilian Economy. 1960. on
cit., p. 35.
41Ibid.. p. 34
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Brazil In 1938 ranked behind Cuba and Russia as the 
world's third leading sugar producer. Sugar production in 
Brazil increased rapidly during the 1930's. Table XX7T 
reveals sugar production, domestic consumption, export 
quantities and export values for the late 1950's. Produc­
tion, whioh was 1,403,000 metric tons of centrifuged sugar 
in 1950, amounted to 3,128,000 tone in 1959* Sugar exports 
represented 4.6 per cent of total. Brasilian exports in 1958 
and 3.3 per cent in 1959. Consumption during the 1950-59 
period rose by 62 per cent. In 1959 only a little over 
half of the sugar cane production was used by the centri­
fuged sugar industry. Brazil has the oapacity to produoe 
and export more sugar. Her ability to export, however, is 
limited by the International Sugar Agreement of 1958, whioh 
limited its export quantity to 550,000 metric tons. Also, 
due to the preferential agreements of the British Common­
wealth, the United States, the Frenoh Community and the 
European Common Market, Brazil is confronted with a limited 
international sugar market.
Traditionally, Brazilian industries have lacked inter­
est in foreign markets and Brazil's Industries have been set 
up to meet domestic demand. This was a result of the for­
eign exchange crisis in the 1930's, the unavailability of 
many imports during Vorld War II, and of the scarcity of 
foreign exchange in the 1940's and late 1950's. The goal 
was to substitute domestic production for goods which could
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no longer be purchased abroad. These factors led Brazilian 
industrial producers to be little Interested in foreign 
markets. Conditions are now changing and Brazil is attempt­
ing to develop heavy industry. However, this heavy industry 
will need large markets to survive and export considerations 
must be given greater emphasis than in the past. It appears 
that in the next several years this sector will do little to 
help overcome balance of payments problems since it does not 
appear to be in a position to compete with more efficient 
foreign producers.
The nature of the export composition of Brazil re­
veals her to be overly dependent on coffee and other agri­
cultural products for foreign exchange earnings. There 
does seem to be a desirable trend toward the increased ex­
ports of other items, primarily iron and manganese ores. At 
present Brazil's major exports face unsteady price levels 
and weak demand as a result of the increased supply in world 
markets and the relative income inelasticity of demand for 
food products.
Exchange rate policies and domestic inflation have 
hindered Brazilian exports. Prom 1939 to 1953 Brazil uti­
lized a system of inflexible exchange rates which for most 
of the postwar period were highly overvalued. This system 
of exchange rates hindered the introduction of new products 
which might in the long run be competitive, but which beoauae 
of the unrealistic rates could not be initially sold. In
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1933 & multiple exchange control system was introduced which 
aided in perpetuating the inflationary pressures. This ex­
cessive Inflation at home helped to price exports out of 
the world market by increasing costs of production as a re­
sult of higher wages and material prices. It is apparent 
that the Inflationary situation has worsened in recent years. 
General price levels increased 37 per cent from 1938 through 
1959 and 33 per cent from 1959 through 1960.*^
Imports
Imports Increased sharply from 194-6f when wartime 
restrictions were lifted, to 1952, when exhaustion of ex­
change reserves accumulated during the war, more severe 
government restrictions and reduced export volumes prevented 
further increased purchases abroad. In 1958 petroleum, 
wheat and newsprint accounted for 31 per cent of total Bra­
zilian imports. Petroleum comprised 7 per cent of the value 
of imports in 1947 and 20 per cent in 1958. There has, how­
ever, been a decline in the percentage of total petroleum 
consumption which is imported. In 1953,92.8 per cent of 
total consumption of crude petroleum was Imported, but by 
1958 the figure was down to 76 per cent. During 1950, 9 8 . 6  
per cent of consumption of petroleum products was imported
^ S e e  Table XII in the Appendix.
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and by 1958 only 37 per oent was purohased abroad. 43 In 
spite of the favorable trend in percentage of petroleum 
needs produced at home, the sum spent abroad each year is 
sizeable and steady. In millions of dollars $264 was spent 
in 1956 for imports of fuels and lubricants; the sum for 1955 
was $286 and in 1959* $258. The maintenance of a high level 
of Imports at a time when domestic production is rising is 
explained by the increasing consumption of petroleum and 
petroleum products in Brazil.
Brazil is dependent on external sources for wheat. 
Approximately 90 per cent of wheat consumed in Brazil before 
World War II was imported and until 1949 wheat and flour 
comprised 12 per cent of total imports on the average. In 
the 1950's the percentage was reduced to eight but in abso­
lute terms the sums have not decreased. Expenditures for 
wheat and flour totaled $107 million in 1957 and $116 million 
in 1958. Much of this wheat is purohased from Argentina and 
Uruguay, which permit payments with soft currencies. The 
introduction by the United States of the PL-4 8O program has 
been of assistance to Brazil by permitting her to pay for 
wheat in her own currency.44 At present plans are under way
43Surysy of the Brazilian Economy. 1959 (Washington: 
Brazilian fiabassy, 19^0), p. 5!>.
44The PL-4 8O program permits payment in the domestic 
currency of the buyer. The United States then often con­
tributes these funds for economic development in the im­
porting country.
203
to increase domestic wheat production hut imports will con­
tinue to he significant. This is explained hy the expected 
increase in Brazil in per capita consumption of wheat, which 
at present is quite low.
Brazil's terms of trade, unit values of imports and 
exports and the quantity of exports and imports reveal un­
favorable developments for Brazil. The terms of trade 
reached low depths for Brazil in the late 1940's and then 
recovered rapidly through 1954 as a result of inoreased 
coffee prices. From 1954 to 1959 there was a decline of 35 
per cent as coffee and cocoa world prices declined with in­
creased world supply. A slight recovery was noted in I960. 
The unit values of exports and imports explain the terms of 
trade decline. From 1954 to I960 unit values of exports 
declined 40 per oent while unit values of imports fell only 
11 per cent. Quantity statistics indicate that while ex­
ports were fairly steady, imports rose appreciably during 
the period. These developments adversely affected Brazil's 
capacity to import. ^
Import substitution has been practiced to the point 
where further curtailment of imports will be difficult.
There are still, however, some tendencies toward change. 
From 1956 to 1959 foodstuffs declined slightly from $170 
to $167 million, representing 13-8 and 12.2 per cent
^ S e e  Table XT in the Appendix.
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respectively of total Imports. Raw material Imports were 
reduced from $218 to $160 million, representing 17.7 and
11.6 per oent respectively of total Imports. Vehicle im­
ports increased from 7.7 to 13 per cent and from $95 to $178 
million during the same periods. Machinery purchases also 
registered a rise from $157 to $232 million from 1986 to 
1989* representing 12.7 and 16.8 per cent respectively of 
total imports. Altogether, essential imports represented
94.6 per cent of total imports in 1956 and 96 per cent in 
1959 * The four per cent of imports in the non-essential 
category does not leave much room for pronounced import 
substitution activities. ^
Balance of Payments Prospects
The rigidity in the import sector is quite obvious. 
Brazil will continue to need capital goods to realize her 
hopes for economic development. In order to Increase the 
capacity to Import, Brazil will have to overcome several 
obstacles. An adequate ratio of debt aervioe payments to 
export proceeds will have to be established. This ratio 
increased from 12.5 per cent in 1957 to 14.5 per cent in 
1959* In December, 1959, Brazil had loans outstanding of 
$523*6 million to which was added $47.7 million in the form 
of a loam from the International Monetary Fund. The
^ Survey of the Brazilian Economy. 1960, op. cit.,
p. 76.
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Brazilian Embassy indicates that during I960 Brazil had to 
repay obligations of $92.2 million inoluding interest on 
these loans, whioh would still leave at the end of I960 a 
debt of $500 million. In I960 combined foreign exchange 
needs to cover repayments and interest on foreign private 
and public financing, consolidated external debt and trade 
arrears amounted to $250 million. It is expected that over 
the 1960-64 period foreign exchange needs to cover these 
enumerated outlays will exceed one billion dollars. To ful­
fill these obligations Brazil will have to attract an in­
creased amount of foreign capital, increase export sales, 
reschedule debt service payments or decrease imports. It 
appears that the latter possibility will not be feasible 
since it would deprive the eoonomy of needed capital goods 
and it would take time to increase home production to sat­
isfy increased home demand for imports such as petroleum 
and wheat. The unchecked inflation will make an increase 
in exports difficult. Therefore, the most likely possibili­
ties are to attract foreign oapltal end reschedule debt 
service payments.
Brazil must oontinue to attract foreign private and 
public funds. These funds must be directed into areas where 
they may yield more benefits than the liabilities of future 
repayments and servicing of debts. Perhaps the private 
funds, because they are motivated by the profit motive, 
should be directed into manufacturing. Public monies should
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be applied to meeting social overhead needs, since in this 
sector returns on the investment are relatively email. The 
key to success in this area will be the politioal stability 
and outlook toward foreign investors exhibited by Brazil.
At the present time politioal tensions make Brazil a ques­
tionable place to invest one's funds.
World prices and demand fluctuations for Brazil's 
major export items present a serious problem. It is esti­
mated by the Brazilian Embassy that a return to the price 
ratio of exports to imports prevailing in 1953 would have 
added about 30 per cent to Brazil's capacity to import in 
1959* with the export quantity staying the same. Brazil, 
with the exception of coffee and possibly oocoa, cannot 
alone influence world prices. A solution may lie in some 
form of international commodity agreements.
The Brazilian Embassy anticipates that Brazil will 
not rid Itself of its balance of payments problems in the 
near future. It feels that: "The future balance of pay­
ments is going to depend naturally, on the one side, on 
Brazil's ability to go on compressing imports, and on the 
other, on a combination of the country's ability to increase 
exports and to attract capital. But these three components 
of the future behavior of the balance of payments are very 
closely related to each other. The ability to compress im­
ports depends on the ability of the country to produce 
import-subBtltuting goods and resources; the import
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substituting production as wall as production for exports 
alwayB depend in some way or degree on the capacity to im­
port equipment, which in turn, depends upon foreign invest­
ments and credits and upon the improvement of present terms 
of t r a d e . T h i s  statement very adequately relates the 
role of the balance of payments in the economic development 
of a nation such as Brazil.
We have read of the vicious cycle of poverty in under­
developed nations. These countries, of which Brazil is one, 
suffer from low income levels, low savings and a low level 
of investment. If this cycle is to be broken in Brazil, it 
must be done through an Increase in productivity. This in­
crease in productivity will be possible only if greater 
amounts of capital are used. Since domestic sources oannot 
Bupply the adequate amounts needed it appears that the chief 
hope lies in increased foreign investment in Brazil. A pic­
ture of the capital situation in Brazil is revealed by a 
comparison with the United States. During the 194-5-52 
period the capital stock in Brazil varied from $500 to $700 
per person while in the same period comparable figures for 
the United States were $10,000 to $15*000 per inhabitant.*® 
United States capital inflows would help Brazil to partially
Survey of the Brazilian Economy. 1959* o p . oit.,
p. 60.
48Ibid.
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overoome the problem of insufficient capital.
The Brazilian Embassy estimates that the gap between 
exports and imports will grow. TableXXYHgives a summary of 
their projections. If one assumes the continuation of the 
1957 per capita income level and the historical growth rate 
of exports of two per oent, no difficulty will arise. Thiet 
of course, assumes there is stagnation in the Brazilian 
economy. However, if the assumption of a two per cant 
yearly increase in the per capita income is made, a serious 
balance of payments situation presents itself. The Bra­
zilian Embassy estimates that with an annual increase in 
income of two per cent per capita the balance of payments 
deficit would amount to $604 million in 1970 and $930 million 
in 1980. These projections clearly indloate the need for 
Brazil to attract foreign capital or inorease to a consider­
able degree her level of exports.
The Brazilian government is assisting economic devel­
opment by channelling its Investment funds into building 
"social overhead.* These projects involve the expansion of 
transportation, electric power and irrigation facilities. 
These are areas of investment where the expected profits do 
not usually justify the risk assumed by private enterprise.
TABLE XIVII
PROJECTIONS OP BRAZILIAN CAPACITY TO IMPORT AND OP IMPORT NEEDS, 1957-1980
(In millions of dollars)
Poreoast of the Absolute 
Capacity to Import!
Global Needs 
of Imports2
Difference
Between
A B bl 3)4 A (capacity A (capacity
Year Historical Maintenance With With to import) to import)
Growth of per capita Stagnant Annual and C and D
(2^ yearly) import capacity 
obtained in 1957
Per Capita Increase of 
Income 2% in Per
Capita Income
(Import 
needs)
(Import 
needs)
1957 1,380.0 1,381 992.0 1,655.0 388.0 -275.0
I960 1,464.5 1,487 1,019.7 1,800.0 444.8 -335.5
1965 1,616.9 1 , 6 8 2 1,064.1 2,076.1 552.8 -459.2
1970 1,785.1 1,903 1,108.1 2,388.9 677.0 -603.8
1980 2,176.0 2,436 1,214.6 3,105.8 961.4 -929.8
^Capaoity to import is assumed equal to the Talus of exports.
Assuming a decrease of 1.53* per year in relation to net national product in 
the imports of equipment and raw materials and an increase of yearly in the total 
Talue of imports of consumption goods which would continue to he ljt of GNP throughout 
the period.
^Assuming a stagnation of the economy measured in terms of per capita Income.
^Assuming a realistic dynamic growth of national product, i.e., an annual 
increase of 2l6 of the income per capita.
Source: Surrey of the Brasilian Economy. 1959. op. cit., p. 61.
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The Bole of the United Statea
The United Statea government haa aided Brazil in the 
past with "hall-out" loana. American investments in Brazil 
have also been sizeable, being exceeded only by thoae in 
Canada, England and Mexico. Barring any unforeseen develop­
ment whioh would provide Brazil with aid from the Soviet 
Bloc, the South American nation will be dependent on the 
United Statea for aid to overcome balance of payments dif­
ficulties and for assistance in ita quest for economic 
betterment. The United States is also Brazil's best cus­
tomer for exports and the latter usually registers a favor­
able balance in United States-Brazlllan trade. Brazil will 
also find the United States to be a large market for her 
developing exports of iron and manganese ores. One wonders 
how Brazil will avoid severe economic difficulties if the 
United States does not assist her during the foreseeable 
future. It appears that political philosophies are changing 
in Brazil, which may endanger cooperation for her economio 
betterment. The United Statea will probably demand economic 
and social reforms as a prerequisite for aid to Brazil. At 
the present time it appears that these social and economic 
changes will not be forthcoming.
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL COMPARED
Brazil has suffered much more than Argentina from 
terms of trade deterioration. Using 1955 as the base year,
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Argentina's terms of trade were 99 In I960 compared with 80 
for Brazil. This is explained by a decline in the unit 
value of exports for Argentina from 100 in 1955 to 88 in 
I960 oompared to a decline for Brazil from 100 to 68 during 
the same period. The volume of exports for Argentina since 
1955 increased more rapidly than imports and for Brazil the 
reverse situation prevailed.
While Brazil generally has surpluses in the merchan­
dise account, Argentina has deficits. Brazil had surpluses 
in all but one of the years under analysis. Argentina, on 
the other hand, had deficits in all the years exoept five. 
Brazil has persistent large deficits in the transportation 
and insurance account while Argentina has managed surpluses. 
Investment inoome net debits are much greater for Brazil 
than for Argentina and foreign capital influx into Brazil 
has been much larger than into Argentina.
Inflationary pressures have hurt the balance of pay­
ments in both nations. Up to 1956 the spiral was more 
severe in Brazil; from 1959 to I960, however, Argentina's 
Consumer Price Index rose more than Brazil's. Stabilization 
of domestic prices would tend to help relieve pressure on 
the balance of payments. With the development of strong 
labor unions demanding and getting higher wages and easy 
monetary policy, price stabilization will be extremely dif­
ficult to achieve in both nations.
Poreign trade is more significant on a per capita
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basis to Argentina than to Brasil. The sums are generally 
somewhat larger for Brazil; however, when compared to the 
population of both countries, the greater per capita im­
portance of trade to Argentina becomes evident.
In both nations the exchange control system has been 
geared to encourage industrialization. The effect of these 
restrictions appears to have been more adverse in Argentina 
than in Brazil. In Argentina a pronounced redistribution 
in the allocation of resources from agriculture to manufac­
turing occurred. Since Argentina was extremely dependent 
on the agricultural sector the results were disastrous to 
Argentina's economy. This was to a great degree responsible 
for the stagnation of the Argentine gross national product. 
Brazil's agricultural sector, on the other hand, did not 
stagnate and she experienced an annual growth in gross 
national product of 3.7 per cent from 1950 to 1958.*^
The United States plays a greater role in the balance 
of payments of Brazil than she does in Argentina's. While 
Argentina usually incurs deficits in her trade with the 
United States, Brazil has surpluses. Magnitudes and compo­
sition of the trade of these two nations with the United 
States were discussed in Chapter II. As was stated, 
Argentine-United States trade tends to be competitive and 
United States-Brazillan trade is complementary. Economically,
^Committee for Economic Development, op. cit.«
p. 46.
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Brazil is United States oriented and Argentina is more 
closely tied with Europe.
Balance of payments data reveal both countries to be 
in the debtor category. Both Brazil and Argentina have 
generally fluctuated between being immature and mature 
debtors. During 1946 and 1947 Argentina was in the mature 
debtor repayer category, but this was exceptional.
The balance of payments acts as a regulator of eco­
nomic growth in both nations. Its role, however, is some­
what different. Both nations depend on foreign capital 
goods for their economic development; Brazil, however, also 
needs foreign monetary capital. Thus Brazil is an under­
developed nation needing both money capital and capital 
goods. Argentina's dilemma is not one of insufficient 
savings, but a lack of foreign exchange to procure capital 
goods. The Argentine dependence on external sources in the 
long run should not be as great as Brazil's. Argentina is 
a case of a physically decapitalized nation as a result of 
poor governmental economic policies compared to Brazil, 
which is an underdeveloped one.
While both nations are confronted with balance of 
payments deficits, Brazil's problems appear more serious. 
This is explained by the heavy burden of investment income 
payments, greater dependence on external capital, a very 
weak service sector as the result of am inadequate merchant 
marine, and poor outlook for traditional exports.
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Development of a Brazilian merchant marine and of her mineral 
export potential would help relieve the balance of payments 
problem. In Argentina's case the primary problem seems to 
be inefficient allocation of resources which will take sev­
eral years to correct even if policies are correctly geared 
to restoring her agricultural export sector.
Foreign capital could help reduce the economic woes 
which Argentina and Brazil are experiencing and hasten the 
correction of balance of payments disequilibrium. The belt 
tightening which will be needed without external assistance 
may be impossible in a democracy. As long as balance of 
payments problems persist, progress toward economio develop­
ment will be hindered. Neither Argentina nor Brazil appears 
at present to have the political stability needed to attraot 
this capital.
In I960, political instability appeared to make it 
improbable that internal austerity to help solve the balance 
of payments problem could be expected in either country.
These reforms would involve checks on inflationary pressures 
along with responsible monetary and fiscal measures. Such 
moves would entail considerable belt-tightening and govern­
ments which would be strong enough to withstand the various 
pressures such action would encounter. At present the 
political situation would seem to make such action Improbable.
CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Many factors in addition to economic considerations 
enter into the formulation of a nation's economio policy. 
These factors include political philosophies, traditions, 
personalities, external threats to regional integrity and 
cultural differences. United States economic policy toward 
Argentina and Brazil has been motivated by all these faotors. 
In this chapter we shall: (1) describe the amount of United
States economic assistance to the two South American nations; 
(2) discuss the factors influencing United States economic 
relations with Argentina; (3) examine the various aspects of 
American economic policy toward Brazil, and (4) compare and 
analyze United States policy toward Argentina and Brazil.
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Export-Import Bank
The Export-Import Bank has been active in extending 
credits to Argentina and Brazil. Table XXPZIIreveals the 
status of Export-Import Bank loans to the two South American 
countries from 1934 to June 30, I960. Brazil received
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credits from the Bank totaling $1.34 billion, representing 
34 per cent of total authorized credits to Latin America. 
Argentina ranked third behind Mexico in credits authorized 
during this period with $619 million. These credits to 
Argentina represent 13 per cent of the Bank's loans to Latin 
Amerioa. The data in Table JBLViXL do not, however, reveal a 
trend which has developed since 1959 in the Bank's dealings 
with these two nations. Brazil received one loan during 
1959 and one during the first six months of I960 totaling a 
combined sum of $7 million. During 1959, the Bank received 
from Brazil in repayments and interest collections $25 
million more than it paid out in loans to Brazil; this con­
trasted with 1998 when Brazil received $90 million of net 
aid. Argentina, on the other hand, was the recipient of $ 4 8  
million in net assistance from the Bank in 1958 and $53 
million in 1959. During the first four months of I960 
Brazil paid out $13 million more to the Bank than she bor­
rowed. Argentina during the same period had net loans of 
$ 1 9 million extended to her.1
Generally, oredits obtained by both nations have been 
used primarily for the purchase of capital goods. Xn 1955, 
a loan of $60 million was received by Argentina for the 
purchase of steel mill equipment. A sizeable credit of $88
"'‘Simon G. Hanson, "The End of the Good Partner 
Policy." Inter-American Economic Affairs. XIV (Summer 1960). 
75, 76, ST.
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million was extended In 1956 to the same nation for the pro­
curement of railroad equipment. In 1958, Argentina's gov­
ernment borrowed to purchase equipment and services to de­
velop power and industrial output. Major loans to Brazil 
during the 1934 to I960 period were: steel mill equipment,
$45 million in 1940; refinancing the purchase of equipment 
manufactured in the United States, $300 million in 1953* 
railroad equipment, $100 million in 1956; and refinancing 
the purchases of equipment in the United States, $100 
million in 1958.2
TABLE XXVIII
CREDITS MADE BY THE EXPOHT-IMPORT BANK TO 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1934 TO JUNE I960 
(In millions of dollars)
Nation CreditsAuthorized Disbursements Repayments
Principal
Outstanding
Argentina 519 270 69 201
Brazil 1,344 1,015 502 513
Total loans to 
Latin America 3,965 2,700 1,234 1,467
Source: "Question of U.S. Economic Aid to Latin
America," Congressional Digest, XL (February 1961), 40.
The Export-Import Bank also made loans to these two
o
Report to Congress. Export-Import Bank, Washington, 
June 30, 196b, pp. 62-74, 76-92.
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nations as an agent of the International Cooperation Admin­
istration. Credits authorized to Argentina totaled $20 
million, all during 1958, while credits to Brazil amounted 
to $149 million, all in 1956. Actually only $2 million of 
the Argentine and $54 million of the Brazilian loans had 
been disbursed as of June 30, I960.3
Other United States Public Agencies
Three other agencies besides the Export-Import Bank 
have provided financing and economic aid to Argentina and 
Brazil. These agencies sure the Foreign Agricultural Service 
of the United States Department of Agriculture, the Inter­
national Cooperation Administration, and the Development 
Loan Fund.
The Foreign Agrloulture Service of the United States 
Department of Agriculture has since 1954 been responsible 
for administering the agriculture surplus program authorized 
under Title I of the Agricultured. Trade Development Act of 
1954 (Public Law 480). Under this law the United States 
sells farm surpluses overseas for locstl currencies, then 
makes loans of these funds for economic development.
Assistance under Titles II and III of the Agricul­
tural. Trade Development Act of 1954 is administered by the 
International Cooperation Administration. Under Title II,
3I b ld . ,  p. 214.
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surplus farm products may be distributed abroad for use in 
famine relief and other emergency assistance. Provisions 
are made in Title III for the bartering of surplus food and 
fibers for strategic materials abroad. Under Section 416 of 
Title III, private, voluntary agenoiee have been instru­
mental in the distribution of food to the needy throughout 
the world.*
The Development Loan Fund was originally established 
within the International Cooperation Administration by the 
Mutual Security Act of 1957. In 1958, under the Mutual 
Security Act of that year, the Fund became an Independent 
corporate agency of the United States. The Development 
Loan Fund is required by law to consider the action taken 
by nations asking for assistance to solve their own prob­
lems and funds are allocated for specific projects. Argen­
tina, as of I960, had received the largest single loan,
$24.8 million.
Table XXIX presents a summary of total United States 
Government financial and economic assistance to Argentina 
and Brazil during the period for fiscal years 1946 to I960.
^"Question of U.S. Economic Aid to Latin America," 
op. cit., p. 41.
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TABLE XXIX
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1946 TO I960*
(In millions of dollars)
Agency Argentina Brazil
Mutual Security Programs 26.3 27,8
International Cooperation Admin. 1.5 37.6
Development Loan Fund 24.8 .2
Non-Mutual Security Programs 4.21:1 1*116.6
Public Law 460 34.8 164.4
Title III — ~ 16.3
Export-Import Bank 390.8 986.8
Other .1 45.4
Total 452.0 1,234.4
•Fiscal I960
Source: "Question of U.S. Economic Aid to Latin
America," loc. cit.
Loans by International Agencies
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment has made loans totaling $292 million to Brazil, of 
which $267 million was still outstanding in March, I960. 
Approximately $239 million of this money was used for elec­
tric power and communications development. The remainder 
went into the Improvement of transportation facilities of 
the Central de Brazil Railroad. The United States is a 
subscriber of 33.2 per cent, and Brazil and Argentina each
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have 1.57 per cent of the I.B.R.D. total subscriptions. 
Argentina became a member in 1956, and as of March, I960, 
had not received any loans from the Bank. The point to be 
made is that Brazil has borrowed considerable sums from an 
international agency of which the United States is the 
biggest contributor. Thus, about one-third of the Bank's 
loans to these two countries, almost $100 million, may be 
attributed to United States funds.
Argentina and Brazil have obtained short term funds 
from the International Monetary Fund of which they, along 
with the United States, are members. Of a total quota of 
$9,228 million during the period covered by this study, the 
United States quota was $2,750 million or almost 30 per 
cent. Argentine and Brazilian assessments were only $150 
million each. From March, 1947, through April 30, 1959* the 
Fund purchased $93.5 million of Argentine currency and 
$260.7 million of Brazil's. In December, 1958, Argentina 
arranged for a standing loan of $75 million to support a 
program that included exchange, fiscal and credit reforms. 
Brazil, during the fisoal year ending April 30, 1959, had 
a stand-by agreement of $37.5 million.^
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop 
ment. Fourteenth Annual Report. 1958-59, September 1959* 
p. 38.
^International Monetary Fund, Annual Report. 1959.
pp. 20, 21, 25, 27, 208.
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ARGENTINE POLICY
Traditionally, Argentine-United States relations have 
not been amicable. Part of this Is explained by Argentina's 
attempt to become the leader of the South American nations. 
Argentina viewed the United States as an obstacle in the 
path of the fulfillment of this aspiration since many of the 
Latin American nations gravitated toward the North American 
nation rather than toward her. The economic magnet of the 
United States was too powerful. American and Argentine 
products have also traditionally competed against each other 
in world markets. To these factors have been added the ani­
mosity resulting from the restrictive regulations imposed by 
the United States on Argentine meat products and wool enter­
ing the United States. American attempts to gain Argentine 
acceptance of multilateral trade practices In place of its 
bilateral arrangements have caused further friction. Argen­
tina has felt that bilateral trade agreements were of bene­
fit to her in the move toward economic development.
During World War II relations were further strained 
between the United States and Argentina. The latter nation 
did not declare war against the Axis until it was completely 
evident that the Allied powers would emerge victorious.
There is little doubt that the sentiments of the government 
of Argentina were with the Axis. In May, 1942, President 
Castillo secretly informed the Axis that he hoped they would
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win and that rather than sever economic relatione with them, 
he would eventually come out officially on their aide. 
Enrique Rule Cruifiazu, a leading Argentine government of­
ficial, declared in July, 1942, that Argentina belonged to 
the European economic community land that he considered the 
increase in United States military, political and economic 
strength as a greater menace to Argentina than Nazi Ger-
7
many. Even after Argentina severed relations with the 
Axis on January 26, 1944, Nazi activity in Argentina con­
tinued unsuppressed. The Parrell government made no at­
tempt to curb German and Japanese espionage activities.
United States-Argentlne relations deteriorated fur­
ther in 1946 when Amerioan ambassador to Argentina, Sprullle 
Braden, toured the South American nation speaking against 
the Parrell regime and Juan Peron, the candidate of the new 
National Labor Party for the Presidency. Braden was deter­
mined that a democratic form of government should be estab­
lished In Argentina. Unfortunately, Argentinians considered 
this to be Yankee Interference in Internal affairs. The 
United States Department of State issued a Blue Book on 
Argentina in February, 1946, revealing information obtained 
from captured German documents. The Blue Book linked Juan 
Peron with the Nazis of Germany and was released two weeks
^Edward 0. Guerrant, Roosevelt *s Good Neighbor Policy 
(Albuquerque: University of New Hexioo Press,' 7 "pT'TBOT
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prior to the election. This activity only angered the proud
Q
Argentinians* who responded by voting Peron into office.
Insistence by the United States upon multilateral 
trade agreements, non-preferential tariffs and private capi­
tal loans in Hemisphere economic affairs clashed with the 
rising nationalism of Argentina. The latter hoped that her
industrialization programs would free her economy from
q
colonial status in world markets. In the immediate postwar 
period, when United States aid was not forthcoming to the 
nations of the Southern Hemisphere in expected quantities, 
Argentina made a big drive for economic leadership of Latin 
America. Argentina wsb in a favorable position because of 
food surpluses and large holdings of foreign exchange. 
Washington strongly opposed Peron*s plan because it ran 
counter to multilateral trade policies and threatened to 
divide the Western Hemisphere.
During 1949-50 there was a noticeable Improvement in 
United States-Argentine relations as Argentina became more 
cooperative, partly because of economic necessity. By the 
middle of 1948 there was a decline in the world sellers' 
market, Great Britain, Argentina's chief buyer, was in eco­
nomic difficulty, and there was a dollar shortage throughout
Q
Edmund 0. Smith, Yankee Diplomacy (Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press, 1953J, p. l!>7.
9 Ibid., p. 171.
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Latin America and the Sterling-Area. Argentina was, as a 
result of theee factors, in a poor economio condition; and 
Peron was forced to turn to the United States for aid. The 
United States was heing influenced by the rising Communist 
menace and Argentina was needed as a force against this 
threat. On May 17* 1950, the Export-Import Bank extended 
$125 million in credits to Argentina. This loan retired 
Argentina's $100 million indebtedness to the United States 
and made possible purchases of machinery.^ In return for 
this assistance, Peron modified the severe restrictions on 
United States investments and business interests in his 
country. Peron also ratified the Rio de Janeiro Pact on 
June 29» 1950. It is noteworthy that Argentina voted with 
the United States in the United Nations after the invasion 
of South Korea by the Communists.
Relations between these two nations continued to im­
prove and under President Eisenhower the cementing of United 
States-Argentine relations came to be of prime importance. 
Milton Eisenhower on his visit to Argentina called Peron 
"the great leader of a great n a t i o n . P e r o n  made a deal 
which Involved United States government financing of a huge 
industrial plant in return for Argentine oil concessions to 
American private oil companies. The United States Depart­
ment of State now felt that its Argentine policy was a
^ Ibid.. p. 177. ^Hanson, oj>. cit., p. 79*
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success. When Arturo Prondizi oamt to power, apparently as 
the first freely elected Argentine President In thirty years, 
Washington was pleased. Prondizi*s statements concerning 
his desire to remove many of the governmental restrictions 
on the Argentine economy further heartened United States of­
ficials who visioned Argentina as the foundation around 
which American economic policy toward Latin America would 
revolve. The new Argentine government, like Peron, made 
concessions to private American oil companies to develop 
Argentina's oil reserves and promised to remove the state 
from several areas of the Argentine economy. Apparently a 
private enterprise democratic economic system was to be 
given a trial in Argentina. President Eisenhower on his 
journey to Argentina declared to an Argentine audience that 
he was one hundred per cent for Frondizl. It apparently 
mattered little to Elsenhower that the opposition to Fron­
dizl felt this to represent intervention in internal affairs. 
To the Eisenhower administration the permission obtained for 
American firms to develop Argentine petroleum resources and 
the reduction of the role of the Argentine Government in 
economio affairs meant success for their policy of promoting 
private enterprise within a democratic framework of govern­
ment . Apparently the United States government partially 
equated the well-being of American petroleum firms with the 
well-being of America. One of the major factors behind the 
change in United States relations with Argentina was
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apparently the concessions made to the oil companies. Past 
behavior on the part of Argentina was forgotten as were the 
past contributions of a friendly nation like Brazil; thus 
demonstrating the minor role sometimes played by morality 
in a nation's economic and political policy. Relations 
between nations must of neoessity be based on enlightened 
self-interest rather than morality. In the case of relations 
between the United States and Brazil, however, moral aspects 
tend to reinforce the main theme of this study— that, based 
on economic factors, Brazil should be the main country 
around whloh the United States should build its Latin Ameri­
can policy.
In return for petroleum and economic reform conces­
sions 'rgentina was given what Eisenhower called "a billion 
dollar program" and which was referred to as the most ex­
tensive program of financial cooperation in the Hemisphere.
In spite of extensive United States assistance real wages 
in Argentina fell 20 per cent in 1959» and the gross national 
product declined by 3 to 5 per cent. While the level of in­
dustrial output did increase by 10 per cent, labor's share
of gross national product declined and the cost of living
12was rising faster than in Brazil. During 1959* per capita 
gross national product increased by two per oent in Brazil 
and declined by five per cent in Argentina. Economic
12Ibid., p. 77
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faotors should havs Indicated to American policy-makers that 
the main United States economic effort in Latin America 
should have been geared toward Brazil.
BRAZILIAN POLICY
During World War II Brazil proved herself a good 
partner. On January 1, 1942, the Portuguese-speaking nation 
declared her solidarity with the United States and she be­
came the source of natural rubber, nickel ores and vegetable 
oils needed in the war effort. This South American nation 
also provided major bases for the African campaign. North­
eastern Brazil became a major supply base and in 1942,1,238 
planes flew from this area to and from the war areas. Dur­
ing 1 9 4 4 , military traffic through this air corridor was 
greater than through all other military air routes combined. 
Near the termination of the war the United States had 
165,000 troops stationed in Brazil, and at the end of 1942 
the United States had built or added to fifteen airports in 
the country.1 -^ North Americans also built naval bases, 
seaplane bases, warehouses, observer posts, hospitals and 
radio transmitters. Military equipment, at 30 per cent of 
American Army list cost, was sold to Brazil and in addition 
$34 million of materials under Lend-Lease agreements were
1^Donald M. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? (Gaines­
ville: Florida University Press, 1961), pp. 122-23*
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provided by the United States.14
Brazil's support of the Allied cause went further. 
With United States assistance she built up her air defenses. 
This greatly assisted successful Allied operations in North 
Africa in 1942 and aided air transhipment to all areas of 
the world. Brazil provided a fighter aircraft squadron 
which worked under the United States Twelfth Air Force in 
Italy and an infantry division which served under the com­
mand of the United States Fifth Army in Italy. Brazil also 
supplied a considerable naval group which operated under 
United States command in the South Pacific and by 1944* this 
naval unit was given the duty of anti-submarine patrol in 
South Atlantic waters.
Brazilians had evidenced considerable anxiety during 
the war over whether the United States would abandon her 
bases at the conclusion of hostilities. In the spring of 
1944 the Brazilian newspaper* 0 Journal of Bio de Janeiro* 
expressed the hope that "as soon as the war is over the
Americans will leave the Brazilian bases which they occupy
1 *5at present." J The newspaper assured the United States that 
the bases would be made available again "if times similar to 
those through which we are now living should occur again.w1^ 
Only "the ingenuous and the ignorant," it said, would now 
advocate the retention of the bases. Hints were made at the
l4Ibid., p. 124. 15Ibld., p. 135. 16Ibid.
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possibility of armed resistance in Latin America against 
Yankee retention of these bases. The article concluded with
the view that the "occupation of Nicaragua is an episode
1 7much too recent to be lost sight of.H Thus, under the 
apparent harmonious spirit of cooperation the old bogy of 
Yankee imperialism was present. With the end of the war and 
the elimination of the common enemy, some old jealousies, 
suspicions and hatreds were revived.
At the end of World War II it seemed to Brazilians 
that American interest in their economic problems waned 
rapidly. The United States, for example, did not provide 
the funds for economic development that the Latin American 
nation had expected. Brazil also suffered economically from 
her inability to compete with synthetic rubber and the plan­
tation rubber of the East Indies. Thus, the shift of re­
sources during the war period to the growing of rubber trees 
now proved to be a liability. As the United States personnel 
withdrew from Latin America, what did they leave behind, 
asked a Latin American diplomat: "In the rubber regions,
empty tin cans, one or more broken down Frigidaires, rural 
air strips from which their airplanes took off with their
l ft
household goods, their office employees and their blondes."
United States racial practices helped to widen the 
breach in Brazili&n-Yankee solidarity. Brazil, with a large
17Ibid. l8Ibid., p. 201.
231
Negro population, felt angered at the racial practices of 
the United States, particularly in the South. Gilbert 
Preyre, a noted Brazilian sociologist, remarked that "the 
Latins have developed their ethnic aspects of democracy 
more than the political and the Anglo-Saxons the purely
iq
political aspect more than the ethnic." Brazilian news­
papers repeatedly cited their country as an example of 
racial tolerance.
World War II created a new drive of rising expecta­
tions in Brazil, with hoped for results in the postwar 
period. However, outside assistance was necessary to 
achieve the hoped for economic betterment. After the war 
Pedro Luis Correa e Castro, Brazilian Minister of Finance, 
stated that Brazil had contributed much to the war effort 
without receiving material remuneration of any type. He 
said that in the event of another war Brazil in its present 
condition could not be of much assistance and thus she 
should receive loans from the United States for her finan­
cial recuperation and future economic development to the
O0
amount of $1,000 million. The Minister of Finance con­
cluded with an old Brazilian proverb: "lend me your hand
if you do not wish to carry me on your back." When the 
American funds were not forthcoming, Brazilians felt there 
was a dollar curtain as well as an Iron Curtain.
19Ibid., p. 221. ^°Ibid., p. 236.
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Brazilians felt that the main objective of United 
States economic policy was the promotion of private invest­
ment capital. Uuch of this capital flowed into the petro­
leum industry in Latin America. Brazil, however, held out 
for government development of its oil resources. This be­
came a source of difficulty between the two nations. Bra­
zilians interpreted the attempt of the United States to push 
private investment as an effort by the Tankee nation to de­
velop the type of enterprise which so many persons in Brazil 
had made the focus of bitter attacks. The fact that invest­
ments after World War II often came with an extension of a 
defense system against Communism led Brazilians to suspect 
the motives of the Yankees as efforts to reduce Brazil to 
the status of a satellite in preparing for a new war.
Augusto Frederico Schmidt, a Brazilian, stated the situation 
rather well: "We need, ask for, and hate foreign capital at
the same time." He further stated that: "Yankee foreign
business has a colonizing effect, which, though usually un­
intentional, is profoundly contradictory to the idealism and
21generosity of that great country."
The reaction against foreign capital, particularly 
American, was well established by 1954. In that year Presi­
dent Vargas stated that when he had returned to office in 
1950, profits of foreign enterprises reached 500 per cent
21Ibid., p. 254
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22yearly. Also, many of these firms did not participate or 
consult at the local level. Agitation aided by the slogan 
"the petroleum is ours" led to the passage of the Fetrobras 
Bill in 1933 and the creation of Petrobras. The latter is 
a government corporation formed to handle all phases of the 
petroleum industry from exploration to refining. In 1949 
Brazil limited to eight per cent of original capital invest­
ment the profits that might be sent out of the country by 
foreign investors each year. A Brazilian journalist wrote 
in 1952 that "in Brazil the public man who wants to be un­
popular has one easy resource: to defend the thesis of
collaboration by Brazil with the United States."23 This 
rising nationalism and tide of anti-Yankee feeling led 
President Kubitscheck in 1956 to refuse to give the United 
States permission to prospect for uranium and to transport 
nuclear materials out of Brazil to America.
The Brazilian resentment against the United States 
had perhaps started as early as 1949 with Truman's Point 
Four Program. After high initial hopes Brazilians became 
disillusioned with the delays in putting the program into 
operation plus the modest scope of the program. With the 
outbreak of the Korean War came further evidence that mat­
ters were not cordial between Washington and Rio de Janeiro. 
Brazil agreed to help only, as President Vargas said, if
22Ibid., p. 255. 23Ibid.t p. 272.
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the nation's needs were "heeded, understood, and met by our 
powerful ally." When Secretary of State Dean Acheson visited 
Rio de Janeiro in 1952 to request Brazilian troops, he was 
met by icy silence. Part of this reaction was due to lack 
of acceptance of the Korean War as being in defense of the 
Western Hemisphere and part was due to disappointment with 
United States economio assistance.
Brazil's disappointment and frustration with foreign 
capital was expressed in 1953 by its Plnance Minister, Dr. 
Oswaldo Aranhu. He announced that foreign capital was not 
necessary to his country and if foreign countries objected 
to proposed new taxes that "they oan leave, it makes no 
difference."2* Brazil, he said, had depended too much on 
outside aid: "We must learn to stand on our own feet." It
was against the background of this sentiment In Brazil that 
the Eisenhower Administration attempted to obtain oil con­
cessions for American oil firms as a prerequisite for United 
States aid to Brazil. Word went out from the United States
Department of State to break Brazilian resistance to United
2*5States development of Brazilian oil reserves.
A noticeable change in United States economic assist­
ance to Brazil soon became evident. In 1959 the Eacport- 
Import Bank received from Brazil in repayments and Interest 
collections about $25 million more than it disbursed on
2*Ibid.. p. 374. 2^Haneon, 0£. cit., p. 75.
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loans to Brazil. During the same year the Department of 
State reported that oooperation with Brazil had been reduced 
by 75 per cent. A study of the Export-Import Bank's activi­
ties during the first four months of I960 reveals that the 
Bank was receiving from Brazil in repayments and interest 
collections two dollars for every one it disbursed to 
Brazil.2** Also, Brazil was barred from the Development Loan 
Fund, while Argentina was receiving a sizeable amount of 
assistance. This change in United States assistance oc­
curred at a time when adverse world markets were creating 
additional economic problems for Brazil. It appears that 
the United States had awaited a Brazilian economic oollapse 
of such extent that the South American nation would have to
accept private American investment in petroleum. Brazil,
27however, did not break; she survived the squeeze. 1 On 
March 28, I960, the State Department testified before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that per capita gross 
national product had increased more in Brazil than in any 
other Latin American nation. Formally the program against 
Brazil was explained in terms of her refusal to accept an 
economic stabilization program such as that to which Argen­
tina had agreed. As we have noted previously, however, the 
consumer price index during 1959 and I960 increased more 
rapidly for Argentina than it did for Brazil. It thus seems
26Ibid. 27Ibid.
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that this argument was only a cloak for the attempt to force 
Brazil to admit greater amounts of United States private 
capital in its petroleum industry.
COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OP UNITED STATES 
ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
While Brazil received a larger amount of United States 
assistance in the postwar period, a noticeable change began 
to occur in 1959* It appears that petroleum concessions to 
private American firms and promises of monetary and fiscal 
policy reforms by Argentina and the denial of similar con­
cessions by Brazil played a major role in the change in 
emphasis of United States aid to these two countries. Al­
though some writers accuse the Eisenhower Administration of
28
seeking favors for wealthy supporters in the oil industry, 
this writer feels that the major reason for the change was 
the genuine desire to establish the private enterprise, 
capitalistic system in Latin America. That the use of an 
economic club in the face of strong nationalistic feelings 
about petroleum resources in Brazil would engender bitter 
resistance should have been apparent to American policy 
makers.
United States economic policy in the postwar period 
appears to have been extremely imprudent. In basing her
28Ibid.. p. 78
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Latin Amerioan hopes on Argentina rather than on Brazil, 
American policy makers may have lost sight of the facts. 
Brazil's potential is much greater than Argentina's. She 
is a nation which occupies almost half of South America, has 
the largest population of the Latin nations, and possesses 
most of the needed resources to beeome a major world eco­
nomic power. Argentina, on the other hand, lacks some criti­
cal resources in her quest for industrialization and while 
her future appears to be bright it does not compare with 
Brazil's. Also, if American policy had been geared toward 
Brazil, the Yankees could have dealt with a nation which 
historically had been a friend and ally. Perhaps under 
these conditions the chances for success would have been 
greater than in Argentina. These assumptions are apparently 
partly substantiated by the recent results obtained in the 
two economies. Brazil expanded economically during this 
period despite curtailment of economic assistance, while 
Argentina was economically stagnant. As has been stated, 
poor policy explains many of Argentina's economic problems; 
however, one wonders what the results would have been in 
Brazilian economic growth if Brazil had received the eco­
nomic assistance she sought. Such assistance may have 
helped to remove bottlenecks such as inadequate transporta­
tion facilities and power shortages, whioh would have as­
sisted industrial and agricultural development.
Based on the United States postwar economic policy
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toward Argentina and Brazil, it appears that political 
ideologies have been more significant in United States eco­
nomic policy decisions than whether the economies of the 
United States, Brazil and Argentina have been complementary 
or competitive. Prom a point of view of economic self- 
interest one would expect United States assistance to be 
primarily channelled toward Brazil. This is not to imply 
that the United States should not assist Argentina but that 
economic as well as political factors should make Brazil 
America's number one conoern. American policy makers under 
the Eisenhower Administration seemed to place their primary 
concern on the type of role assumed by the governments of 
Argentina and Brazil in the economic development drive.
When Argentina permitted private capital to develop her oil 
reserves and promised that the government would begin to 
remove itself from the economy by de-natlonalizing some 
sectors of transportation and by removing eoonomic oontrols, 
American officials were impressed and provided assistance. 
When Brazil, on the other hand, felt that public rather than 
private capital was the answer to petroleum development, 
this evidently did not fit the private enterprise, capital­
istic model the United States had envisioned for economic 
development in Latin Amerloa.
The emphasis by United States foreign economic policy 
makers on re-creating in these two countries a replica of 
the way that America developed economically seems full of
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perilous pitfalls, (l) It may be expected that such an ap­
proach will lead to charges of eoonomic Intervention in the 
internal affairs of both these countries. While this charge 
has already been made in Brazil by government officials, in 
Argentina it is adhered to by a large portion of the masses 
if not by the government personnel in office during the time 
covered by this study. (2) These are different times from 
those existing while the United States was evolving into an 
industrial giant. In the post-World War II period the 
"demonstration effect" and the Communist threat make haste 
imperative if nations are to develop economically along 
capitalistic lines. Today's peoples are impatient for the 
better things of life and if a democratic political-economic 
system will not deliver them, they will experiment with con­
trolled political and economic systems. Often the needed 
quickening of a nation's economic pulse can be realized 
through greater participation of the public sector in the 
economy. In Brazil, for example, the low level of voluntary 
savings, the wide year-to-year fluctuations in export pro­
ceeds, and the lack of continuity and adequacy of the inflow 
of foreign resources has necessitated a greater participation 
in economic matters by the government than would otherwise 
have been the case.
These factors make for instability in the pattern of 
Brazilian economic development. The Brazilian government at 
times is able to counter the unfavorable impacts of reduced
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export earnings by making public funds available for develop­
ment projects. Alsof as we have stated, bottlenecks present 
problems to the expansion of the Brazilian economy. Some of 
these bottlenecks such as Inadequate power and transporta­
tion facilities cannot apparently be solved with private in­
vestment because the expeoted profits do not Justify the 
rlBk of the undertakings. In these areas the most plausible 
solution appears to be public funds. It should be remembered 
that the history of the United States reveals a great degree 
of federal, state and local government assistance to rail­
roads and for road construction. Power projects were 
assisted, for example, by Federal expenditures for TVA and 
the Hoover Bam. These developments took place during a time 
when the pressures for economic betterment of the population 
and social tensions were minor in comparison to what Brazil 
and Argentina face.
A significant group of writers, whioh includes Walter 
Heller, A. M. Lewis, Benjamin Higgins and Edward S. Mason, 
strongly advocates the need of vigorous participation by the 
public sector. Supporters of government action feel that 
social overhead capital formation can best be facilitated 
by public participation. They argue that this is a sector 
of economic development in which private enterprise is not 
sufficiently motivated by anticipated returns. Some of the 
pro-public participation proponents feel that the number of 
private entrepreneurs in underdeveloped countries is limited
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and new entrants are kept out by rigid social structures.
As a result of this, government may be the best agent to 
Initiate economic development. It is stated by some that 
public participation may lower the real cost of development 
by reducing the waste of natural resources in the productive 
process. The slowness and oumbersomeness of the private 
enterprise system is attacked by some as a justification for 
public efforts. Pinally, centralized planning is advocated 
on the grounds that it may facilitate an all around, co-
pq
ordinated attack on the problem of development. J
Exponents of a private enterprise approach to develop­
ment, such as P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey, feel that a high 
rate of profit is a good source of capital formation. They 
argue that the disperse!, of decision making is desirable 
because it will avoid over-emphasis on possible unproductive 
investment efforts. Also, bankruptcy will purge the system 
of inefficient productive efforts. Pinally, free enterprise 
advocates feel that capitalists have a capacity for innova­
tion not generally possessed by public sectors because 
bureaucracies become bureaucratic and tend to cling to proven 
methods. At the present time it appears that the matter of 
the proper roles of public and private funds in achieving 
economic development is largely unresolved. The fact that
^Charles P. Eindleberger, Eoonomic Development (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 195b), pp. 132-34.
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there is considerable controversy over which is the proper 
approach would seem to make the position taken by the Eisen­
hower Administration against public development assistance 
open to question. It may have been more prudent for the 
United States to have continued assisting Brazil instead of 
changing her Latin American policy emphasis from Brazil to 
Argentina. The result of the change in Amerioan policy 
toward Brazil has been a very noticeable deterioration of 
United States-Brazilian relations.
The United States attitude toward the inflationary 
spirals of Brazil and Argentina needs further examination. 
While it is true that excessive inflation tends to present 
difficulties to economic development, should the United 
States withhold economic assistance from Brazil until the 
latter can ourb inflation? It should be kept in mind that 
while in the United States and other developed nations in­
flation generally tends to occur only when full employment 
is approached, in underdeveloped countries this may not be 
the case. Bottlenecks prevent the full utilization of the 
factors of production. If the main policy objective is 
eliminating inflation rather than removing the bottlenecks, 
this policy might lead to permanent underdevelopment. In 
the long run it would appear that removal of these bottle­
necks, such as power shortages, inadequate railroad facili­
ties, insufficient petroleum production, and the absence of 
a road system worthy of the name, would increase the flow of
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products and help reduoe Inflation. The Brazilian Embassy 
estimates that annually about one-fourth of agricultural 
output is lost because of the lack of needed storage and 
transportation facilities. Steel mills, such as Volta 
Redonda, at times have to operate at less than full capac­
ity as a result of the railroads' inability to supply iron 
ore or coal to maintain capacity output. It is not Intended 
here to imply that the excessive rate of Inflation has 
helped Brazil nor that fiscal and monetary tools should not 
be utilized as complementary measures. However, if Brazil 
does not receive assistance to pursue projects to eliminate 
these bottlenecks, inflation will be favored rather than 
slowed down.
The United States must pursue an Intelligent eoonomic 
policy toward Brazil. Such a policy should take into con­
sideration the different economic factors existing in Brazil 
as compared to the United States. These Brazilian factors 
are: low educational levels; unstable government; transpor­
tation and power bottlenecks; a new Brazilian sense of 
nationalism and a high degree of inequality in incomes and 
wealth. Brazil's problems and outlook for economic develop­
ment cannot thus be evaluated on the basis of the United 
States experience. American policy makers should keep in 
mind that a decision as to the proper combination of public 
and private enterprise has not as yet been reached. Also, 
even if the private enterprise system is better, the
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uncompromising United States approach on the petroleum issue 
was unrealistic. Brazilians felt that they had to choose 
between maintaining their self respect or capitulating to 
United States demands. They chose to maintain their posi­
tion of keeping private oapital out of petroleum development 
at the cost of a reduction in much needed American economic 
assistance. The United States may have to accept a consid­
erable degree of socialism in Brazil in the foreseeable 
future. Perhaps if this is done, a drastic movement toward 
a planned economy in Brazil may be avoided and the basis 
laid for a later strengthening of the private enterprise 
sector of the Brazilian economy.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A summary of the major conclusions reached as a 
result of this study will now be undertaken. The purpose 
is primarily to state and explain the observations deduced 
from the data which have been gathered and analyzed through­
out this study. Conclusions are reaohed pertaining to:
(1) resources; (2) the balance of payments; (3) the role 
played by the United States in the economlo lives of Argen­
tina and Brazil; (4) the role of economic and political 
factors in relations between these countries; (5) the change 
in emphasis of United States eoonomic policy; (6) the empha­
sis of United States economic policy; (7) the stages of 
Brazilian and Argentine economic development; (8) the impact 
of inflation on economic development; (9) foreign capital, 
and (14)) a program of United States economic assistance.
Resources
A comparison of the resouroe bases of the two South 
American oountries indicates that Brazil has a greater eco­
nomic potential than Argentina. This statement is explained 
by: (1) Brazil's greater size; (2) her larger population;
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(3) her possession of a wider range of reaourcee, and (4) 
her greater achievements In economic growth during the poet- 
World War II period. Brazil Is approximately three times 
the size of Argentina and occupies 47 per cent of the total 
land area of South America. She la the fifth largest coun­
try in the world and borders on all nations of South America 
except Chile and Ecuador. In I960 Brazil had a population 
of approximately 67 million persons with an average annual 
rate of increase during the 1950*s of 2.5 per cent. In the 
same year Argentina's inhabitants numbered 21 million with 
an average yearly rate of growth since 1937 of 2.4 per oent. 
Should these rates of increase continue Brazil's population 
will yearly increase numerically more than Argentina's. 
Brazil has a wide variety of mineral resources, including 
one-fourth of the world's known reserves of iron ore, ap­
proximately one-third of the world's known sources of zir­
conium and almost all of the world's supply of high grade 
rock crystal. Additional minerals found in Brazil are: 
manganese, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, molybdenum, titanium, 
chromium ores, lead, bauxite, mercury, bismuth, platinum, 
gold, silver, diamonds, marble, gypsum and graphite. In 
1956 it was estimated that Brazil ranked fourth in the world 
in potential hydroelectric power. Petroleum and hard coal 
are the only resouroea she lacks in sufficient quantities 
and all indications are that petroleum resources are avail­
able and that they lack only proper development* Brazil is
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the possessor of the second largest forest area In the world 
after Russia. Forest products are exported and Include 
lumber, fine cabinet woods, Parana pine, mate tea, carnauba 
wax and Brasil nuts. Argentina, in contrast, is not self- 
sufficient in forest products and is a net importer of such 
items as paper, cardboard and newsprint. She also has suf­
fered in her quest for economic development from the lack 
of mineral resources. Although Argentina is a producer of 
minerals such as coal, iron ore, salt, bismuth, lime, lead, 
zinc, gold, silver, copper end tungsten, their output has 
not been in significant amounts. The Argentine problem of 
petroleum shortages appears to have finally been solved 
during 1962. Economic growth rates for the two nations in 
terms of per capita gross national product represent a con­
trast during the 1950 to 1958 period. While Argentina's 
average annual real per capita inorease in the gross national 
product was zero, Brazil's was 3.7 per cent. These trends 
undoubtedly partly reflect the disastrous eoonomic policies 
of the Argentine government, such as the multiple exchange 
control system which penalized agriculture and the channel­
ling of Investment funds into non-productive monuments and 
apartment buildings, but may also partly represent the ad­
vantages of Brazil's superior resource base.
Argentina's resource advantages relative to Brazil's 
are: (1) a better over-all climate; (2) greater availability
of farm land, and (3) a more literate and homogeneous
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population. Most of Argentina is in the Temperate Zone 
while only a small portion of Brasil is within this range. 
Argentina is the Bread Basket of South America with approxi­
mately one-third of her land Being oultlvaBle and she has 
historically Been an exporter of corn and wheat. Brazil is 
usually a net importer of staple food products such as 
wheat. The population composition of the two countries is 
very different and while Argentina*s population is 97 per 
cent Caucasion, Brazil's Is composed of different racial 
groups. Also, Brazil's population is not as well educated 
nor as well trained as is that of Argentina.
It is true that nations such as England and Japan 
have greatly overcome inadequate resource Bases. However, 
it appears that their tasks would have Been facilitated and 
their economic achievements^ greater had nature endowed them 
more generously with needed raw materials. The economic 
well-Being of England and Japan depends to a considerable 
degree on external factors such as foreign market potentials, 
degree of competition faced in external markets and trade 
restrictions, which are Beyond their control. While it is 
possible in theory and in practice for nations with inferior 
resource Bases to make greater eoonomic advances than those 
with superior resourcesf it is with those nations having the
^By economic achievements it is here meant the level 
of per capita income.
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greater resource base that the greater potential lies, other 
thlnge (such as stable government and sound economic poli­
cies) being equal. In Argentina and Brazil institutional 
factors such as Inadequate educational facilities, very 
uneven distribution of wealth, inadequate tax systems and 
political instability have prevented proper development of 
natural resources.
Balance of Payments
The balanoe of payments has presented serious ob­
stacles in the economic development of both South American 
countries. Brazil generally incurs surpluses in her mer­
chandise account, while Argentina usually registers defi­
cits. The situation is reversed in the transportation and 
Insurance accounts where Brazil has persistent large defi­
cits and Argentina has managed surpluses. Investment income 
debits are much greater for Brazil than for Argentina, indi­
cating that foreign capital influx has been muoh greater 
into Brazil than into Argentina. While both are facing 
balance of payments defioits, Brazil's short run problems 
are more difficult. This is explained by the heavy burden 
of investment income payments, greater dependence on external 
capital, a weak service sector and a poor outlook for tra­
ditional exports. Argentina's chief problem appears to be 
inefficient allocation of resources which has hurt agricul­
tural production.
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It has been established that both nations depend on 
foreign earnings to purchase needed eapltal goods. Brazil 
has experienced pronounced sugar, cotton, rubber and coffee 
export cycles while Argentina has depended on a few agricul­
tural products such as meat, wool and vegetable oils. World 
demand for the exports of both oountrles has tended to fluc­
tuate pronouncedly and It Is along the lines of stabilizing 
demand for these exports that poseible action by the United 
States holds promise. This is particularly true of Brazil 
where the United States is the Latin nation's chief buyer.
Although both nations should diversify their exports, 
Brazil's problem is more pressing, yet her prospects are 
more promising. Future prospects for foodstuff exports are 
not very good; however, the outlook for exports of minerals 
is promising and Brazil appears to have considerable poten­
tial along these lines. Argentina will not be a significant 
exporter of minerals in the foreseeable future. A better 
control of the inflationary spirals in both nations would 
assist these countries to improve the competitive position 
of their exports. Coffee may in the future be replaced by 
a synthetic substitute and the United States and Brazil 
should make preparations for this possibility because suoh a 
development would create grave economic problems for Brazil.
The Role of the United States
The United States has played a greater role in the
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economic life of Brazil than In that of Argentina. fvoAn ■, 
1947 through I960 Brazil sold 48 per cent of her exporta to 
the United States, compared to 13 per cent for Argentina.
The United States is by far Brazil's best coffee market and 
coffee represents 77 per cent of Brazil's sales to the 
United States. In the years 1957-59 coffee represented 58
p
per cent of total Brazilian exports. Argentine meats face 
sanitation restrictions and quotas in the United States and 
must compete with American meat producers. In the postwar 
period Argentina's imports from the United States averaged 
20 per cent and Brazil's 32 per cent. During the same 
period the average value of United States trade with Brazil 
was $1.1 billion and that with Argentina only $346 million. 
United States government financial and economic assistance 
to Brazil and Argentina totaled $1.2 billion and $452 million 
respectively. Direct investments by Amerioans in I960 were 
$953 million in Brazil and $472 million in Argentina. These 
figures represented 12 and 6 per oent respectively 6f total 
United States investments in Latin America. During 1955 
Amerloan-owned firms in Brazil had sales of $672 million 
compared with $583 million in Argentina. United States owned 
companies in Brazil spent $600 million in Brazil for wages 
and materials, compared with $530 million in Argentina.
^Committee for Eoonomic Development, Cooperation for 
Progress in Latin America (Washington, 1961), p. 2l7#
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These firms employed 94,000 Brazilians and 79»000 Argen­
tinians.
The statistics substantiate the thesis that the 
United States is of greater economic importance to Brazil 
than to Argentina. The future potential of trade seems to 
indicate that this situation will continue. Brazil will 
probably export increasing amounts of minerals to the United 
States while Argentina will continue to export her tradi­
tional products which generally compete with American pro­
ducers .
Economic and Political Factors
This study reveals that during 1947 to I960 Brazilian 
and Argentine actions toward the United States were gener­
ally governed by economic factors, while United States gov­
ernment policy toward the two nations was primarily in­
fluenced by political considerations. During World War II 
Argentina did not support the United States for fear of 
losing her continental European markets in the event of a 
German victory which seemed probable early in the war. In 
July, 1942, Enrique Ruiz-Cruiftazu, a leading Argentine gov­
ernment official, declared that Argentina belonged to the 
European community. After World War II Brazilian-American 
relations became strained because of Brasil's feeling that 
she had not been provided the economic assistance by the 
United States that she deserved and had been promised. The
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United States did not feel that the situation was as politi­
cally serious in Brazil as it was in Europe and Asia. Dur­
ing 1949-50 the Peron regime made overtures toward the 
United States because of economic necessity. Argentine 
world markets were declining, there was a dollar shortage 
throughout Latin America and the Sterling area, foreign ex­
change holdings were exhausted and oapltal assets were de­
preciated. Thus, although the Argentine government was 
antagonistic toward the United States, eoonomio necessity 
by Argentina led her to move for a rapprochement with America 
and a loan from the Export-Import Bank. The United States 
action was to a great degree motivated by the desire to ob­
tain Argentine cooperation in the event of a clash with 
Communist Russia. In 1959 Argentina was again in economic 
difficulty and as a result she agreed to let United States 
private firms develop her oil resources. Also, the Frondlzi 
government promised a change toward a private enterprise 
economic system sought by the Elsenhower Administration. As 
a result the United States poured both private and public 
dollars into Argentina because she appreciated the supposedly 
democratic government of Argentina. The oase of Brazil in 
1959 presents the only exception to our general conclusion 
during the postwar period. The United States pressed for 
private development of Brazil's resources— to a great degree 
a position motivated by the Eisenhower group's political and 
economic philosophy. Brazil at this time, while in eoonomio
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difficulty, did not yield to this American pressure, but was 
primarily motivated by the politics of nationalism as exem­
plified by the slogan "the petroleum la ours." This one 
exception should not invalidate the general conclusion that 
the United States government aotion was usually motivated 
by political considerations and Argentina and Brazil were 
generally Influenced mainly by economic factors in their re­
lations. In 1959* Brazil was overcome by an almost hysteri­
cal wave of nationalism fanned by ambitious politicians.
She did not act in her economic self-interest as indeed she 
should have. The Latin American deoided that he might have 
to remain poor, but he was going to keep his pride. It is 
unlikely that such emotion could have arisen over any other 
sector of the economy but petroleum. If our general obser­
vation is correct several conclusions may be arrived at.
The United States has the economic club to demand and prob­
ably obtain needed economic reforms from Argentina and 
Brazil. Argentina and Brazil appear to have political clubs 
to wield against the United States as both countries have 
Communist movements. Agreements between the United States 
and the two South American countries will thus be the out­
come of economic necessity for the Latins, political neces­
sity for the Americans and shrewd negotiations by the parties 
involved. They all need each other and the significant fac­
tor is to convince the other side that they need you more 
than you need them.
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United States Policy Change
The change in the emphasie of United States policy in 
1959 from Brazil to Argentina was probably incompatible with 
the national interest of the United States* (1) In making 
such a change Brazilian-American relations were strained to 
a point which may be beyond repair. (2) Argentina did not 
and does not now have the potential to become an eoonomic 
power such as Brazil. (3) The apparent reason for the ohange 
in emphasis seems to have been the desire of the Eisenhower 
administration to see Brazil and Argentina develop along the 
private enterprise, capitalistic model of the United States. 
The enumerated objectives manifested themselves in the quest 
to develop Brazilian and Argentine oil resources by private 
capital. One may question whether this action was in the 
best interests of the United States. As a result of this 
controversy friendly past relations between the United 
States and Brazil were set back by Brazilian cries of Yankee 
intervention. Furthermore, the fact that the Argentine 
public was greatly outraged over the agreement that per­
mitted development of her petroleum Interests leads one to 
conclude that the interests of the United States were not 
served even in Argentina. Clearly the issue in Brazil was 
whether the United States should have tried to assist Brazil 
to overcome some of her eoonomic difficulties by helping to 
develop petroleum production by a government agency, or 
whether the United States should have been primarily
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concerned with private capital developing the resources.
The State Department emphasised the second alternative.
This study contends that greater consideration should prob­
ably have been given to the possibility of assisting Bra­
zilian economic development. There are several reasons for 
this statement. It may be unrealistic to expect that Brazil 
can evolve economically along the same private enterprise, 
democratic capitalistic system as the Dnited States did. 
Private enterprise cannot be expected to develop transporta­
tion and power facilities with the present rates permitted 
utility companies. With the haste needed to improve living 
conditions as the result of the Communist menace and the 
"demonstration effect," the public seotor may facilitate 
economic development by helping to remove transportation and 
power bottlenecks. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
evaluate thoroughly the issue of public versus private de­
velopment and it appears that at the present time no con­
crete unequivocal answer can be given. Part of the answer 
may take several decades to be determined. If the United 
States does not assist Brazil she may fall under the domina­
tion of Communists. Thus, an Intelligent American policy 
should take into consideration the possibility that United 
States assistance today, although not entirely in the form 
of developing private enterprise, may save Brazil from com­
plete socialism.
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United Statea Economic Policy Toward Brazil
Brazil must Be the keystone of United States eoonomio 
policy toward Latin America. This conclusion is based on:
(1) Brazil's territorial size; (2) its large population 
relative to other Latin American nations; (3) her consider­
able economic potential; (4) the probability of success of 
such policy* and (5) moral aspects of United States and 
Brazilian relations. It is not implied by this that other 
nations south of the Rio Grande such as Argentina should be 
neglected, but rather than a friendly, pro-American Brazil 
should be the number one priority in formulating Latin 
American policy by our State Department. Brazil borders on 
all but two of the South American nations and should she 
fall into the Communist camp this would have an adverse im­
pact on neighboring countries. Several examples of Communist 
activity in Asia such as Laos and Vietnam oome to mind when 
considering the difficulty of stopping a determined foe from 
infiltrating across frontiers. Furthermore, Brazil's re­
sources would make her extremely dangerous in the hands of 
a Communist enemy. A combined array of Russian, Chinese end 
Brazilian resources would pose the United States with a most 
serious economic threat. This is particularly true if the 
conclusion made in this study— that Brazil will within time 
become a major world eoonomic power— is correct. The prob­
ability of sucoess of economic assistance to a nation such 
as Brazil is good. Brazil has the resources and according
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to W. W. Rostow is in the "take o f f  stage where consider­
able economic progress can be expected.^ Her economy is 
complementary to ours and historically there have been 
amicable relations which would tend to make American aid 
perhaps more effective. While one should not justify actions 
between nations solely on moral grounds, in this Instance 
moral aspeots reinforce the general theme of this conclusion. 
Brazil in the past has come to the support of the United 
States during perilous times for the latter nation. Thus, 
self-interest, logic and morality seem to validate the 
proposition of making Brazil the number one United States 
policy objective in Latin America. As former Brazilian 
President Juscellno Kubitschek stated: "Brazil means Latin
America because our country is almost half of Latin America
4.
in size and population."
Stages of Economic Development
Brazil is an underdeveloped country, while Argentina 
is a decapitalized nation. Previously enumerated reckless 
governmental policies such as exchange controls and mis- 
allocation of investment funds have been primarily respon­
sible for the Argentine situation and she needs more re­
covery and rehabilitation rather than development. These
^W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Eoonomic Growth (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1§60), p. 127.
^"Ex-Brazil Chief Confirms Plan to Run Again," New 
Orleans States-Item, March 22, 1963» P» 19.
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points are partly revealed by a comparison of savings as a 
percentage of gross national product. In five selected 
years during the 1950's, Argentina's average percentage of 
savings of the gross national product was 20f while Brazil's 
was only 14. Argentina's figure for these years was higher 
than that of the United States, which had 17 per cent. Un­
fortunately, Argentina channelled much of these savings into 
apartment houses, stadiums and monuments. The illiteracy 
rate in 1950 in Brazil was 50, compared with 13 in Argentina. 
Also, Argentina falls into the category of Latin American 
nations with 25*30 per cent of its labor force employed in
5
agriculture, while Brazil is in the 50*65 per cent group.
W. W. Rostow places Brazil in the "take off* stage which is 
characterized by; (1) new industries expanding rapidly;
(2) reinvestment of profits; (3) an increase in factory 
workers; (4) a rise in savings and income, and (5) an in­
crease in the rate of investment from five to ten or more of 
national income. Rostow classifies Argentina as a country 
which has completed the "take o f f  and is commencing her 
drive for economic maturity.*’ Such a nation is oharaoterlzed 
by: (l) Investment of from 10 to 20 per cent of national
income; (2) the economy extends its capabaillties to more 
complex processes such as machine tools, chemicals and
c
''Committee for Economic Development, oj>. eft., p. 19.
^Rostow, 0£. cit.. p. 127.
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eleotrlcal equipment, and (3) the output of the economy 
regularly outstrips population increases. By the end of 
this stage the nation has the means to produce what she 
chooses. It appears that Argentina has at times during the 
post-World War II period fallen back into the "take o f f  
stage since she did not expand output more rapidly than 
population during the 1950's. The over-all data suggest 
that Brazil is underdeveloped and will be more dependent on 
the United States for capital and economic assistance and 
for a longer period of time than will Argentina.
Foreign Capital
The period of eoonomic transition to better eoonomic 
performance levels, in Argentina as in Brazil, will be has* 
tened and made easier if United States capital inflows are 
encouraged* Argentina and Brazil have serious balance of 
payments problems. Argentina has incurred deficits in the 
trade account as a result of the decline in the foreign 
sales of her leading agriculture exports and she needs for­
eign capital goods to rebuild her agriculture and transpor­
tation systems. Argentina also needs physical capital if 
her industrialization aspirations are to be realised.
Brazil faces difficult balance of payments problems as a 
result of inflation, declining ooffee prices atnd large defi­
cits in the income and service accounts. These deficits in 
the income arnd service aocounts are expected to continue in
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the foreseeable future. United States oapital could help 
relieve Brazil's problems by developing petroleum resources 
and reducing Imports of this commodity. External capital 
could help to develop transportation and powerf thus reduc­
ing major bottlenecks to Industrial progress which could 
possibly lead to reduced Imports and Increased exports plus 
a reduction in the inflationary spiral. Argentina would 
benefit by the Inflow of American oapital if it provided the 
needed agricultural, power and industrial equipment. Ex­
cessive nationalism, unstable governments and bureaucratic 
restrictions will reduce this needed oapital inflow. To the 
extent that this happens eoonomic development in these two 
nations will be delayed and economic problems perpetuated.
History reveals that the economically advanced wes­
tern nations went through a period of belt tightening during 
their industrial revolutions. This resistance to higher 
wages and better living conditions made possible the forma­
tion of the needed capital bases. In these earlier periods 
the "demonstration effect" causing unrest was not present, 
nor were well organized Communist agitators demanding a 
change in the structures of government and society as a 
whole. Today democratic governments such as Argentina and 
Brazil face the additional problems created by the "demon­
stration effect" and the Communist agitators. These factors 
make the people impatient for improvement and when they feel 
that economic conditions are not being bettered rapidly
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enough they often turn their frustrations on their govern­
ments. The results are political upheavals and uncertainty 
which in turn hinder economic development. United States 
economic assistance oan ease this period of transition, par­
ticularly in Brazil, by reducing some of the need for belt 
tightening and shortening the time needed to go through this 
period of transition. Amerloan assistance may make the dif­
ference as to whether democratic political institutions can 
survive such a period of transition.
Inflation
It appears that the degree of Inflation in Argentina 
has been a detriment to her economic development and that 
inflation haB probably had an adverse impact on Brazilian 
growth. There appears to be a difference in the impact of 
inflation between the short and long run. In the short run 
commodity prices usually increase more rapidly than wages 
and many fixed costs. This means profits rise, thus gener­
ating further demand for factor inputs, such as land, labor 
and materials. This increased factor demand is also gener­
ally accompanied by heavy inventory buying. Eventually 
interest rates and wages begin to increase rapidly and 
profit margins are reduced, which in turn leads to a reduc­
tion in demand for factors of production. Unless another 
inflationary spiral takes hold there will be a recession 
which will mean inventory reductions, production reductions
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and increased unemployment. Prices may continue to rise 
during the slump but at reduced rates.
In the long run, Inflation in Argentina and Brazil 
has been uneven. This has caused uncertainty in the minds 
of consumers and business people concerning prices, costs 
and profits. Uncertainty with a bias toward expected price 
increases leads to greater expenditures on consumer goods 
and less in the way of savings, whose future value is 
dubious. Inflation has also reinforced a tendency in Argen­
tina and Brazil to hold value in the form of physical assets 
such as land and buildings. This reduces the rate of sav­
ings and investments in productive enterprises. Excessive 
inflation in Argentina and Brazil has led to government 
action to help control the price spiral. In Argentina gov­
ernment interference to halt inflation destroyed the ability 
of the price mechanism to channel resources into productive 
uses. Price controls on meat, for example, during the 
period of inflation reduced prioes to a point where producers 
did not find it profitable to supply the market with good 
quality meat. The same situation prevailed with wheat.
Thus, Argentine meat and wheat exports dropped at a time 
when foreign exchange earnings would have helped economic 
development. In Brazil the exchange control system dis­
criminated against coffee and cocoa, the leading export 
products. Also, in Brazil some projects had to be halted 
because of laok of materials, indicating that the prevailing
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high rate of inflation had outlived ite usefulness.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York made a study of 
the relation between inflation and economic growth from 1950 
to 1957 for 16 underdeveloped countries. The study revealed 
that those with little or no increase in prices had average 
growth rates of six per cent in their gross national product. 
Those countries with average annual prioe increase rates of 
over 20 per oent registered increases in their gross national
7
product of only about 4 per cent. According to the Chase 
Manhattan Bank, during the 1950*s the Latin American nations 
with the most rapid inflation such as Argentina and Bolivia 
had the lowest growth rates, while those with low increases 
in prices such as Venezuela and Costa Rica experienced the 
greatest advances economically.
The role of inflation in Brazilian economic develop­
ment is somewhat uncertain because she has experienced a 
considerable rate of growth with an annual rate of inflation 
between 1948 and I960 of approximately 20 per cent. This 
may lead the reader to conclude that the position taken in 
this study that such excessive inflation is detrimental to 
economic growth is invalid in Brazil. However, the conten­
tion of this study is that the Brazilian case is unique and 
at the present time defies a final solution. This writer
7
1"Inflation and Growth," Latin Arnerloan Business 
Highlights. Vol. II, No. 2, The CKase Manhattan Sank, New 
York, 1961, p. 17.
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feels that Brazil has grown economically In spite of ex­
cessive Inflation and not because of It. In addition to the 
previously enumerated factors there are several reasons for 
this conclusion. (1) Brazil has great potential for eco­
nomic growth. This Is the result of her abundant natural 
resources and her economic advancement Into the "talcs off" 
stage where the eoonomic basis for rapid growth has been 
laid. Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that Brazil 
would have grown without inflation. (2) The balance of pay­
ments deficits have facilitated economic progress in the 
past but may Impede It in the future. Foreign loans and in­
vestments have made possible the chronic deficits and large 
amounts of capital goods Imports. Many of the loans have 
not been repaid or serviced and Brazil has had to seek ex­
tended terms of payment. The burden of these loans, which 
are payable in foreign currencies, will be detrimental to 
future economic growth because they will reduce available 
investment funds. Brazil's repayment task will be made more 
difficult by the inflationary spiral which has depreciated 
the value of the cruzeiro in terms of most other currencies.
( 3) Developments during 1962 present a case against excessive 
inflation as an agent of economic growth. During 1962 living 
costs in Brazil Increased 52 per cent, but the rate of eco­
nomic growth was only 3-5 per cent compared with the 6 to 7
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per cent averaged in the 1950*s. Population increased 3.1 
per cent during 1962, thus per capita income increases were 
negligible. This development took place during a year when 
the inflationary spiral was very pronounced. One reason in 
part for the economic decline was the decrease in new for­
eign investments to less than a quarter of the 1961 figure. 
This reduction was due to expropriation of foreign owned 
firms, to restrictive limitations on profits that could be 
taken from Brazil. The 1962 experience seems to indicate 
that perhaps foreign investments in Brazil have been a more 
important factor in her growth than inflation. Thus, Brazil 
presents an uncertain situation in reference to the impact 
of inflation on growth. For the reasons enumerated, this 
writer feels that the inflationary impact has probably been 
adverse.
Program for United States Economic Assistance
A United States program of economic assistance to 
Argentina and Brazil should be based on the principle of 
enlightened self-interest. It should be clearly understood 
by the Latin Americans that we need them politically, but 
that we realize they need us economically. To approach our 
program of assistance on any other grounds would make us 
appear like the proverbial Greeks bearing gifts. Economic
®"Brazil: Two Billions From U. S. and Yet— ", U.£5. 
News and World Report, LIV (April 1, 1963)* 46. ""
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assistance should be In the form of long term, low interest 
loans. Grants give the impression of charity and the proud 
Latins tend to resent such assistance, while short term 
loans do not give the recipients time to utilize the capital 
to best advantage before they start making repayment. The 
United States should have strings attached to its loans such 
as: (1) demanding where possible institution of a progres­
sive income tax system; (2) a land reform which will dis­
tribute to the peasants lands currently idle rather than 
lands presently under cultivation and provide improved agri­
culture education and credit; (3) more effective measures to 
keep domestic Brazilian and Argentine capital at home, end 
(4) policies to control excessive inflation. America should 
not provide any assistance unless some concrete efforts 
along these lines are made. Without some of these basic 
reforms, United States assistance will be in vain and both 
funds and valuable time will be lost. The United States 
cannot develop these nations; they will have to do the task 
themselves. The best Argentina and Brazil can expect from 
the United States is assistance to make the transition 
through their Industrial revolutions less painful. It is a 
form of political irresponsibility for politicians in Brazil 
and Argentina to blame the United States for their failures. 
These failures are due to them, not to the United States.
Assistance should be provided for education in Argen­
tina and Brazil. One of the biggest bottlenecks to economic
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growth in these countries is inadequate education. This is 
particularly true of Brazil where over 50 per cent of the 
population in 1950 was illiterate. The colleges in Argen­
tina and Brazil are generally controlled by irresponsible 
students. These schools lack both quantity and quality in 
their faculties, have inadequate facilities and their cur- 
riculi place too much emphasis on the social sciences. What 
is needed is assistance to this vital area to return control 
of the schools to administrators and faculties, provide new 
and better trained faculties, increase scientific facilities 
and equipment and increase eduoatlonal programs stressing 
technology. Engineers, trained farmers and scientists will 
be needed if these two countries are to make the economic 
advances of which they are capable. Graduate sohools in 
agriculture, of which there are none in Argentina or Brazil, 
would be a good starting point to expand educational facili­
ties. In the early stages, a vigorous program of lending 
United States professors to Argentina and Brazil should be 
pursued. Also, capable young Brazilians and Argentinians 
should be encouraged to enter teaching as a career and as 
many as possible sent to the United States for training.
Speaking from a point of view of economics, education 
should provide information pertaining to birth control in 
Brazil, if at all possible. Starvation and suffering from 
want of bare essentials are a daily occurrence in Brazil, 
especially in the Northeast. Much needed increases in
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Brazilian per capita incomes are made difficult by annual 
population increases of approximately 2.5 per cent. It will 
be hard under such a population pressure for Brazil to make 
any real economic strides on an individual basis. Her 
ability to escape from the vieious cycle of poverty will be 
rendered more difficult. A program such as this would have 
to be executed through interested Brazilian groups rather 
than through any American agency. This would be an explosive 
issue at best and direct foreign intervention would no doubt 
make the possible success of such a program less plausible.
Education could do much to instill a sense of com­
munity responsibility in the minds of Argentine and Bra­
zilian business leaders. Any real progress within a demo­
cratic controlled capitalistic system will be impossible if 
this group does not shoulder its obligations to their com­
munities. They must be made to realize that their group 
cannot survive long when a few are extremely wealthy and the 
vast majority is so miserably poor. The United States in 
the late nineteenth century was forced to resort to public 
regulations when the "robber barons" held their "public be 
damned" attitude. Argentina and Brazil may be forced into 
similar action because the private enterprise whioh is being 
tested in these countries is unfortunately primarily the 
nineteenth century version of private enterprise. Along 
these lines, perhaps some courses in management responsi­
bilities and ethics would be valuable.
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Policy makers will have to continuously modify the 
program in the light of new developments and they should 
hope for the best and expect the worst. Economic, political 
and social problems which have existed for oenturies cannot 
realistically be expected to lend themselves to any quick, 
easy solution. However, the excellent eoonomio resource 
potentials of Argentina and Brazil give hope that the eco­
nomic expectations of these two countries will be realized 
with time and United States economic assistance. The exist­
ence of economically developed, democratic societies in 
Brazil and Argentina, when combined with the economic might 
of the United States and Canada, would help to ensure the 
stability of the Western Hemisphere.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA BY GROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Groups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Animal ft Animal Products, Edible 557 319 378 63 203 222 266
Animal ft Animal Products, Inedible 4,105 1,398 752 74 300 419 20
Vegetable Food Products ft Beverages 6,748 4,764 26 60 185 19,001 205
Vegetable Products, Inedible
(Accept Fibers ft Tood) 22,907 9,807 1,950 1,191 1,926 1,115 1,485
Textile Fibers ft Manufacturing 67,760 16,815 2,990 1,057 5,691 3,096 564
Wood and Paper 10,747 8,206 356 864 16,976 3,926 288
Metals and Manufactures
(Except Machinery ft Vehicles) 108,961 58,910 20,191 15, 676 27,478 13,951 14,328
Nonmetallic Minerals 28,158 25,182 5,638 8, 623 33,900 26,304 15,183
Machinery ft Vehicles 363,851 213,073 83,495 87, 215 111,165 58,607 48,451
Chemicals ft Related Products 41,147 30,733 9,135 22, 569 43,714 18,248 21,903
Miscellaneous 23,120 16,273 4,077 4,184 6,021 1,997 1,388
Total Domestic Exports 678,059 378,301 128,988 141, 577 232,349 146,887 104,131
U.S. Exports of Foreign Mer­
658chandise 2,133 161 175 1,093 424 91
Total, Including Re-exports 680,212 378,959 129,149 141, 752 233,442 147,311 104,222
Souros: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Report No. Foreign Trade 420. 
porta of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise. For Calendar years! 1347, p. 
T5J57 p. 20; 1950, p. 18; lfUl, p. 18; 1§52, p. 20; 1953, p. 21.
United States Ex-
TTTT9*B7p7 IS;
2
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TABLE I (continued)
Groups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Aniaal ft Animal Products, Edible 561 516 306 493 281 302 673
Animal ft Animal Products, Inedible 107 270 147 275 486 125 263
Vegetable Food Products ft Beverages 3,784 8,667 22,511 259 221 803 238
Vegetable Products, Inedible 1,048 1,913 4,009 3,667 2,809 7,775 1$,323
Textile Fibers ft Manufacturing 233 123 594 4,632 7,523 4,641 9,731
food ft Paper 7,176 8,577 2,680 3,829 3,400 3,693 5,065
Nonmetallic Minerals 5,803 13,982 28,149 27,214 4,991 7,108 10,849
Metals ft Manufactures 20,219 35,037 34,285 35,094 29,338 21,091 37,599
Machinery ft Vehicles 55,933 57,332 81,273 167,563 176,667 161,081 240,067
Chemicals ft Belated Products 24,955 19,552 33,132 33,450 19,454 19,571 20,194
Miscellaneous 2,254 1,688 4,765 3,835 2,942 3.611 6,183
Total Domestio Exports 122,072 147,657 211,852 280,311 248,110 229,802 347,185
U.S. Exports of Foreign Mer­
chandise 288 101 316 1,492 894 760 1,958
Total, Including Re-exports 122,360 147,758 212,168 281,803 249,004 230,562 349,143
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Report No. Foreign Trade 420, op. cit.
For calendar years: 1954, p. 21; 1955, p. 2l; l9'567"p. '21'; T?57TpT 2TT l9?8,“p7 31;
1959, p. 31; 1960> pp. 32-33.
TABLE II
UNITED STATES IMPORTS PROM ARGENTINA BY GROUPS, 1947-1960
Groups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Animal k Animal Products, Edible 11, 2 2 8 33*789 21,030 35,193 50,199 42,726 37,470
Animal k Animal Products, Inedible 36,807 40,864 14,562 32,953 36,098 14,854 15,602
Vegetable Food Products k Beverages 5,762 1,535 4,774 6,170 1,605 9,575 3,196
Vegetable Products, Inedible 50,176 21,665 10,368 16,852 26,229 34,791 29,638
Textile Fibers k Manufactures 46,581 82,740 48,479 105,411 98,119 58,48* 90,337
food k Paper 100 46 32 48 15 15 18
Nonmetallic Minerals 228 235 218 237 143 58 127
Metals k Manufactures 381 190 39 97 1,180 2,288 2,506
Machinery k Vehicles 12 3 1 .3 .2 1 2
Chemicals k Related Products 2,456 1,687 1,687 1,959 2,247 1,337 2,2t>2
Miscellaneous 899 838 838 810 1,226 1,163 518
Total Imports 154,629 183*592 102,028 197,730 217,060 165,290 181,696
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census. "Argentina," Report No. Foreign Trade 120,
United States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption. For calendar years: 19^7, P. lO;
irorrpTT?; i r o ;  p. tt? ttot; pTT3rs5i;"p. i?ri952f p. 1 4 ; 1 9 5 3 , P. 1 4 .
TABLE II (continued)
Group 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Animal ft Animal Products, Edible 24,791 32,020 27,691 29,657 58,552 39,078 21,191
Animal ft Animal Products, Inedible 10,230 14,784 15,940 19,003 14,734 18,138 17,222
Vegetable Food Products ft Beverages 4,706 1,123 2,753 2,841 2,619 1,830 2,719
Vegetable Food Products, Inedible 16,341 14,327 16,104 13,221 11,454 11,459 8,848
Textile Fibers ft Manufactures 48,677 59,736 59,612 54,437 39,450 50,605 45,420
Vood ft Paper 47 17 13 7 6 11 6
Nonmetallic Minerals 33 79 154 165 85 93 44
Metals ft Manufactures 140 2,910 6,895 6,313 2,085 786 859
Machinery ft Vehicles 5 1 5 23 23 59 20
Chemicals ft Related Products 793 1,823 1,302 1,723 1,465 906 858
Miscellaneous 420 406 427 671 1,002 1,525 1,587
Total Imports 106,184 127,226 130,896 128,061 181,476 124,489 98,774
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Argentina."Report No. foreign Trade 120. on.
oit. For calendar years: 1954, p. 16; 1955, p. 16; 1956, p. 16T^.957, P* 17; 1^58, p.lV;
15^9, p. 20; 1960, pp. 22-23.
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TABLE III
UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO BRAZIL BY GROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Groups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Animal 4 Animal Products, Edible 3,046 1,764 4,250 1, 467 3,778 1,410 2,240
Animal A Animal Products, Inedible 2,661 952 574 205 455 152 157
Vegetable Food Products ft Beverages 66,292 56,053 13,317 14, 646 31,468 98,257 13,300
Vegetable Products, Inedible 14,175 6,008 4,917 5, 247 9,429 5,203 3,451
Textile Fibers ft Manufactures 8,241 6,193 4,414 3,750 4,490 3,346 3,717
Wood ft Paper 6,485 9,530 1,584 1.067 8,823 10,717 2,604
Nonmetallic Minerals 4,777 34,776 30,715 26, 496 42,431 32,998 27,811
Metals ft Manufactures 81,897 41,861 41,746 21, 873 48,681 45,990 35,888
Machinery ft Vehicles 335,820 277,958 212,525 209, 432 429,764 301,554 163,907
Chemicals ft Related Products 43,301 45,607 46,709 43, 212 95,566 50,691 29,418
Miscellaneous 34,685 22,170 20,414 15, 429 21,914 13,027 11,432
Total Domestic Exports 640,601 476,390 381,164 342, 830 697,799 563,135 293,924
Exports of Foreign Mer­
chandise 2,580 1,169 777 691 1,606 1,011 1,996
Total, Including Re-exports 643,181 477,559 381,941 343, 521 699,405 564,146 295,920
Souros: U.S. Bursau of the Census. "Brazil," Report No. Foreign Trade 420. United
States Exports of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise. For calendar years: "T9Z7. p. ITT
i g r e r p.- i Tt .""19; i9S f f , " r i 77 m rf pr r r ;  1952, P. 19; 1953, p. 20.
0\
TABLE III (continued)
Croups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960
Animal A Animal Products, Edible 1,959 2,491 4,140 4,776 4,356 953 1,919
Animal A Animal Products, Inedible 401 79 213 347 174 75
Vegetable Food Products A Beverages 15,944 8,612 35,722 34,460 32,684 42,857 39,487
Vegetable Products, Inedible 5,394 2,438 2,677 3,978 5,539 8,548 10,844
Textile Fibers A Manufactures 2,776 1,586 1,460 1,696 646 367 1,226
Wood A Paper 9,337 4,588 4,489 4,066 2,797 1,556 4,398
Rommmtmllic Minerals 36,425 27,898 27,701 34,201 31,494 30,785 35,151
Metals and Manufactures 61,255 30,164 29,434 48,789 39,368 28,527 38,524
Machinery A Vehicles 237,378 111,840 127,122 278,690 345,663 242,562 234,34i
Chemicals A Related Products 67,276 39,457 46,951 55,619 52,465 35,714 48,824
Miscellaneous 16,318 10,983 12,236 13,976 10,353 9,442 10,406
Total Domestic Exports 454,460 240,137 292,146 480,598 525,540 401,388 422,451
Exports of Foreign Merchandise 640 399 649 1,186 4,138 4,767 4,430
Total, Including Re-exports 455,100 240,536 292,795 481,784 529,678 406,155 426,881
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil," Report Ho. Foreign Trade 420. op. cit. 
For calendar years: 1954, p. 20; 1955, p. 20; 1956, p. zb; 195V, p. §2; 19 5tJ, p. 29;
1959, p . 29; I960, p. 31.
297
TABLE IV
UNITED STATBS IMPORTS FROM BRAZIL BY GROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Groups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Animal ft Animal Products, Edible 16,507 14,158 10,425 13,597 18,247 6,297 10,144
Animal ft Animal Products, Inedible 4,088 8,872 2,998 2,981 2,231 1,264 452
Vegetable Food Products ft Beverages 344,899 410,170 471,648 621,366 771,481 708,950 680,782
Vegetable Products, Inedible 59,729 50,064 42,220 45,734 59,356 38,598 33,333
Textile Fibers ft Manufactures 2,993 8,744 6,594 10,551 20,629 11,345 6,893
Vood ft Paper 1,487 2,162 1,163 3,696 5,073 2,215 2,633
Nonmetallic Minerals 6,001 8,397 4,175 4,463 7,291 7,782 6,375
Metals and Manufactures 4,259 5,573 6,542 8,825 13,780 25,431 20,864
Machinery ft Vehicles 2 4 0 2 2 7 9
Chemicals ft Related Products 3,124 3,257 2,723 1,810 4,208 2,753 2,903
Miscellaneous 2,539 2,766 2,710 1,465 2,229 3,771 1,596
Total Imports 445,630 513,968 551,199 714,489 904,526 808,414 765,983
Sourcs: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil," Report No. Foreign Trade 120. United
States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption. For calendar yaarsl 1947, p. 9; 194tJ, p. 12 
R 0 ,  P* 12; 19^, p. 12; 1951, p. 12; 1§52, p. 13; 1953, p. 13*
TABLE IV (continued)
Croups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960
Animal A Animal Products, Editle 477 1,494 1,170 1,508 4,553 12,228 5,121
Animal ft Animal Products, Inedible 8,265 9,409 10,386 8,007 9,012 13,637 10,925
Vegetable Food Products ft Beverages 616,995 553,050 658,105 573,485 456,905 504,344 463,216
Vegetable Products, Inedible 27,087 26,464 21,819 30,167 25,524 24,883 20,088
Textile Fibers ft Manufactures 5,002 8,972 11,343 7,957 5,782 6,004 6,357
Wood ft Paper 2,007 1,772 1,492 1,458 1,531 1,958 2,401
Nonmetallic Minerals 4,303 4,846 4,755 5,879 8,785 7,694 5,578
Metals ft Manufactures 15,526 20,824 31,390 54,163 36,003 35,564 42,273
Machinery ft Vehicles .3 1 3 1 2 52 105
Chemicals ft Related Products 1,311 1,710 2,345 2,724 3,507 3.236 6,110
Miscellaneous 624 935 2,665 1,210 1,073 1,570 1,288
Total Imports 681,597 629,477 745,473 686,558 552,736 611,172 563,483
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil," Report No. Foreign Trade 120. op. clt. 
For calendar years: 1954, p. 15; 1955, p. 15; 1956, p. 16; 1557, p. 16; 1^58, p. 16;
1959, p. 19; I960, p. 21.
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TABLE V
PRINCIPAL EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO ARGENTINA BY SUBGROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Subgroups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Automobile, Parts * Accessories* 149,638 40,674 8,150 12,882 40,485 9,308 6,132
Coal 4 Related Fuels 11,414 8,200 340 993 16,975 10,673 5,776
Petroleum ft Products 7,968 10,935 4,150 5,554 10,289 14,147 8,489
Steel Mill Products, Roll ft
Finished 82,324 45,402
38,505
15,918 14,621 22,804 11,637 10,537
Electrical Machinery 4 Appliances 48,973 10,714 14,084 19,445 9,334 9,080
Construction, Conveyers ft
7,309Mining Equipment 22,779 17,143 9,230 9,805 7,593 3,627
Industrial Machines ft Parts 24,260 19,988 8,875 7,146 6,116 8,919 7,145
Medicinal ft Pharmaceutical
Preparations 10,791 15,920 5,452 11,142 20,325 6,211 13,168
Chemical Speoialtlts 6,47° 4,167 1,852 4,909 7,221 1,792 2,521
Rubber ft Manufactures 13,885 4,764 318 222 672 1,020 1,070
Agriculture Machinery ft Tractors 22,018 14,650 3,156 16,599 21,183 15,827 9,366
Engines, Turbines ft Parts 9,751 14,961 13,334 14,593 4,413 2,899 2,851
*Buses and trucks are Included.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Argentina," Report No. Foreign Trade 420.
United States Exports of Domestic and Porelgn Merchandise. For calendar years: 1947* p. 16
T O T T p T T F r i T O T  p". W j  195^|- p.-TO;T95irP7T^r'19157r p. 20; 1953, p. 21.
TABLE V (continued)
Subgroups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Automobile, Parts ft Accessories* 4,585 14,666 47,575 84,988 29,478 28,540 60,217
Coal ft Related Fuels 74 1 , 0 0 3 16,160 10,963 2,122 3,998 6,377
Petroleum ft Products 
Steel Mill Products, Roll ft
4,678 11,227 9,680 12,845 298 625 1,934
Finished 13,204 21,609 21,229 16,632 15,624 11,851 19,623
Electrical Machinery ft Appliances 
Construction, Excaration ft
7,814 5,290 8,530 16,695 29,309 19,206 27,479
Mining Equipment 6,548 7,960 5,275 15,170 25,550 30,280 40,873
Industrial Machinery ft Parts 
Medicinal ft Pharmaceutical
6,867 7,776 6,957 9,978 13,075 20,901 31,976
Preparations 13,587 8,474 16,090 15,625 7,342 4,553 5,158
Chemical Specialties 5,073 4,085 7,638 8,537 6,733 6,609 7,289
Rubber ft Manufactures 657 1,288 2,708 1,857 1,668 5,800 14,638
Agriculture Machinery ft Tractors 3,519 2,999 2,161 4,527 4,158 6,172 2,298
Engines, Turbines ft Parts 3,882 4,523 2,293 5,324 5,258 9,592 7,446
♦Buses and trucks are included.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Argentina." Report Ho. Foreign Trade 420. op.
cit. For calendar years: 1954, p. 21; 1955* p. 21; 1956, p. 2lT~195f» pT 23; l$5o,'p. $1;
15^9, p. 21; 1960, p. 32.
TABLE VI
UNITED STATES IMPORTS PROM ARGENTINA BY SUBGROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Subgroups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Meat Products 8,785 29,951 15,917 30,920 47,016 39 , 291 31,786
Hides and Skins, Raw 17,104 23,212 3,882 18,636 17,407 6,290 5,426
Animals, Animal Products, Inedible 12,117 13,447 8,103 11,669 12,186 7,635 8,708
Pruits and Preparations 1,608 173 1,263 945 654 911 1,037
Drugs, Herbs, Leaves, Roots 3,583 3,795 1,025 1,042 1,516 1,467 1,000
Vegetable Oils, Waxes, Inedible 32,273 289 2,850 4,290 5,144 8,684 4,914
Veg. Dyeing ft Tanning Materials 13,658 16,822 6,356 11,110 19,187 23,990 23,335
Wool, Unmanufactured 43,525 79,248 44,251 95,396 82,489 48,999 84,873
Hair and Manufactures 2,281 1,748 1,717 2,184 3,162 1,391 2,659
Wool, Semi-manufactured 564 1,607 2,323 5,630 12,277 7,726 2,686
Industrial Chemicals 839 587 900 1,536 1,674 827 2,043
ferroalloys, Ores ft Metals 290 33 0 20 599 734 2,745
Sourcs: U.S. Bursau of ths Census. "Argentina," Report No. foreign Trade 120.
United States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption. for calendar years: 1947, p. 10;
1948, p. 12? 1?J4§, p. TJ; 1950, p. 13; i95l* p. 12; 1952, p. 14; 1953, p. 14.
IV)
TABLE VI (continued)
Subgroups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Meat Products 22,570 29,587 22,918 26,255 52,919 36,316 18,672
Hides ft Skins, Raw 1,089 1,938 2,484 1,432 1,230 3,580 2,817
Animals, Animal Products, Inedible 8,601 12,308 12,525 13,406 11,562 1,212 10,853
Fruits ft Preparations 339 585 1,519 1,513 917 1,032 1,160
Drugs, Herbs, Leaves, Roots 372 400 286 429 578 896 472
Vegetable Oils, Waxes, Inedible 6,258 3,694 6,308 4,830 4,633 3,788 3,958
Veg. Dyeing, Tanning Materials 8,196 8,406 7,834 7,077 5,779 6,266 3,749
Wool, Unmanufactured 43,861 52,908 48,624 47,455 32,909 43,254 40,329
Hair and Manufactures 2,000 2,817 3,948 2,045 2,424 2,538 2,531
Wool, Semi-manufactured 2,724 3,963 6,441 4,436 3,656 4,532 2,313
Industrial Chemicals 477 1,724 1,169 1,616 1,180 627 699
Ferroalloys, Ores ft Metals 26 2,896 6,862 5,738 1,877 739 562
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Argentina," Report Wo. Foreign Trade 120, op.
cit. For calendar years: 1954, p. 16; 1955* p. 16; 1956, p. 16; 19f>7, pT 17; 195&, p. i7;
15*9, p. 20; I960, pp. 22-23.
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TABLE VII
PRINCIPAL UNITED STATES EXPORTS TO BRAZIL BY SUBGROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Subgroups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Grains ft Preparations 60,462 52,974 11,614 11,827 27,667 96,412 12,556
Coal ft Related Fuels 12,843 9,530 6,798 9,822 10,724 9,312 8,658
Petroleum ft Petroleum Products 17,557 17,860 18,165 10,604 19,640 14,450 13,954
Iron ft Steel Mill Products,
Roll ft Finished 57,605 27,281 27,578 16,022 32,749 22,613 16,722
Electrical Machinery 57,878 45,688 33,404 29,132 61,797 40,536 27,777
Construction, Conveyer ft
Mining Equipment 15,986 11,346 25,675 26,419 30,195 28,620 18,788
Industrial Machines ft Parts 26,155 22,611 19,291 17,313 32,483 39,337 23,484
Medicinal ft Pharmaceutical
Preparations 12,918 18,307 20,117 20,443 37,017 22,701 12,865
Autos, Parts ft Accessories 116,252 109,739 64,727 70,739 197,728 119,812 35,801
Chemical Specialties 6,720 7,749 7,986 9,889 20,502 13,036 6,662
Textile Machinery 14,456 13,546 11,634 9,898 32,483 14,412 2,355
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil," Report No. Foreign Trade 420, United 
States Exports of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise, fror calendar years: 1947, p. TT; 
15*8,' p. l7"; 1 9 * 5 , 'IT; W ,  p. 17; 1951,” .' T7i 1952, p. 19; 1953, p. 20.
TABLE YII (continued)
Subgroups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Crains ft Preparations 14,994 8,083 35,391 33,932 30,509 41,371 38,766
Coal ft Related Fuels 10,530 10,657 9,992 12,241 11,462 9,928 10,668
Petroleum ft Related Products 
Iron ft Steel Mill Products,
18,892 11,945 12,162 15,077 12,729 13,005 16,336
Roll ft Finished 27,578 15,114 15,087 30,026 16,854 13,361 20,547
Electrical Machinery 
Construction, Conveyer ft
35,516 16,720 17,752 22,237 33,725 30,098 33,845
Mining Equipment 26,276 11,913 18,120 48,854 51,748 30,316 38,726
Industrial Machinery ft Parts 24,477 16,800 15,285 24,276 30,640 31,629 26,277
Autos, Parts ft Accessories 
Medicinal ft Pharmaceutical
61,444 21,386 35,160 66,625 77,122 53,261 44,445
Preparations 20,705 11,463 12,179 15,969 14,148 7,132 7,807
Chemical Specialties 12,449 11,606 12,393 14,234 15,140 12,975 17,286
Textile Machinery 3,671 1,199 2,777 2,515 3,292 2,699 3,240
Agriculture Machinery ft Tractors 49,551 12,233 10,873 29,261 21,326 6,647 18,706
Industrial Chemicals 18,148 5,611 8,094 8,926 8,106 5,684 7,950
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil,” Report Bo. Foreign Trade £20, oj>. oit. 
For calendar years: 1954, p. 20; 1955, p. 20; 1956, p. zO; 1957, p. 2?; l958, p. 29;
1959, p. 29; I960, p. 31.
TABLE VIII
UNITED STATES IMPORTS PROM BRAZIL BY SUBGROUPS, 1947-1960
(In thousands of dollars)
Subgroups 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Meat Products 2,874 7,128 2,370 2,651 2,057 1,139 94
Bides & Skins, Raw, except Furs 11,579 10,255 7,498 9,242 13,672 3,696 6,394
Vegetables ft Preparations 5,071 6,347 3,315 3,690 3,370 3,143 3,122
Nuts ft Preparations 6,968 4,781 5,325 4,462 6,507 6,085 6,437
Coffee 298,300 352,600 428,800 566,400 719,900 670,700 627,900
Cocoa ft Cocoa Beans 31,800 42,200 33,100 42,400 38,100 26,900 36,800
Naval Stores, Gums ft Resins 2,039 2,408 253 701 1,081 1,202
6,667
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Oil seeds 26,530 28,894 21,063 12,889 13,031 3,258
Vegetable Oils, Waxes, Inedible 21,994 18,014 19,928 30,577 42,773 29,614 28,272
Vegetable Fibers ft Manufactures 1,037 3,814 1,918 7,241 16,883 8,843 2,473
Ferroalloy Ores ft Metals 3,727 3,458 4,164 4,164 3,542 10,317 14,455
Iron Ore ft Concentrates 
Medicinal ft Pharmaceutical
422 2,355 4,635 8,963 14,932 6,386
Preparations 3,017 2,811 2,579 1,525 3,819 2,552 894
a
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil," Report No. Foreign Trade 120, United
States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption. For calendar years: 1§47, p. Si 1948, p. 12 
15Wrpri2;"T95T.,"p. IT; I W T p *  12; 1957, p. 13; 1953, p. 13*
TABLE VIII (continued)
Subgroups 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Meat Products 441 1,297 947 1,073 3,833 10,906 3,158
Hides ft Skins, Raw, except Furs 
Vegetables ft Preparations
5,351 6,580 6,795 5,004 5,519 7,622 5,751
1,627 3,576
8,885
3,075 1,270 1,492 2,193 2,975
Nuts ft Preparations 4,040 7,722 6,211 6,140 6,006 8,202
Coffee 544,800 486,300 604,700 528,400 406,900 449,302 398,888
Cocoa ft Cocoa Beans 59,900 47,000 37,500 31,500 38,600 33,900 32,492
Naval Stores, Gums ft Resins 1,235 862 500 1,254 874 637 767
Oil Seeds 3,751 4,861 1,801 1,947 764 603 12
Vegetable Oils, Waxes, Inedible 21,525 19,837 18,652 25,860 22,605 22,000
4,339
15,654
Vegetable Fibers ft Manufactures 2,892 6,038 8,934 6,160 4,924 3,488
Ferroalloy Ores, ft Metals 
Medioinal ft Pharmaceutical
8,502 9,560 14,498 33,879 23,990 21,938 26,709
Preparations 1,148 1,553 2,169 2,313 3,105 2,905 3,2a
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Brazil," Report Wo. Foreign Trade 120, op. cit. 
For calendar years: 1954, p. 15; 1955, p. 15; 1956, p. 16; 1957, p. lb; 19^8, p. 16;
1959, p. 19; I960, p. 21.
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TABLE II
PRICES OP LEADING EXPORT COMMODITIES OP ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL BY COMMODITY, 1950-1960
(Yearly average In dollars)*
Commodity 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960
Coffee, Santos No. 4 .51 .54 .54 .58 .79 .57 .58 .57 .49 .38 .37
(N. Y. Snot)
Cocoa, Accra .32 .34 .36 .37 .58 .37 .27 .31 .44 .34 .29
N. Y. PP.
Beef, utility grade 
cow, all wgts.**
.37 .44 .38 .26 .25 .25 .25 .28 .38 .36 .33
Quebracho Extract, 8.32 10.28 11.50 11.50 11.57 11.70 11.70 10.00 9.90 n.a. n.a.
N. Y.**
Vool (greasy) raw, 74.60 108.80 62.30 63.70 61.70 57.10 57.20 64.70 48.00 54.30 56.80
Boston**
Corn, No. 3, yellow, 
Chicago***
1.49 1.79 1.77 1.57 1.58 1.38 1.42 1.27 1.23 1.14 n.a.
♦All figures rounded to nearest oent. **Per 100 pounds. ***Per bushel.
Source: U.S. Congress, "Commodity Problems inLatinAmarlcn. " United States and
Latin American Policies Affecting Their Economic Relations. 86th Congress, I960 
tWashington: Government Printing Office, i§60), p. 158, and "Commodity Price Trends," 
Latin American Highlights. Chase Manhattan Banfc, Fourth Quarter, 1961, p. 11.
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TABLE X
TERMS OP TRADE, UNIT VALUE OP EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
FOR ARGENTINA, 1948-1960 
(1955 - 100)
Year Terms of 
Trade
Unit Value of 
Exports
Unit Value of 
Imports
1948 143 118 82
1949 129 114 88
1950 130 104 80
1951 133 135 102
1952 105 112 107
1953 123 112 92
1954 100 98 97
1955 100 100 100
1956 90 91 100
1957 92 88 95
1958 93 83 89
1959* 94 83 90
I960* 99 91 92
"Calculated from data In "Argentina," International 
Financial Statistics, XIV (November 1961), 46-1?.
Source: United Nations, Eoonomic Commission for
Latin America, "Statistical Supplement," Eoonomic Bulletin 
for Latin America, IV (October 1959)» 80, 64*
TABLE XI
POSSIBLE EFFECT ON SELECTED UNITED STATES IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA OF A 
NON-DISCRIMINATORT SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
Estimated Increases
Present Restrictions_________  Following Suspension of
Commodities Ad Valorem Other Restrictions
Tariff Restrictions MillionsPer Cent of
Cattle and beef 9.0-17 Sanitary reg 100 or more 25 or more
Leather pocketbooks 17.5-20 50^ of import fee 100 or more 1 or more
Preserved meats 8.0 Quota 25 to 50 2 to 4
Sugar 9.0-12 Quota 50 to 100 200 to 400
Apparel, wool 25 Sub. to U.S. prod. 50 to 100 7 to 14
Canned beef 15 — 25 to 50 6 to 12
Cotton 8 Quota 25 to 50 2 to 4
Source: Louis 0. Delwart, The Future of Latin American Exports to the United
States, 1965 and 1970 (Washington: The National Flanning Association, 1*57>0J, p. 99-
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TABLE XII
BOOK VALUE OP UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENTS
IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL POR SELECTED YEARS
(In nlllions of dollars)
1946 1950 1952 1955 1957 1958 1959 1960*
Argentina
Brazil
202
323
356 393 447 
644 1,013 1,115
333
835
330
798
366
8 2 8
472
953
♦Preliminary estimates.
Source: U.S. Department of Commeroe, U.S. Invest­
ments in the Latin American Economy (Washington, 1953), 
p. 112, and U.S. department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business (Washington, 1961), p. 22.
TABLE XIII
GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL PORMATIONS 
(Per cent of G. N. P.'
Year Argentina Brazil United States
1950 23 17* 17
1953 18 13 16
1957 22 12 17
1958 21 14 16
1959 18 13 17
*Por 1951.
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (New
York, I960), pp. 471, 474; BraziTTan Embassy. Purvey of 
Brazilian Economy. 1958 (Washington, 1958), p. 1C>6;
Ibid.. I?59. p . l5;"T E l d .. I960, p. 9*
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TABLE XIV
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR ARGENTINA, BRAZIL 
AND THE UNITED STATES
(1953 - 100)
1948 1953 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960*
Argentina 31 100 132 165 217 464 590
Brazil 59 100 173 206 237 325 433
United States 90 100 102 105 108 109 110
*1960 figures from Committee for Economic Dewelop- 
ment. Cooperation for Progress in Latin America (Washington. 
I96lj,-p. 48?------------- -------------------------
Source: United Nations. Statistical Yearbook. 1960
(New York, I960), pp. 451, 456.
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TABLE XV
ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES, 1950
(Pesos per dollar)
Selling Rates
9*73 Imports classed "Preferential A"
5.37 Imports classed "Preferential B"
6.08 Imports classed as essential
12.53 Permitted non-essential Imports
Buying Rates
3.86 Basio exports
4.83 Exports classed "Preferential A"
5.73 Exports classed "Preferential B"
7.20 Speelal export list
Free Rate Financial remittances
Source: "Argentina," International Financial
StatiBtios. International Monetary Vund/XXt ^°* 1958,
p. 39*
The following are some of the items included in the 
various import categories in Table XV:
1. Preferential A— coal, fuel oil, crude petroleum.
2. Class B— coffee, bananas, rubber, soft woods, 
newsprint, industrial ohemloals.
3. Essential imports— machine parts, yerba mate.
4. Non-essentials— all items not enumerated under 
the categories above.
For export sales which represented the buying rates, 
the description is as follows:
1. Basic exports— beef, mutton, grains, linseed.
2. Preferential A— pork, raw hides, sheepskins, 
greasy and washed wool.
3. Preferential B— combed wool, textile piece goods, 
dairy products.
4. Special exports— tanned leather, leather manu­
factures, fresh fruit.
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TABLE XVI
ARGENTINE IMPORT SURCHARGES, 1959
List One— fuels, principal metals, rubber, news­
print, Industrial maohinery and motors of a type not manu­
factured In Argentina— no surcharge.
List Two— industrial raw materials, drugs, iron and 
steel bare, tin plate, wood pulp, bond paper and paper for 
plates— 20 per cent.
List Three— semi-processed articles, lumber and 
chemical products— 40 per cent.
List Pour— spare parts, tires and tools— 100 per
cent.
List Five— luxuries and musical instruments— 150 per
cent.
List Six— industrial maohines and motors like those 
produced in Argentina— 150 per cent.
List Seren— these items had not been published at 
the time of this writing but items in this category will 
carry a 200 per cent tax.
Source: "Argentina," Exohamte Restrictions. Eleventh
Annual Report, International Monetary #und, I960, p. 25.
TABLE XVII
ARGENTINA'S GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS, 1945-1949
(In millions of dollars)
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
Gold 1,197 1,072 332 142 216
Foreign Exchange 466 624 749 666 566
Total 1,663 1,696 1,071 809 782
Source: "Argentina," International Financial Sta-
tistics. International Monetary Fund. Il (December 1949). 
1B119.
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960*
TABLE XVIII
SUMMARY OP ARGENTINA’S BALANCE OP PAYMENTS, 1946-1960
(In millions of dollars)
 Transp. A Investment Other Private
p p Insurance Income Services Donations
1,371 -1,480 231 -451 -60 29
1,614 -1,585 74 - 82 -51 —
1,407 -1,491 50 - 8 -40 —
934 -1,073 33 - 10 -22 —
1,167 -1,045 18 - 3 -24 —
1,178 -1,442 31 - 28 -13 —
709 -1,196 61 - 5 -33 —
1,148 - 862 37 - 7 -42 —
1,161 -1,075 44 - 15 9 1
929 -1,173 41 - 21 -14 -3
944 -1 , 1 2 8 62 - 16 9 -2
975 -1,310 47 - 13 — -2
994 -1,233 33 - 31 -19 -3
1,009 - 993 34 - 40 4 -3
1,079 -1,249 55 - 57 - 7 -7
H
VJl
TABLE XVIII (continued)
Year Current Account Balance
Private
Capital
Official A 
Banking Cap. 
Long Term
Net Errors A 
Omissions
Surplus or 
Deficits
1946 -360 -329 -773 - 75 -1» 537
1947 • 3° - 40 -112 -113 - 2951948 - 82 6 —428 187 - 317
1949 -138 39 - 3 65 - 37
1950 113 47 — - 74 86
1951 -274 146 88 21 - 19
1952 -464 68 5 17 - 74
1953 274 46 3 31 354
1954 124 15 - 10 - 99 - 10
1955 -241 31 - 14 34 190
1956 -131 201 67 - 70 167
1957 -303 61 -133 103 - 272
1958 -259 - 12 62 2 - 207
1959 11 55 - 11 17 72
I960* -186 366 -175 4 9
*1960 data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis­
tics, XVI (February 1963), 44.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1952,
V, 2; 1955. VIII, 23; 1959. XII, 2.
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TABLE XII
ARGENTINA'S HOLDINGS OP GOLD AND 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE, 1951-1960 
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Gold
Holdings 267 287 372 372 372 224 126 60 56 104
Foreign
Exchange 253 133 160 152 85 158 160 70 293 554
Total 520 420 532 524 457 382 286 130 349 658
Sourcs: United Nations, Statistical Offlos, Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics (October I960), p. 174. I960 data,
Tbi'd”  M a F l S S F r  p. T 6 6 .
$
TABLE IX
INDEX NUMBERS 0? ARGENTINA'S INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1951-1960
(1953 = IOC)
1951 1952 1953 195* 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1 9 6 0 #
General 108 101 100 108 118 117 121 125 111 116
Mining 89 93 100 105 110 114 125 13 2 159 217
Manufacturing 110 1 0 2 100 1 0 8 1 1 8 117 121 126 110 1 1 2
Electricity A Gas 92 95 100 108 115 123 124 114 114 113
♦"Argentina," Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. Statistical Office of the 
United Nations, New York, May 1962, p.T6.
Source: "Argentina," Mohthly Bulletin of Statistics, Statistical Office of
the United Nations, New York, Ociober i9 6 0 , p.”?0.
TABLE XII
INDEX NUMBERS OF THE OUTPUT OF THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE IN SELECTED
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(1945 =
AND THE
100)
UNITED STATES
Year Argentina Brazil Mexico Colombia Chile Uruguay United States
1946 104 108 103 104 101 113 106
1947 106 109 104 107 105 104 107
1946 108 113 114 106 108 113 121
1949 93 117 118 115 109 126 121
1950 92 121 133 104 104 130 130
1951 95 119 131 111 102 148 131
1952 81 125 123 119 103 144 139
1953 105 124 131 119 105 152 143
1954 103 127 149 117 110 163 146
1955 108 139 156 120 112 158 147
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Produc­
tivity of Labor and Land in Latin American Agriculture," Economic Survey for Latin 
America. 1956 (New York, 1957)t P* 171.
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TABLE XXII
BRAZILIAN IMPORT CATEGORIES UNDER 1953 FOREIGN EXCHANGE LAW
Group
Category I 
Category II 
Category III 
Category IV
Category V
Principal Commodities
Agriculture supplies.
Ores, scrap metal and raw materials. 
Wood, industrial machinery and vehicles, 
Office machinery, fresh fruits and some 
consumer goods.
Commodities not included in the first 
four categories.
Source: "Brazil,*1 International Financial Statistics,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, April 195^1 p . 36.
TABLE XXIII
BRAZILIAN EXPORT CURRENCY CATEGORIES UNDER 1957 LAW
(Cruzeiros per dollar)
Curr.no? Groupings Conmoditi.s
Convertible All Other ------------
37.06 35.55 Coffee
43*06 41.31 Cotton, cocoa, hides, skins
55.00 52.77 Most other raw material exports
67.00 64.28 All other exports
Source: "Brazil," International Financial Statistics,
International Monetary Fund, November 19^7, p. 58.
TABLE XXIV
BRAZILIAN EXCHANGE RATES, NOVEMBER I960 
(Cruzeiros per dollar)
General
228.92
228.92
228.92
228.92
Category
Special
634.92
620.93 
632.34 
635.42
Source: "Brazil," International Financial Statistics.
International Monetary Fund, January 1961, p. 6$.
TABLE XXV
BRAZIL'S TERMS OF TRADE, UNIT VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 
QUANTUM OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1948-1960
(1955 = 100)
Year Terms of Trade
Unit Value of Quantum of Capacity 
to ImportExports Imports Exports Imports
1948 66 65 98 126 88 83
1949 64 63 98 122 88 78
1950 113 94 84 100 101 113
1951 113 115 102 108 152 121
1952 102 109 107 91 144 93
1953 114 109 96 99 105 113
1954 131 125 96 88 130 115
1955 100 100 100 100 100 100
1956 100 96 96 108 98 108
1957 104 99 95 99 120 103
1958 101 92 91 95 114 96
1959 86 74 86 121 122 104
I960* 80 75 85* 119 n.a. n.a.
♦Calculated from data in "Brazil," International Financial Statistics, XIV
No. 11, pp. 66-67.
Source: Naciones Unidas, Boletin Economico de America Latina, VI (Novi- 
embre 1961), 74, 76, 77 for 1959 and 1750; Ibl'd, V TTTovIemEre I960), 42, 43; 
United Nations, "Statistical Supplement," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
IV (October 1959), 80, 84.
TABLE XXVI
SUMMARY OF BRAZIL'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1946-1960
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
  Current Account_______  __ n+i__
y.ar ¥i*anan & Investment Other Private
Iear Exports Imports TnaTirannft Income Services Donations
1946*
1947 1,157 -1,029 -160 - 55 - 61 -18
1948 1,182 - 905 -166 -105 - 44 - 8
1949 1,103 - 947 -110 -102 - 59 - 3
1950 1,358 - 934 -219 -110 - 79 - 3
1951 1,770 -1,702 -261 -156 -119 - 3
1952 1,416 -1,702 -232 -121 - 69 - 4
1953 1,539 -1,111 -137 -126 - 90 -17
1954 1,558 -1,410 -150 -136 - 91 - 7
1955 1,419 -1,099 -142 -117 - 88 -11
1956 1,483 -1,046 -127 -140 -150 -16
1957 1,392 -1,285 -123 -126 -143 -17
1958 1,244 -1,179 -108 -108 -113 - 9
1959 1,282 -1,210 - 96 -150 -166 -10
I960 1,209 -1,293 -110 -194 -210 -13
*Not available.
noro
TABLE XXVI (continued)
Year OfficialDonations
Current
Account
Balance
Private
Capital
Public
Capital
Errors 4 
Omissions
Surplus or 
Deficit
1946*
1947 -6 -172 129 - 37 - 58 -138
1948 1 - 45 121 -125 14 - 35
1949 1 -117 59 -120 110 - 71
1950 1 104 - 82 - 60 - 16 - 54
1951 1 -470 75 - 18 122 -291
1952 2 -710 653 2 - 49 -104
1953 3 - 61 -363 302 22 17
1954 2 -234 75 223 18 82
1955 3 - 25 90 124 33 212
1956 4 8 246 - 57 - 54 143
1957 5 -297 352 - 91 -140 -176
1958 6 -267 231 107 -211 -140
1959 8 -342 212 - 32 5 -157
I960 8 -603 194 n.a. - 13 n.a.
*Rot available.
Source: "Brazil," International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook,
Vol. V, p. 2; Vol. VIII, p. 23; Vol. XII, p. 2. Data for“TTOT Trom ^BrazilT* 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, XVI (February 1963), 
65.
ro
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